VISIT…

The sexy, witty and often bizarre novels, poetry and dialogues of the first centuries of this era (works such as Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Cleitophon* and Plutarch's *Amatorius*) were being composed at the same time as fundamental ideas about the body, gender and sexuality were being set in place with the rise of Christianity and the Church to dominate the pagan world. Modern writers on the history of sexuality have largely ignored this literature in favour of prose treatises, philosophy and Christian homilies. Simon Goldhill, writing with the same wit and verve as the ancient writers he engages with, sets out to put these texts back into the history of sexuality. The result is a dazzling celebration of sex and sexuality in the Greek literature of the first centuries CE.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars in many fields: it is a lively and readable contribution to literary criticism, classical studies and the history of the novel; to the discourse of sexuality and gender studies; and to early Christian studies and theology. All Greek is translated.

THE W. B. STANFORD MEMORIAL LECTURES

Foucault's Virginity

THE W. B. STANFORD MEMORIAL LECTURES

This lecture series was established by public subscription, to honour the memory of William Bedell Stanford, Regius Professor of Greek in Trinity College, Dublin, from 1940 to 1980, and Chancellor of the University of Dublin from 1982 to 1984.

FOUCAULT'S VIRGINITY

Ancient erotic fiction and the history of sexuality

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PREFACE

'Male lions don't desire male lions, because lions don't do philosophy.'

If wonder is the beginning of intellectual enquiry, it is wonder and laughter that has prompted the essays in this book. My opening quotation comes from a late Greek text that sets up a debate on whether it is better to desire boys or to desire women; it's a claim from a wonderful and erotically charged demonstration that male desire for males is the only true choice for a philosopher.[1] The three essays that make up this volume are all concerned with Greek writing from later antiquity about desire, *eros*. In particular, the erotic narratives of the novel tradition form the main body of the material to be discussed; and the development of a normative discourse about desire provides the questions on which I focus: what the proper nature of desire is, how it is to be written about, how it is to be controlled and patrolled. My overriding concern (thus) is with the interplays between desire's narratives and the normative.

While most of the texts I shall be considering show the wit, verve and outrageousness of the period known as the Second Sophistic, it must not be forgotten that at the same time there is taking place one of the most important transformations in Western cultural attitudes to sexuality and the body, a transformation inevitably associated primarily with the rise of Christianity. At about the same time as the author of the *Erotes* was using lions to prove the natural connection between philosophy and desiring boys, Augustine was arguing that even if a female body had been penetrated and violated by an *obstetrix*, 'a female midwife', 'whether by testing, malevolence, inexperience or chance', surely only the *integritas* and not the *sanctitas* of the girl's body had been damaged.[2] Defining the

mutually implicative categories of *integritas* (wholeness, integrity, being untouched), and *sanctitas* (holiness, purity, untouchability), is a fundamental labour of Christian homiletics on desire and the body. Part of the importance of the works I shall be discussing comes simply from the teleology – set firmly on the agenda by Michel Foucault, Peter Brown and others – that sees later antiquity as the time when a crucial modern inheritance was formulated. My key texts – humorous, oblique, baroque – play an integral role in this intense and passionately contested development.

There are three contemporary debates to which I hope these essays will make a contribution. The first and most straightforward contribution is to literary criticism and classical studies, which have largely ignored both the central and the marginal texts of the following chapters. It is surprising how often one reads about the rise of the novel in the Western tradition without encountering not merely the name of Heliodorus, the widest read of Greek novelists from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century, but also any recognition of the ancient novel at all. Although Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, now the most famous of the novels and the focus of my first chapter, has in recent years begun to receive some of the attention it deserves – the chapter can thus be shorter than the others – there has been little discussion either of *Leucippe and Cleitophon*, Achilles Tatius' masterpiece, or of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* (despite its huge influence in the Renaissance), or of Plutarch's *Amatorius*, or of the epigrams, or of the prose homilies that all find a place in what follows; none has been admitted to the canon with regularity or relish. Only part of the blame for this can be laid at the doors of the Victorians, who found the sexy, violent and sophisticated writing of the novels inappropriate for Classical Study. Or as it was put by an academic in Cambridge, objecting not so long ago to their inclusion in the Tripos: 'Just Not Greek'. The novels certainly aren't Thucydides ... It's customary to begin a book that stars the Greek novels with a lament or an apology, followed by plot summaries. I will just say that I hope what I have written will turn more readers towards the pleasures of a remarkable and underappreciated corpus.

The second debate which informs these essays is the contemporary interest in the history of sexuality, or more precisely in the history of the discourse of sexuality. There is not much in these

essays about what people did to or with each other: the historiographical problems for such a project in such a period are well known. My focus is on what gets written about desire – and this discussion may help show some of the ways in which the lures and tropes of narrative, the stories told about desire, are an intrinsic element in the formation of a culture's negotiation of sexuality. Surprisingly and in striking contrast with, say, the literature of the classical city or the poetry of Republican Rome, the Greek writing I discuss has only rarely been allowed to have a voice in the history of sexuality. I hope to show not only that it has been wrongly silenced, but also that what it has to say may make a telling contribution to the general question of how desire is (to be) written about. The writers I discuss are nearly all male writers and my concern (thus) is primarily with the multiform constructions of male sexuality. The middle chapter is in all senses central: the first chapter's concern with violence, innocence and the construction of norms through reading about desire, and the third chapter's concern with the representation of females as objects of male desire, frame the discussion of male desire for males. The aim of this book is to explore how the male desiring subject is articulated within and across such a variegated range of interlocking fields, disciplines, writings, questions.

The third area of debate is signalled by my title and is a subset of the previous two, namely, the specific and influential contribution to both classical studies and the history of sexuality made by Michel Foucault. His final books, *The History of Sexuality*, vols. 2 and 3, with their strongly articulated overall view of a vast period, coupled with sets of readings of often obscure texts, set out to do for later Greek and Roman writing (as well as earlier texts) what Peter Brown has achieved for the Christian apologists and polemicists. Foucault's work has been deeply influential and profoundly provocative – with great cause. A recent critic has commented, however, that there hasn't been much criticism of these later volumes, except, she adds somewhat sniffily, for occasional classicists complaining of Foucault's inaccuracies of interpretation (as if mere (mis)reading was unimportant when there are Big Ideas to be discussed).[3] She herself goes on to analyse Foucault's concept of the self and sexuality with barely a reference to the texts from which his conceptualization is developed. This is paradigmatic, it seems, of a difficulty in maintain-

ing the balance between an engagement with the sweep of Foucault's vision, and an engagement with the series of individual readings from which that sweeping vision is formulated. I will in my classicist hat sometimes point to places where systematic misreading seems to me to be more than usually debilitating to an argument. But my major interest, most explicitly articulated in the second and third chapters, is with how Foucault (and certain Foucauldians) have discussed the formation of a sexual discourse, its boundaries, negotiations and contestations. It is not by chance, I shall argue, that it is the *narratives* of the novels (and works like Plutarch's *Amatorius*) that are treated most inadequately by Foucault. The engagement required by these allusive, ironic, and highly self-reflexive texts produces not only problematic history, but also a problematizing frame for the homiletic texts with which Foucault is most concerned.

Much as Foucault is necessarily part of the history he describes, so too I am acutely conscious of the necessary implication of a critic in such a subject, not least when I examine the problematic status of claims to truth and authority, to be the teacher who knows, the *erotodidaskalos*, in ancient and modern discussions of desire, and the complicities involved in reading and writing about desire. Who could escape with *integritas* and/or *sanctitas* untouched from such debates? Even the constant questions of such self-consciousness – what Hegel calls the 'labour of the negative' – cannot conceal that to speak about desire is to speak from a position of (some) authority (even or especially when contesting the certainty of authorization). It is in the full sense of the phrase that I wish this book to be seen as a *contribution to* an ongoing, contemporary debate. An opening for further discussions. Amid the vulnerabilities of (intellectual, social, sexual) self-positioning, the rhetorical stance of the distanced, objective, unimplicated commentator on such material is simply an untenable claim. The question is, how is engagement to be negotiated?

The chapters that follow are essays, and make no pretence to a fullness of coverage, nor have I tried to provide the lengthy bibliography that classicists like. I have included the Greek of most passages discussed, however, because few people will have ready access to all the relevant texts. They are put at the bottom of the page to be easily ignorable by non-Greek readers, who are an intended

readership. The three chapters look at virginity and the complicity of reading erotic narratives; male desire for males, and how irony and comedy affect the normative nature of erotic narrative and arguments about desire; the representation of the female and female desire in male arguments about the properness and control of desire. The three topics are clearly interrelated not least in their consideration of how the normative emerges from, is inscribed in, and is manipulated by erotic narrative.

I was first asked to speak about the novel by Jim Tatum for the International Conference on the Ancient Novel at Dartmouth, and I owe thanks to him and the other participants at that superb congregation for their educative responses to what has now after many years become chapter 1. These three essays owe their present form, however, to the invitation of Professor John Dillon on behalf of the Faculty of Classics at Trinity College, Dublin, to give the Stanford Memorial Lectures, which were delivered in 1993 under the title 'Ravishing Bodies and Penetrating Arguments'. For the kind hospitality of all the department and the audiences in Dublin much thanks. Thanks too go to the Department of Classics at Cambridge which granted me sabbatical leave during which the lectures were prepared and given. In turning the lectures into essays, and the essays into a book, I have been helped by discussions with many friends and colleagues: Carol Gilligan and Judith Butler kept me focused on the general issues; the Cambridge ancient fiction *équipe* were particularly helpful, especially Richard Hunter and Helen Lakka, who read and annotated; Froma Zeitlin read and debated much of this during her time in Cambridge (and still is debating); Malcolm Schofield, Jonathan Walters, Kate Cooper, Geoffrey Lloyd read greater or lesser parts with care and assistance; John Henderson, as ever, read, commented, and supported through it all.

I dedicate this book with love to Sarah Rebecca Goldhill, for hugs and kisses, while it was being thought about, sketched and typed.

1

Virginity and Going the Whole Hog: Violence and the Protocols of Desire

> I've been the whole hog plenty of times. Sometimes ... you can be happy ... and not go the whole hog. Now and again ... you can be happy ... without going any hog.
>
> H. Pinter, *The Homecoming*

Imagine a symposium of young women, not of men; held not at a rich citizen's celebration of a theatrical success but in a paradise garden of soft trees and gentle breezes. Imagine this symposium led not by the ironic and satyric Socrates, but by Thecla, the tortured companion of St Paul. Imagine the *Symposium* committed not to praising desire, but to praising virginity: 'For exceeding great, awesome and worthy is Virginity.' This *Symposium* is the work of Methodius, a third-century Christian from the Aegean coast of Turkey: an eleven-book account not of 'the god, Desire', but of how 'virginity with but a bare change of letters is divinity', (*parthenia/ partheia*).[1] This little-read homily may stand as an icon for the major concerns of this and subsequent chapters, though the writings I will be mobilizing in general will be of quite a different order of righteousness, their symposiums less relentlessly sober.

First of all, the fetish of virginity for both men and women becomes through the course of later antiquity a key sign of what Peter Brown has called a 'change in the perception of the body itself'.[2] It is not merely that 'asceticism was in the air', a topic to be traced 'in medical ... philosophical and religious terms',[3] but that the relationship between the body and the self, between the self and the world, between the self and others, particularly the divine other,

is being reforged. The connection between 'integritas' and 'sanctitas', as Augustine would put it, or between citizenship and penetration, as Foucault would put it, becomes a battleground of definition. The Greek novels which form the central texts of this study, stem from this selfsame world of conflict and demonstrate the same obsession with virginity. Although, as we will see, the relations between the novels and the society in which they were written are extremely hard to trace even in outline, their passion for chastity cannot be seen merely as a literary *topos* (despite the evident influence of New Comedy's constant staging of rape and the anxiety of virginity[4]), or as a sign of The Romance (despite the earliest novels' already fertile interest in bodily integrity). In later antiquity, virginity was a hot topic.

Secondly, Methodius' rewriting of a Platonic literary and philosophical form is testimony to the deep ambivalence that Christian intellectuals display towards the inheritance of classical culture – St Jerome says he had a terrifying nightmare in which he was flagellated before the gates of heaven for his continuing love of pagan texts: 'Ciceronianus es, non Christianus', thunders the judge, 'You are Ciceronian not Christian.'[5] Methodius needs and embraces what he is translating and appropriating. On the one hand, this Christian in Asia Minor writing in Greek, using a model of some six hundred years earlier from a different and still powerful intellectual tradition, thus bears witness to the mingling of cultural influences in the Roman empire, that so strikingly transforms the normative articulations of self and other which are so familiar from the classical polis. (And the novels regularly transport their heroes and heroines in a grand cultural tour around the Mediterranean from Persian court to Alexandrian art gallery to Ethiopian mystery rituals ...) On the other hand, Methodius' active redrafting of Plato emphasizes the pull of the past in the very claims of the newness of his testament. The novels are similarly aware of their belated position within literary tradition. The Second Sophistic – the conventional name of the period (*circa* 50–250 CE) in which the Greek novels seem to have been written[6] – is so called precisely because it promotes a revival of the 'sophistic' attitudes, forms and language of the classical polis. This sense of the weight of the past is seen not merely in the settings of novels in the past – the fifth-century BCE world of Thucydides,

say, in the case of Chariton, the earliest extant novelist – but also and most importantly in the allusive layering of language and narrative. This is nowhere more evident than in *Daphnis and Chloe*, whose pastoral fiction displays and transforms the language of Theocritus, comedy, Plato, Sappho, Homer ...[7] As with Methodius' religious tract, the significance of the erotic narratives I shall be discussing is formulated in and against a lengthy tradition of writing about desire and sexuality.

Methodius' praise of virginity has a didactic import. Indeed, while Methodius' work replays the form of Plato's dialogues by having the symposium of women relayed by a certain Gregorion to a certain Euboulion[8] (both female), it also returns at the end of the dialogue to the framing scene (unlike Plato's work) so that Gregorion and Euboulion can finally discuss and underline the conclusion to be drawn from the speeches (as if trying to avoid the openness so carefully cultivated by Plato). Where Plato famously inscribes himself as absent from the dialogue around Socrates' death-bed ('Plato was ill ...'), Gregorion in an authorizing gesture tells us in the final pages that Methodius, absent inevitably from the maidens' symposium, none the less learnt precisely what has just been recounted from the hostess of the symposium herself (293). How desire is (to be) taught is a repeated concern of this book: what is the strategic place of erotic narrative in the discourse of desire and how is it to be negotiated? Although the use of prose narratives to construct a telling lesson is a fundamental part of Christian tradition with the gospels, the martyr acts, and the saints' lives (as it is of the Jewish tradition of Midrash), for Peter Brown and Michel Foucault it is primarily the homiletic texts of philosophy and theology that offer a view of the policed world of sexual relations. The novels, however, not merely adopt and adapt the language of teaching and the structures of didacticism for their erotic narratives, but also in the very production of 'histoires d'amour' constitute a (normative) site of engagement for the readers' understanding of how desire works. My discussion of erotic narrative is to explore what is telling about desire. Whose story is being laid out when you read a love story?

A central term in this erotic discourse is *sophrosune*, which is regularly translated as 'self-control', 'chastity', 'temperance', 'con-

tinence'. This polyvalent expression of proper attitudes has a long and recently much-discussed history.[9] For the classical city, it implies a political, moral and sexual control over the destabilizing forces of desire (for sex, food, drink, power . . .). So particularly for the female subject, *sophrosune* is associated with a chastity that is indicative of a female's proper place within the patriarchal household and the polis. For the ancient moralists it becomes the defining characteristic of the proper role of the citizen. For Methodius' Marcella it is paradigmatically a sexual continence, a control of desire, that is but a step towards the commitment to virginity: in the proper order of things the move should be made by Christians from a resistance to transgression 'to *sophrosune* and from *sophrosune* to virginity, from where, by learning to despise the flesh, they fearlessly reach a haven in the calm waters of incorruptibility' (1.18). As we will see, the link between *sophrosune*, sexual corruption and sexual purity is repeatedly made in the novel, though without necessarily rehearsing the passage towards the blissful harbours of religious purity that Methodius' Marcella requires. The realignment of the care for the flesh that is characteristic of later antiquity brings with it a realignment and a new contestation of the senses of *sophrosune*, an ideological matrix in which the novel also plays a significant role.

Methodius' Gregorion and Euboulion end by agreeing ('Aye, by *Sophrosune*!') that it is 'better to maintain virginity without experiencing desire than to be able to control one's desire' (*Epilogue* 293). The onset, control and negotiation of desire between a young male and a young female, both as yet untouched by sexual contact, is the motivating force of the plotting of the best-known novel, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*. Indeed, so untainted are the young shepherd and shepherdess, Daphnis and Chloe, that they are represented as knowing nothing at all about desire, not even the name or word, Eros. It is this novel of the invention or discovery of desire that will provide the focus of this first chapter. Where Christian apologetics are so concerned with man's fall from an innocent state in the garden (and in some radical cases with a hope to destroy this fallen world by a militant abstention from the lures of the flesh), *Daphnis and Chloe* (which, it had better be said, shows no knowledge not merely of Christianity but also, it seems, even of Roman culture) establishes a

quite different fiction of innocence – a pastoral landscape, an enchanting prose style, rich in sophisticated naivety, and a world where pirates are undone by a shepherdess's pipe, and a ruined flower garden is a most violent scene of destruction.

Yet this fiction of innocence which informs *Daphnis and Chloe* is manipulated so knowingly, so scandalously even, that the novel's status as founding text in the history of pastoral romance has provoked in the modern era a startling range of response – from wry amusement at the series of misprisions that constitutes literary tradition, through admiration for its 'sober portrait of naivety', to disgust at what Rohde famously called 'the revolting, hypocritical sophistication' of the work.[10] The fiction of the natural, innocent state of the protagonists, Daphnis and Chloe, produces a narrative of ignorance and education focused on what Tony Tanner, following Lacan, terms 'The Whence of Desire' – which Tanner glosses grandly as 'necessarily a central topic of all literature'.[11] If the history of the novel is a history of the 'complex, devious and diverse manifestations' of 'the diffuse genesis of desire',[12] *Daphnis and Chloe*, at the outset of that tradition, offers the representation of an erotic relationship which does not even know the word 'desire', so that the genesis of desire in nature – in all senses of the phrase – may be held up to view and reflection. That Daphnis and Chloe find themselves performing a series of actions fully recognized in the ancient world as the highly conventional gestures of socialized courtship, inevitably raises a set of questions about the natural and the conventional in desire. When on the one hand Daphnis and Chloe know naturally to pelt each other with apples – that most conventional behaviour of the ancient wooing shepherd; and when on the other hand Daphnis and Chloe have to be taught that most natural of acts, sexual intercourse – and it takes four books and several types of lesson to complete the education – the boundaries of what is natural and what is conventional with regard to desire are provocatively problematized. (And as many sets of quotation marks as is thought fit can be placed around my uses of the terms 'natural', 'conventional' 'knows' etc.) As Froma Zeitlin has recently written of the erotic entanglements of Daphnis and Chloe: 'conventions are rooted in nature – or is it the other way round? – that nature (or more accurately our perceptions of it) is deeply conventional'.[13]

This necessary *double-take* is played out time and again in the twists and turns of Longus' tale.

It is the proem of the work, however, that first establishes the relationship between the erotic text and *sophrosune* as being of particular importance. The narrator, while hunting (an activity often associated as a practice and an image system with amorous pursuit) on Lesbos (an island whose tradition of erotic poetry is celebrated and much echoed in the novel), visits a grove (a locus of often surprising erotic encounters away from the city) sacred to the Nymphs (the sponsors and tutelary spirits of (particularly pastoral) desire). There, he views a painting, dedicated to the Nymphs, of a Love Story (*tuchen erotiken*). The painting, he observes, is 'more pleasurable' (*terpnoteron*) even than the lovely scene of the grove – a characteristically sophistic evaluation of art (*techne*) over and against unadorned nature. As the narrator observes with wonder the scenes of the painting, which he describes as *panta erotika*, 'all the love-story stuff', a 'longing' (*pothos*) comes over him to rival the art of painting in the art of prose (*antigrapsai tēi graphēi*). Seeing erotic art produces longing, here to compete in artistic production: Longus playfully manipulates not merely the association of painting and writing that goes back at least and most famously to the dictum of Simonides ('painting is silent poetry, poetry painting that speaks'), but also the specifically Hellenistic accounts of the feelings stimulated by erotic fictions/paintings, together with the equally Hellenistic sense of generic, agonistic interplay and artistic competition.[14] With the help of an interpreter of the image, he thus offers the four books of *Daphnis and Chloe* as a 'dedication to Eros, the Nymphs, and Pan' and as a 'a pleasurable possession (*ktēma terpnon*) for all mankind'. Thucydides famously called his History a *ktēma es aei*, 'a possession for all time'. Longus' allusion to the historian here is not merely to set up a wryly self-deprecating or ironically grandiose association of the novel with the grandest and most austere of classical prose works, but also to place emphasis on the adjective, *terpnon*, 'pleasurable'. This thoroughly un-Thucydidean aim of pleasure[15] marks a rhetorical self-positioning with regard to what is a 'focal point for historiographical dispute throughout the Hellenistic period'[16] – the theoretical opposition between the 'pleasurable' (and 'the mythic') on the one hand, and 'the useful' (and the

researched) on the other. It also, however, recalls the lure of Gorgias' sophistic rhetoric (who declares programmatically that there is no pleasure (*terpsis*) in telling people who know, what they know); and Gorgias in turn recalls the Homeric 'pleasure' in poetry, a scene of delight which also provokes the Platonic attacks on the ability of rhetoric and poetry *merely* to pleasure its audience.[17] *Terpnon*, in other words, points towards the contested relations of (im)proper pleasure between a text and an audience. The term *terpnon* here, then, picks up the 'pleasure' of the picture in the promise of the 'pleasure' of the novel itself, but it also looks forward, as we will see, both to its repeated use in the narrative of Daphnis' search for sexual knowledge (where the pleasurable and the useful overlap . . .), and also and directly, in its provocative sense of how a work of literature might affect its audience, to the concluding lines of the proem, which I give here in Thornley's translation, as redrafted by Edmonds in the Loeb edition:

and a delightful possession even for all men. For this will cure him that is sick, and rouse him that is in the dumps; one that has loved, it will remember of it; one that has not, it will instruct. For there was never any yet that wholly could escape love, and never shall there be, never so long as beauty shall be, never so long as eyes can see. But help me that God to write the passions of others; and while I write, keep me in my own right wits.*

'All men' are subcategorized according to their experience of desire, and the book's effects are listed according to those experiences of desire. The novel is offered first as a panacea for the sickness and depression of desire – the common trope of love as malady; second, the tale promotes knowledge, reminding one who has experienced desire, and the 'one that has not [experienced desire] it will instruct' – the proclaimed didacticism of this erotic narrative. The reason why (*gar*) 'all men' are categorized according to desire, however, is that desire afflicts all men: 'no-one has escaped or will escape desire'. This will be the case 'as long as beauty exists and eyes see'. As the narrator has been prompted to write by a view of what is beautiful, so, as long as eyes by seeing prove the source of desire

* κτῆμα δὲ τερπνὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὃ καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται καὶ λυπούμενον παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα παιδεύσει. πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς Ἔρωτα ἔφυγεν ἢ φεύξεται, μέχρι ἂν κάλλος ᾖ καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ βλέπωσιν. ἡμῖν δὲ ὁ θεὸς παράσχοι σωφρονοῦσι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων γράφειν.

(and we will discuss how this is worked out for Chloe shortly), desire will be ineluctable. Everyone is subject to desire, and this narrative tells of the education of Daphnis and Chloe in part at least to be educational with regard to desire. This claim of a propaideutic function, however, leads directly in the final sentence of the proem to a prophylactic prayer. The author hopes to keep his writing free of the desire that threatens self-control. He prays for *sophrosune* ... As the pleasure of the beautiful picture prompted 'longing' in him, and as he offers the text as a 'pleasurable possession', so now he hopes to write of others' affairs without losing his cool. Writing about desire has its risks ... The self-awareness of the dangers of self-implication here seems particularly instructive (as teachers and critics of this teaching manual – will, may, should – have found out). As the proem after its generalizations about all men moves for the first time into the first person plural, one question raised is to what degree and in what ways the prophylactic prayer of the author for self-control is programmatic for us readers of this educational text. How do self-control and self-awareness or self-implication interact in this didactic text of (innocents) learning about desire?

To explore this sense of (self-)control over the fictions of desire I will turn first to two especially relevant scenes, namely, the onset of desire in Chloe, and the scene in which Daphnis is taught by a married woman about penetrative sexual intercourse. In both cases, I will be concerned to analyse how the narrative's display of innocence together with its claims to teach on the one hand, and its worry about *sophrosune* on the other, work to implicate the reader in a particularly telling dynamic of self-control and pleasure. From these two paradigmatic scenes of desire, education and erotics, I will move to engage explicitly with one of the most adept blendings of Foucauldian theory and classical scholarship, namely, Jack Winkler's *The Constraints of Desire*, a book which has made it harder than ever to treat the novels' treatments of sexuality simply as trivial entertainment or light humour. Indeed, this book's discussion of *Daphnis and Chloe* establishes a remarkable account not merely of what the lesson taught by this erotic fiction is, but also of the relation between the pleasures of the text and the politics of reading. As this radical exegete and translator analyses in particular the role of the exegetes of desire within the novel, the question of what it is

to read and write (of) desire will emerge in a particular and striking form – as I attempt to trace how the history of the discourse of desire is informed by the dynamics of reading erotic narrative. How does writing about Longus' narrative of desire become enmeshed in the strategies of self-control and the lures of self-implication?

Let me set the first scene in a context. *Eros*, desire, says the narrator, enflames the young couple by the following device (1.11). Daphnis has fallen into an animal trap and been rescued (1.12); Chloe helps wash him clean (1.13). She has been much taken by the delicacy of his flesh and by the impression his beauty makes on her. She sees him play the pipes and thinks it must be his playing that produces the impression of attractiveness that she feels. We pick up the story as she tries a control experiment – by getting him to wash again and to be touched by her again to test her response (1.13):

> Then she asked him if he would come again to the bath, and when she persuaded him, watched him at it; and as she watched, put out her hand and touched him; and before she went home had praised his beauty, and that praise was the beginning of love.* Edmonds/Thornley

This time of washing, then, she praises him – *epainesasa* – and, the narrator concludes, this praise was the 'beginning of desire', the *erotos arche*. Since this is the most explicit statement of 'the whence of desire', I want to dwell very briefly on this phrase and I have two points I wish to make. The first is this. In terms of the expected narratives of desire that Longus so carefully manipulates in this novel,[18] the origin of desire is a well-known problem. 'Tell me, Moon, whence came my desire' is the refrain of Simaetha's lament in Theocritus' famous second *Idyll*, for example; and the parentage of the god of desire is, precisely, a standard question of debate at least since Plato's *Symposium*.[19] The usual moment of the onset of desire is sight. (So the desire to write the novel comes from seeing a picture, and desire, in the proem, is said to be inescapable 'so long as eyes can see'.) Lust at first sight is a *topos* of erotic experience in Greek poetry. Particularly the sight of a naked youth. Now, Chloe has, of course, spent many days with Daphnis, so it is not exactly 'first sight' that counts here, so much as the moment of viewing at the

* ἔπεισε δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ λούσασθαι πάλιν καὶ λουόμενον εἶδε καὶ ἰδουσα ἥψατο, καὶ ἀπῆλθε πάλιν ἐπαινέσασα, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος ἦν ἔρωτος ἀρχή.

bath itself. It is when he stands in the spring and washes that 'it seemed to Chloe as she viewed him that Daphnis was beautiful'.* As Odysseus rises from the bath beautified by the goddess Athene to be an object of amazement to Nausicaa or Penelope, so here for the observing, gazing[20] girl it is only now from the bath that Daphnis seems *kalos*: the echo of the archetypal inscription of a Greek male's wonder or boast of triumph – *kalos ho pais* – points towards an attack of *eros*, as the text refuses recognition of such an attack to the girl. Indeed, 'because he did not seem beautiful before, she thought that the bath was the source (*aition*) of the beauty'. The narrator, with his ironic twist of the Homeric narrative of beautification by bathing, sets the 'literary awareness' of the sophisticated reader against the 'innocent feelings' of the girl in the pursuit of an explanation of glamorous beauty. Chloe goes further than Nausicaa, however. For she washes Daphnis, and is much taken by the softness of his skin, as her other senses are gradually involved: 'So she secretly touched herself often, testing to see if she were more delicate.'† Longus with a recession of voyeuristic representation offers to the reader's view the beautiful girl touching herself as she watches the beautiful boy washing ... From this scene, Chloe suffers one effect: the wish (*epithumein*) to see Daphnis washing again. The word *eros* again does not occur as Chloe's feelings are described as a wish, or appetite (*epithumein* is often opposed to *eran* in the moralists, as 'appetite/lust' to 'love / higher feeling'). The next day as they pasture their flocks, Daphnis plays his pipes. Chloe again looks at him attentively (*heōra*) and listens (as her hearing joins her sight and touch) and again *edokei kalos*, 'he seemed beautiful', and this time she thinks that the 'music-making was the cause (*aitian*) of his beauty'. In Greek culture, even in Plato's Utopias, the training in nobility – in how to be a *kalos kagathos*, a 'gentleman' – always included music, dance and poetry. As with the wry treatment of Homeric beautification, however, any association between 'music' and being *kalos* is here reduced to the misprision of the shepherdess' aetiology. It is after these synaesthetic perceptions of beauty that the sight of the naked body and the touching of the delicate flesh are carefully rehearsed and repeated at Chloe's request.

* ἐδοκεῖ τῇ Χλόῃ θεωμένῃ καλὸς ὁ Δάφνις.

† ὥστε λαθοῦσα ἑαυτῆς ἥψατο πολλάκις, εἰ τρυφερωτέρα εἴη πειρωμένη.

This second scene prompts her to praise Daphnis and it is the moment of praise that is said to be the 'beginning of desire'. After the slow-motion engagement of Chloe's recognition of beauty and the rehearsed scenarios of gazing, washing and touching, moments charged with erotic import by the expectations of the standard Greek narratives of desire, 'desire', *eros*, is finally said to come about as it becomes part of a discourse, a language. Longus' text has withheld the term *eros* for the moment of praise, as the climax of the discovery of Love: Chloe's search for an aetiology of her changed feelings receives the name the culturally conditioned reader has been long expecting only when she turns to that most culturally conditioned of activities, praise. If Longus' fiction is concerned with the natural state of desire, it is, then, fascinating – surprising, titillating – that desire is said to begin with the act of praise, a highly socialized, articulated form of language.

The second point I wish to make, however, is to note that the connection of 'praise' and 'desire' has a long history in Greek culture. Plato's *Phaedrus* takes its impetus from Lysias' speech about why a boy should go for a man who professes *no* desire for him – a wonderfully sophistic version of how to praise a loved one. The discussion of Plato's *Symposium* is set up as 'praise of Desire'; his *Lysis* also mobilizes an ironic account of the act of praise.[21] When Chloe repeats the narrator's accounts of her feelings and says (1.14 see below) *kalos ho Daphnis*, 'Daphnis is beautiful', she mirrors the inscriptions of countless vases from the ancient world. Finding the correct words of praise is a standard and much discussed part of the lover's behaviour. We will see in the next chapter a particularly fine extended version of the advice on seduction from an *erotodidaskalos*, a 'teacher of desire', in the figure of Cleinias in Achilles Tatius. There, to praise a young girl is seen as a route towards inculcating desire in her. Here, however, praise is said to be the very onset of desire (in the one who praises). Longus, then, has brought together two terms integral to the Greek erotic tradition, but in a way which poses something of a question for the whence of desire: *praise* is the beginning of *eros*? Longus' carefully constructed explicit conclusion of where desire begins is designed also to provoke the reader's understanding.

Chloe, however, is so innocent that she does not even know the

word 'desire'; but, none the less, the symptoms that she begins to experience follow the classic symptomology of desire back to Sappho (1.13):

What her passion was she knew not, for she was but a young girl, and bred up among clowns, and as for love, had never so much as heard the name of it. But her heart was vexed within her, her eyes whether she would or no, wandered hither and thither, and her speaking was ever Daphnis this and Daphnis that. She could neither eat nor take her rest; she neglected her flock; now she would laugh and now would weep, now would be sleeping and then again up and doing; and if her cheek was pale, in a twink it was flaming red. In sum, no heifer stung with a breese was so resty and changeable as the poor Chloe.* (Thornley/Edmonds)

The torment, the instability, the neglect of normal duties, the loss of control (*kratos*) over her eyes, and over her tongue (*elalei*, 'she constantly chattered') are the symptoms of desire as a loss of self-control, honoured by long literary tradition. The naturalness, the inevitability, of convention is strongly stressed here. Eros arrives with a train of culturally conditioned expectations. And indeed Chloe turns to do what a girl stricken by desire always does on her own: a monologue (1.13–14):

And one day when she was alone she made such lamentation as this: 'I am sick now, but of what disease? I know not, save that I feel pain and there is no wound. I mourn, though none of my sheep is dead. I burn, and here I sit in the deepest shade. How many the briers have torn me, and I have not wept! How many the bees have stung me, and I have not squeaked! But this that pricks my heart is worse to bear than any of those. Daphnis is fair, but so are the flowers; and fair the sound of his pipe, but so is the voice of the nightingales: and yet I care nothing for those. Would to God I might have been his pipe that his mouth might inspirit me, or a goat that he might be my keeper!'† (Thornley/Edmonds)

* ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἔπασχε οὐκ ᾔδει νέα κόρη καὶ ἐν ἀγροικίᾳ τεθραμμένη καὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀκούσασα τὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνομα. ἄση δε αὐτῆς εἶχε τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οὐκ ἐκράτει καὶ πολλὰ ἐλάλει Δάφνιν· τρόφης ἠμέλει, νύκτωρ ἠγρύπνει, τῆς ἀγέλης κατεφρόνει· νῦν ἐγέλα, νῦν ἔκλαεν· εἶτα ἐκάθευδεν, εἶτα ἀνεπήδα· ὠχρία τὸ πρόσωπον, ἐρυθήματι αὖθις ἐφλέγετο· οὐδὲ βοὸς οἴστρῳ πληγείσης τοσαῦτα ἔργα.

† ἐπῆλθόν ποτε αὐτῇ καὶ τοιοίδε λόγοι μόνῃ γενομένῃ· "Νῦν ἐγὼ νοσῶ μέν, τί δὲ ἡ νόσος ἀγνοῶ· ἀλγῶ, καὶ ἕλκος οὐκ ἔστι μοι. λυποῦμαι, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν προβάτων ἀπόλωλέ μοι· κάομαι, καὶ ἐν σκιᾷ τοσαύτῃ κάθημαι. πόσοι βάτοι με πολλάκις ἥμυξαν, καὶ οὐκ ἔκλαυσα· πόσαι μέλιτται κέντρα ἐνῆκαν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκραγον. τουτὶ δὲ τὸ νύττον μου τὴν καρδίαν πάντων ἐκείνων πικρότερον. καλὸς ὁ Δάφνις, καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄνθη· καλὸν ἡ

Her speech, in a highly ornate, antithetical style, runs through the familiar metaphorical range of erotic symptoms – burning, wounds, stinging pain – in each case defamiliarized by the novelty of her innocent use of the terms as direct expressions of her distress. Where the natural world of plants and animals is often used to frame love poetry, here it is designed to provide a limit to the scope of her experience: grief is the loss of a sheep, pain the pricking of thorns or a bee's sting. Indeed, whereas misrecognition of the symptoms of love(-sickness) is itself a *topos*,[22] Chloe's extreme of ignorance – of the very word, *eros* – ironically exaggerates and literalizes the dynamics of the conceit. So too Chloe's attempt to explain the effect on her of Daphnis as opposed to the effect on her of the natural world – 'Daphnis is *kalos* but so too are the flowers; his syrinx sounds *kalos*, but so too do the nightingales'[23] – is a typical example of the way in which the naivety of the young lovers is framed by the urbane wit and sophisticated generic expectation of this narrative: the whence of desire is both the explicit question of the monologue, and amusingly undercut both by the ignorance of the very word 'desire' and by the less than grand comparison with the birds and the flowers. The amusement at least in part stems from the distance, the superiority of the reader and the innocent pastoral frame: the *reductio* of the question of desire's origin to a search from complete ignorance. (And every reader who can read the passage – and thus knows the word 'desire' – is inevitably placed in a position of some superiority to, some greater experience than, Chloe.) So Zeitlin writes: 'The pleasures of the text are thereby doubled as the reader is asked to view through two lenses, that of the naive child and that of the sophisticated voyeur who is permitted to participate in both domains of perception.'[24] What, then, of the final two prayers? 'Would that I had been born his pipe that he might blow me! Would that I had been born a goat that I might be grazed by him!' (to offer a more literal translation than Thornley's). Here we move into a different register. The conceit whereby a lover wishes to become a particular everyday object for more or less explicitly salacious purposes is a common enough *jeu d'esprit* of Hellenistic and later poetry.[25] Yet the combination of Chloe's extreme innocence with

σύριγξ αὐτοῦ φθέγγεται, καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἀηδόνες· ἀλλ' ἐκείνων οὐδείς μοι λόγος. εἴθε αὐτοῦ σύριγξ ἐγενόμην, ἵν' ἐμπνέῃ μοι· εἴθε αἴξ, ἵν' ὑπ' ἐκείνου νέμωμαι . . ."

such salaciousness provides a fine example of the logic of the *double entendre*: just how smutty a remark do you think Chloe is making? How dirty is her response to cleaning Daphnis? Just how far is the image of blowing a pipe or the associations of grazing, goats, and shepherds to be pressed? The complementary and incremental pleasures that Zeitlin sees in playing the 'naive child' and playing 'the sophisticated voyeur' become here a more complex, adulterated pleasure, as the language of naivety incites the voyeur towards a recognition of the complicity required in the fiction of innocence. If the framing of Chloe's naivety composes the reader as an amused and superior observer of an unsharable innocence, the *double entendre* turns that unsharable innocence against the reader's composed, distanced observation. With how much self-control, *sophrosune*, can – should – a reading of these prayers proceed? Is recognition of these lines' 'revolting, hypocritical sophistication' more than a confession of a reading very far from the ideals of *sophrosune*? How stained, how dirtied, is the reader by an inability to read innocence innocently? Longus' establishment and then manipulation of the possibilities of extreme naivety manipulates also the reader's self-positioning. Puts the reader in the frame.

There is one tradition of writing about comedy in ancient Greek that helps focus the dynamics of the humour of this passage. For despite – or perhaps because of – the many genres of obscene and violent writing in ancient Greek culture, the threat that the pleasures of improper laughter pose to self-control is a continuing concern of ancient Greek moralists. The question of what is tasteful, acceptable, proper humour becomes a question for the Greek moralists not merely because of the moralists' general concern with social interaction, but also and in particular because of a strong connection made in Greek writing of all periods between laughter and violence. 'It is', writes Stephen Halliwell, 'because of what Greek thought widely regards as an intrinsic ambiguity or, perhaps better, volatility in its nature, that laughter becomes a subject of significant social, ethical and aesthetic evaluation.'[26] Halliwell, in his attempt to construct what might be called a sociology of Greek laughter, sets up an antithesis between the playful laughter of the relaxed gathering, on the one hand, with its characteristics of social ease and a vocabulary of inconsequentiality (*paizein*, *paignia*, 'play', 'games'), and, on the

other, what he calls 'consequential laughter', with its associations of *hubris*, malice, and social disorder. This contrast is readily exemplified in the commonly expressed and validated pleasure in laughing at an enemy – 'derision from one's enemies ... is a stock and powerful fear in this culture'[27] – and in the equally prevalent assumption that 'playful laughter is something one can only fully enjoy with friends'[28] – as laughter is repeatedly formulated as a strongly marked force in the articulation of that most basic opposition of Greek social thought and practice, *philia* and *echthos*, 'friendship' and 'enmity'. The volatility and ambiguity of laughter, argues Halliwell, stems, however, not just from the perceived force of laughter within this system, but also and perhaps most importantly from the uncertain boundaries between these poles, where one man's jest can become another man's sense of outrage. So in the famous fourth-century law-case argued by Demosthenes against Conon (Dem. 54), where Ariston, the plaintif, argues that he has been assaulted by Conon, Ariston points out he could charge Conon not merely with *aikia*, 'physical assault', but also with the more serious charge of *hubris*, 'violent assault with intent to humiliate', because – in part at least – of the laughter and scorn with which the attacker mistreated his victim. Conon will, suggests Ariston, represent the events as *gelōta kai skōmmata*, 'jokes and pranks' – the expected if unappreciated behaviour of young men, particularly after a symposium. The judges had to decide 'whether this was a case of contemptuous aggression arising from the pursuit of shameful and socially dangerous enmity, or merely an instance of exuberant and innocent horseplay'.[29] The case against Conon articulates a relation between violence and laughter as an intrinsic element in the social positioning of the elite male.

While the law-case formalizes and emphasizes the potential for contest in the definition of the laughable, the negotiation of the boundary of the (im)proper is always and inevitably at stake in (the disruptions of) laughter.[30] ('Le rire, prodocteur d'écart, permet de mieux négocier avec le réel.'[31]) Halliwell describes this (re-) negotiation as 'a kind of perpetual tension between the spirit of celebratory, playful release and the forces of derisive antagonism, a tension which is handled by the shaping and constraining functions of both ethical attitudes and specific social practices.'[32] Thus the

symposium as an institution, with its constant risk of misregulated humour between ever competitive men, requires careful control, or so advice from the poetry of Theognis to the philosophy of Plato enjoins.[33] Aristophanes with his Philocleon in the *Wasps* stages a marvellous account of the violence that erupts by allowing 'rustic humour' into the sympotic company of the elegant, as 'poor taste' jokes turn finally to physical violence. The invasion of the improper here is displayed for the delight of the city: the ritual civic space of comedy, as so often, represents the deregulation of an analogous civic space for the licensed pleasure of transgression. In the law court too, Gorgias' claim that one should destroy one's enemies' seriousness with laughter, and one's enemies' laughter with seriousness, is developed theoretically by Aristotle and in practice, as it would seem, by Aeschines, say, who in a particularly telling passage recalls (*In Tim.* 80) how when Timarchus, a politician accused of having been a male prostitute, spoke in the Assembly he reduced the audience to gales of laughter by his unwitting *double entendres* about his own sexual behaviour. What is more, when the council of the Areopagus appeared before the people (*In Tim.* 81–5) and the aptly named Autolycus spoke on behalf of Timarchus, again a series of *double entendres* reduced the people to uproarious laughter. When the people are censured for their shameless lack of control, they reply, according to Aeschines, (84) 'We know we should not laugh ... but truth is so strong that it prevails (*epikratein*) over human reasoning.' The lack of control in laughter is ironically attributed to the mastery of truth over reason. The recollection of misplaced laughter knowingly both repeats the humiliation of the victim of scorn and fences itself with a claim of the seriousness of its account. The speaker in the public forums of debate where men contest, utilizes both the aggression of the laughter of derision and the complicity of such laughter to manipulate an audience's perception of the standing, the social positioning, of the antagonists – and risks the dangers of being branded hubristic or flippant in the very provocation of laughter. The law court, like the comic theatre, stages the political violence of laughter in the citizens' contests of status.

Although the greater part of the social, ethical and aesthetic evaluation of laughter is focused on its force in such public arenas,

and on the 'consequential' power of malicious laughter, there is a further concern in the moralists that develops in part out of the place of laughter at the symposium, and that is most relevant to Longus' writing. For the relations between the (im)propriety of laughter and the boundaries of the self also prompt a debate that focuses on the *sophrosune* of the philosophically trained citizen. If self-control is the aim of philosophical *askesis*, what place for the irruptions of laughter? In the *Republic* (3 388e), Plato, with typically regulatory zeal, proposes that in his state no worthy person, let alone a god, would ever be represented as being overcome by laughter, which would be a failure of the self-control expected of his paradigmatic figures. The first two books of Plato's *Laws*, however, perhaps provide the founding document in that Plato's lengthy discussion aims to defend the educational value of the symposium and its wine-drinking from a theoretical perspective. (In the *Symposium*, Aristophanes in particular with his sneezing, hiccoughing 'uncontrolled' body and the laughter he provokes provides a striking commentary on these theoretical positions.) Although this debate, typically for Plato, places leisure under the auspices of the order of the city and the training of the citizen, it does not explicitly consider the place of jesting/joking (beyond the definition of 'play', *paidia*, as 'harmless pleasure' (667e) – and there are very few pleasures that escape Platonic regulation. *Harmless Platonic Pleasure*?!). Aristotle, however, writing in part at least in response to this Platonic discussion, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* analyses the place of the joke in social life and its effects on the subject, or rather the *eleutheros*, 'free', 'liberal citizen', that is, the citizen gentleman. From Aristotle comes not merely the continuing philosophical interest in *to geloion*, 'the laughable',[34] but also its connection with rhetorical theory. In books 3 and 4 of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle lists and discusses the virtues – *sophrosune* itself is analysed and praised at length as the prime quality of the desired 'middle road' at the end of book 3 – and he places his whole discussion under the general rubric of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' actions, a categorical distinction which leads to great emphasis on the process of 'choice' (*prohaeresis*), a privileged term that also links Aristotle's ethical theory to his literary theory in, say, the *Poetics*. Now, laughing and causing laughter are social events that are difficult, it might be thought, to fit

comfortably into the definition of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' (as Bergson and Freud differently suggest), and indeed Aristotle's argument demonstrates a telling discomfort. The importance of Aristotle's account for the rhetorical and philosophical analyses of the 'serious' and the 'comic' has often been noted, but his discussion, as he attempts to place 'joking' within his framework of 'choice' and 'control', needs more careful attention than it has been given.

Aristotle has been analysing the virtues of the *eleutheros*, which I shall translate as 'gentleman' for the purposes of this discussion, when he turns at 4.8 (1128a) to consider relaxation in company. There are for relaxed times too, he says, standards of good taste and propriety both in what is to be said and what is to be heard. According to his doctrine of the mean he proposes that those who go to excess in matters of 'the laughable' are *bōmolochoi*, 'buffoons', whose constant desire to raise a laugh ignores propriety in speech (*to legein euschēmona*) and hurts a listener (Halliwell's 'consequential' laughter). Similarly, those who never laugh are boorish and harsh. Those who know how to be playful with good taste (*emmelōs paizein*), however, are *eutrapeloi*, 'well-turned'/'witty'. This is the desired middle way. There are, he continues from this typically Aristotelian formal position of a polarity of excesses mediated by the golden middle way, many opportunities for humour, and most people like joking more than they should, so that even some *bōmolochoi* are called *eutrapeloi*. This despite the fact that, 'as has been said', the witty man and the buffoon are quite different. So how is the difference to be defined and maintained? The middle and proper position is distinguished by 'tact', *epidexiotēs*. The 'tactful man' says and hears 'what is suitable for a decent gentleman'.* The definitional process has now become fully tautological. The gentleman will show tact; and tact is ... that which befits the gentleman. Aristotle tries again by adducing the example of old and new comedy. Old comedy was distinguished by its *aischrologia*, 'obscenity', new comedy by its *huponoia*, 'suggestiveness' – 'no small difference in propriety'. So, he concludes, 'can we define proper joking as speaking what is not unfit for a gentleman (*eleutheros*), or as not grieving the listener, or even as pleasing him?' This question, however, with its apparent

* οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει.

move forward in the definition of suitable laughter is immediately followed by another that questions the first: 'Or is it impossible to define anything quite like this?' The great systemizer hesitates before the necessarily subjective in judging comic effect ('One thing is hateful or pleasant to one person, another to another'). He tries somewhat half-heartedly a further legalistic attempt at definition: 'Perhaps', he suggests, 'some jokes, like some forms of personal abuse, ought to be banned by law'. (So at *Politics* 7.15.7 1336b, he declares that *aischrologia*, 'indecent talk', ought to be banned by law, because 'from light talk about anything indecent there soon comes action'.) But finally he concludes that for the gentleman it is a case of self-regulation: a gentleman is 'like a law for himself'.[1] If you do not already know what it is to be an *eleutheros*, this passage will barely help as it slides from tautology to tautology with suggested and withdrawn definitions. The uneasiness of Aristotle's discussion of relaxation is marked: it is fitting that his most famous definition of a witticism is the paradoxical and witty phrase *pepaideumene hubris*, 'educated outrage', 'cultivated abuse' (*Rhet.* 2.12.16 1389b), an expression that lets sound both senses of the root *paid-*, 'childish fun'/'education'. The worry of humour is that it may involve an inevitable *hubris* which requires a more than usually tricky engagement of that prime Aristotelian quality, 'self-regulation'.

Plutarch, writing further along the tradition of the debate on comedy, rehearses many of Aristotle's strategic difficulties in his discussion of convivial talk. 'If you cannot tell a joke at the proper time with discretion and skill, you must avoid joking altogether', he warns (*Quaest. Conv.* 2.1 630c). He tries with examples to prove that not merely can a joke (*skōmma*) be more hurtful than an insult (*loidoria*), but also that the joke of a witty man is more hurtful than that of a fool because you know that 'there is artifice added to the insult'.† For 'the joke seems a calculated insulting . . .'‡ A paragraph that begins with the distinction between the (witty) joke and the (unseemly) insult, seems now to argue that the joke of the sophisticated man (*asteios*) by its very sophistication appears to be an 'insulting'. For Plutarch, to laugh and take pleasure in a rude joke

* οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ.
† δόλος τῷ ὕβρίσματι πρόσεστιν.
‡ δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημα δεδογμένον . . .

(2.1 631a) is to be just like someone who confirms the slander of the joke. Indeed, 'the joker inopportunely imbues (*prosanapimplēsi*) those present with bad habits, since they join in his pleasure and insolence (*hubris*). A joke infects the company of men.

There is, then, within the Greek intellectual tradition that stretches from Plato to Plutarch (and deeply influences Latin writing[35]) a particular worry not merely about the threatening violence of laughter (which is scarcely applicable to Longus' humour), but also about the propriety of humour, its balance of *aischrologia* and *huponoia*, 'obscenity', and 'suggestiveness', and how such humour can challenge the self-control of the individual and the group. 'The *sophron* keeps a middle course . . . and does not generally take pleasure in what he should not', writes Aristotle programmatically (3.11 1119a); that 'generally' finds a particularly testing case in the destabilization of self-control and pleasure at the scene of laughter. Incitement to the pleasures of laughter needs regulating. So the story is recounted by Diogenes Laertius (3.26) that Plato, the arch-regulator, when young 'never laughed' (a story which by the time of John Chrysostom has become attached to Christ – and provides another locus for the debate about Christ's human incarnation, and a source of a medieval debate that Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose* famously draws on[36]). And, finally, Clement of Alexandria, with a characteristic twist, denounces laughter as (*Paid.* 3.4.29) 'the prelude to fornication'. It is within such a classical tradition that Longus pitches his proem's programmatic remarks, and it is with such boundaries of a gentleman's 'self-regulation' his humour flirts in its manipulation of obscenity and suggestiveness. As Longus' narrative represents scenes of the collapse of control and propriety in terms that rehearse the standard evaluative discourse of *sophrosune* – as in the case of, say, the comically 'uncontrolled' Gnathon, whom I will discuss in the next chapter, or of Dorcon and his attempted rape of Chloe – so Longus' sly incitement enmeshes and provokes the reader's *sophrosune* in the uneasy calculations and transgressions of proper pleasure, proper laughter.

The second passage I wish to consider bears directly on the theme of education and desire in that it is the scene of Daphnis' loss of virginity – his 'cozening' by Lycainion, as Thornley puts it. As we

will see, it is again a passage where the manipulation of the reader is marked, and crucial to the effect of the writing. By the beginning of book 2, Daphnis and Chloe are locked in mutual desire, but because of their ignorance of what to do, have not consummated their passion. They have been for 'counselling' to an old man called Philetas (the name of a famous pastoral and erotic poet of the generation before Theocritus[37]). He has told them about the winged boy, Eros, and his bow and arrows, a story which delights them, and finally he has had some specific advice (2.7): 'There is no cure for desire, no drink, no food, no spell in song, apart from a kiss, an embrace, and lying down together with naked bodies.'* The failing search for a *pharmakon* for desire is a *topos* of Hellenistic poetry, and Theocritus, the pastoral master, begins one of his most famous poems (*Idyll* 11) with the declaration that 'there is no *pharmakon* for desire, no salve, no ointment, other than the Muses'. Here, the pastoral Philetas seems to echo this poem, only to dismiss the powers of song in his third rejected cure, and to propose what might seem a more straightforward solution to the problem of desire. Yet this advice too – like so many *pharmaka* for *eros* – turns out to be double-edged. For while Daphnis and Chloe are willing if shy to follow through his advice – 'it's cold, but we'll bear it, as Philetas did' (2.8) – when they finally do lie down together in an attempt to assuage their feelings, 'they lay a long time as if tied together, but because they knew nothing of what happens next, they thought this was the limit of sexual satisfaction (*erotike apolausis*), and after wasting most of the day thus, went away' (2.11). The literalism of the young lovers' reading of Philetas' knowing expression turns his advice into a lure for their innocence. The text which offers itself as a didactic work to the person who has not experienced *eros* stages not only a scene of failed erotic instruction, but also a failure that depends on the failing of the unknowing pupils' understanding.

The failure to proceed beyond the literal enactment of Philetas' instructions produces considerable frustration. Daphnis even proposes that they should do 'what the rams and ewes do' since that seems to result in 'a sweet labour that overcomes the bitterness of *eros*' (3.14). This attempt to learn from nature (which I shall discuss

* ἔρωτος γὰρ οὐδὲν φάρμακον, οὐ πινόμενον, οὐκ ἐσθιόμενον, οὐκ ἐν ᾠδαῖς λεγόμενον, ὅτι μὴ φίλημα καὶ περιβολὴ καὶ συγκατακλιθῆναι γυμνοῖς σώμασι

further in the next chapter) is dismissed by Chloe, who points out that sheep don't lie down to do it, and are much shaggier than her even with her clothes on, and Philetas explicitly had said 'naked and lying down'. Once again, the combination of innocence and a literal understanding of the veiled language of sexuality constructs a misrecognition for the amusement of the (sophisticated) reader. ('The banished of Eden had to put on metaphors': Meredith.) This ignorance of the mechanics of sexuality is not an explicit concern of Greek writing elsewhere, however, especially for the male, even in the very rare cases where male abstinence is an issue. In modern Western literature, particularly in novels of 'coming of age', the transition from innocence to experience is often troped as a move from sexual ignorance/fantasy/fear at a physical level to sexual knowledge/acceptance – 'going/knowing all the way'; and, as Stephen Heath points out, the most recent deformation of this model involves a shift towards the physical discovery of the (true) orgasm ('the big O') as narrative climax (a self-conscious answer to the use of marriage as climax in earlier fiction).[38] While sexual manuals seem to have existed in antiquity,[39] and the physiology of sexual reproduction remained a central topic of medical disagreement, 'virginity' is a term inapplicable to men in earlier Greek culture.[40] Even Euripides' Hippolytus, the most famous sexual abstinent of classical literature, when he says his body is pure of sexual contact adds (1005–6) 'I do not know this practice except what I have heard about and seen in pictures', and boasts his soul is 'a maiden'. His transgressive withdrawal from the life of a citizen finds expression in the extraordinary description of his soul in such perverse gender-terms. But even he has read and seen ... A fragment of one of the earliest novels (*Ninus and Semiramis*), perhaps as early as 50 BCE, strikingly sets the hero's sexual restraint against the norms of society. The seventeen-year-old hero, Ninus, is suing for the hand of his beloved. He could, he points out, as a successful soldier have taken satisfaction (*apolausis*) to his fill from the conquered; in which case he might feel less longing now. But as it is, he has returned from war a man but 'uncorrupted' (*adiaphthoros*). So, he triumphantly declares, 'Clearly men of my age are ready for marriage; for how many have guarded their chastity until they are fifteen?' Ninus has a case to make here, of course, but his claim that it is hard to find a fifteen-year-old male

who hasn't experienced sex is offered as the norm to explain the outstanding achievement of reaching seventeen untouched by Aphrodite. It is against such a background that the novels' recurring interest in male sexual abstinence, including Daphnis' extreme of ignorance (and the growth of Christian treatments of virginity and chastity) should be viewed.

For Daphnis, however, help is at hand in the form of another teacher. An elderly neighbour called Chromis has married a young and beautiful woman from the city, one too delicate (*habroteron*) for rustic life.[41] This Lycainion has noticed the handsome Daphnis, and his evident affection for Chloe. Concealed, she has observed Daphnis' tears of frustration, and conceives a plan (*epi*tech*natai*) to forward her own lust (*epithumia*). She lures Daphnis to the woods on the grounds she has lost a goose and needs help there, sits him down and makes him a proposal. 'You desire Chloe', she begins (3.17), a fact she claims to have learnt from a dream of the Nymphs, and the Nymphs have instructed her 'to save him by teaching (*didaskein*) him the business of eros'. These are not 'kisses and hugging and what rams and billy-goats do', she says, recapitulating Daphnis' education so far, 'but other leapings even sweeter than those'. So, with a further stress on the language of education, she makes her offer (3.17):

> If it would be nice for you to be released from your troubles and to try out the pleasures you seek, come, then, and hand yourself over to me as a pleasurable student. I will teach you those things to gratify the Nymphs.*

If Daphnis wishes to try the pleasures, *terpnōn*, he is seeking, he should hand himself over to Lycainion as a 'pleasurable', *terpnon*, pupil. The repetition of the adjective recalls the proem's promise of pleasure from the novel's own instruction, and inevitably provokes speculation about the balance between altruism and self-interest in Lycainion's educational proposals. (And thus Longus . . .? As *pothos* lurks behind Longus' teaching, so *epithumia* informs Lycainion's didacticism.) Where the pleasure is to be located in this passage is one question to which we will return. It is, she assures him, to

* εἰ δή σοι φίλον ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν καὶ ἐν πείρᾳ γένεσθαι < τῶν > ζητουμένων τερπνῶν, ἴθι, παραδίδου μοι τερπνὸν σεαυτὸν μαθητήν· ἐγὼ δὲ χαριζομένη ταῖς Νύμφαις ἐκεῖνα διδάξω.

'gratify' the Nymphs that she will teach: *charizesthai* may be used in Greek to indicate the grace of the gods to humans and a human's reciprocal expression of thanks and duty towards divinity, but it also regularly implies *sexual* gratification, often the service of the hetaira to her client, as much as the reciprocity of lovers. Lycainion's knowing language, however, also unwittingly points to the prime movers of the plot, the Nymphs, who will bring Daphnis and Chloe together finally. If Lycainion is less innocent, more knowing than Daphnis, then her figure establishes a recession of frames – with the knowing reader evaluating the knowing Lycainion's education of the ignorant Daphnis.

Daphnis' response is immediate (3.18):

> Daphnis could not restrain himself for pleasure. Like the rustic he was (and a goatherd and young and in love), he threw himself at her feet and begged her to show him as quickly as possible the technique by which he could do to Chloe what he wanted. As if he were in truth about to be taught some great and god-sent thing, he declared he would give her a kid and soft cheeses of the new milk and the goat too.*

Longus' language is carefully and ironically layered here. The archetypal aim of the philosophically trained citizen, self-restraint before pleasure, is echoed in Daphnis' naively enthusiastic acceptance of her teaching – the mark of his being a rustic and a goatherd ... and young and in love: if being a rustic and a goatherd distances Daphnis from the reader, what of being in love and young? Daphnis begs to be taught (*didaskein*) the *techne*, the technique or art. As many critics have noted, the opposition of *techne* and *phusis*, 'nature', is a founding principle of Longus' rhetoric. Here, the term which might be expected to indicate a sophisticated *ars amatoria*, is ironically applied to the boy's more modest requirements of instruction, and at the same time indicates the fulfilment of Lycainion's erotic plan (*epi*tech*natai*). His rustic gifts (recalling, say, the Cyclops' promises to Galatea in Theocritus, *Idyll* 11) are offered 'as if he were in truth about to be taught some great and god-sent

* οὐκ ἐκαρτέρησεν ὁ Δάφνις ὕφ' ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ἅτε ἄγροικος καὶ αἰπόλος καὶ ἐρῶν καὶ νέος, πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν καταπεσὼν τὴν Λυκαίνιον ἱκέτευεν ὅτι τάχιστα διδάξαι τὴν τέχνην, δι' ἧς ὃ βούλεται δράσει Χλόην. καὶ ὥσπερ τι μέγα καὶ θεόπεμπτον ἀληθῶς μέλλων διδάσκεσθαι, καὶ ἔριφον αὐτῇ δώσειν ἀπηγγείλατο καὶ τυροὺς ἁπαλοὺς πρωτορρύτου γάλακτος καὶ τὴν αἶγα αὐτήν.

thing': this dismissal recalls both the apparent and real motivation by the Nymphs and Eros, and also, perhaps, the tradition of the discussion of the divinity of Eros from Plato onwards – where desire is indeed 'god-sent'. Daphnis' response to the offer of erotic instruction in its very naivety subtly manipulates the sophisticated expectations of erotic discourse.

Daphnis' instruction proceeds apace. 'Lycainion now that she had found a rustic simplicity beyond all her expectation, gave the lad his instruction in the following way.' And here comes the moment towards which one strand of the narrative has been leading (3.18):

She ordered him to sit as near to her as he could and to kiss her with the sort and number of kisses he was accustomed to, and as he was kissing to embrace her, and to lie on the ground. When he had sat down and kissed her and lain down, she discovered he was ready for action and erect. First she raised him from his position lying on his side; then she skilfully spread herself underneath; and led him to the road he had long sought. Then she did nothing strange. Nature itself taught what else had to be done.*

This passage has often been the subject of comment but more rarely of analysis. Zeitlin writes: 'The scene of Lycainion's education of Daphnis into the mechanics of sex is far blunter and more literal a lesson than the sweet promise of an erotic didactic work might have implied'[42] – a sweet promise, we may add, famously evoked by Thornley's knowing subtitle, 'A Most Sweet and Pleasant Pastoral Romance for Young Ladies'. Anderson is blunter than Zeitlin: 'No detail is spared', he writes.[43] No detail? Let us look more closely at the narrative's game of revealing and veiling that all too cannily mirrors the revelation to Daphnis.

At first the details do indeed mount up with a structure of repetition bordering on the explicitness of a technical manual: 'She told him to sit down and to give her the usual kisses and to embrace her and to lie on the ground. When he sat down and kissed her and lay on the ground ...' She discovers that he is ready and erect,

* ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν καθίσαι πλησίον αὐτῆς ὡς ἔχει καὶ φιλήματα φιλεῖν οἷα εἰώθει καὶ ὅσα, καὶ φιλοῦντα ἅμα περιβάλλειν καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι χαμαί. ὡς δὲ ἐκαθέσθη καὶ ἐφίλησε καὶ κατεκλίθη, μαθοῦσα εὐεργόν τε καὶ σφριγῶντα, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ πλευρὰν κατακλίσεως ἀνίστησιν, αὐτὴν δὲ ὑποστορέσασα ἐντέχνως ἐς τὴν τέως ζητουμένην ὁδὸν ἦγε. τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν οὐδὲν περιειργάζετο ξένον· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις λοιπὸν ἐπαίδευσε τὸ πρακτέον.

euergon kai sphrigōnta. She raises him from his reclining position on the ground and skilfully spreads herself underneath him – again a certain explicitness – and ... 'led him to the long sought-for road'.* As the narrative reaches the moment beyond which Daphnis has been unable to progress without explicit instruction, the description reverts to the most euphemistic expression. If it is knowledge for which you read this text, the narrative leads you down the path, but refuses – precisely – the information sought. Indeed, that amusing shift from most explicit to the most euphemistic leads to a further pair of jokes each of which has considerable implications for the thematic texture of the work. 'Then' – as we proceed down the path with Longus – 'Then she/he' – who is the subject here? – 'then she did nothing *xenon*', 'nothing strange, outlandish, foreign'. If the narrative of Chloe's desire stained the reader with an inability to read with *sophrosune*, then here the manipulation is equally implicating. What can be referred to by *ouden xenon*, 'nothing odd', in this narrative of the natural? What do you need to know to read this allusive remark knowingly? The suggestiveness of 'nothing odd' (with its implications of a series of possible odd things that might have been done) encourages the reader to join in the pastoral fantasy in an all too active fashion. Or, at very least, holds up a veil that depends on the reader's *sophrosune* for its continuing existence as a veil.

The joke of these euphemisms is pointed by the final sentence of the paragraph, which is offered as an explanation. 'For nature itself taught what had to be done.' After some three books of the young couple living in nature, observing nature, trying to imitate nature's way – all of which led to the state of dissatisfaction that Lycainion takes advantage of by teaching him the missing *techne*, the *techne* to fulfil the natural urges – it can only be with the strongest tinge of knowing irony that nature is finally said to teach what is required to be done.[44]

Once again, the play of nature and convention, ignorance and knowledge, explicitness and implicitness, works to frame the reader. The mastery of the reader's knowingness (above Lycainion, above Daphnis) – knowing what's going on – is turned to an inevitable in-

* ἐς τὴν τέως ζητουμένην ὁδὸν ἦγε.

dulgence in the 'lascivious experimentation' that so outraged Rohde, as the reader is tempted to pierce the veil of euphemism; to read through the indirectness of Longus' description of Lycainion's directions. Once again, the prayer for *sophrosune* in writing, in reading, the desires of others is most apposite. How far is the reader implicated, stained, by his knowing intrusion into the pastoral frame, the pastoral fantasy? By this turning to euphemistic veil at the turning-point of the erotic narrative, Longus' fiction of innocence catches the reader in what Felman calls 'the fiction of mastery.'[45]

The logic of Longus' strategy of implication is demonstrated in a fascinating way in two particularly influential modern versions of this passage, and their attempts to deal with Longus' shyness or slyness. Both are instructive for my argument. First, Thornley's version of 1657, and very fine it is too:

If then thou wouldst be rid of thy misery, and make an Experiment of that pleasure, and sweetnesse which you have sought, and mist so long, come on, deliver thy self to me a sweet Schollar, and I, to gratifie the Nymphs, will be thy Mistris. At this Daphnis as being a rustick Goat-herd, a Sanguin Youth, and burning in desire, could not contain himself for meer pleasure, and that Lubency that he had to be taught; but throwes himself at the foot of Lycaenium, and begs of her, That she would teach him quickly that Art, by which he should be able, as he would, to do Chloe; and he should not only accept it as a rare and brave thing sent from the gods, but for her kindnesse he would give her a young Kid, some of the finest new Cheeses; nay, besides, he promised her the dam her self. Wherefor Lycaenium now she had found the Goat-herd so willing and forward beyond her expectation, began to instruct the Lad thus – She bid him sit down as near to her as possibly he could, and that he should kisse her as close and as often as he used to kiss Chloe; and while he kist her to clip her in his arms and hugg her to him, and lye down with her upon the ground. As now he was sitting, and kissing, and lay down with her; She, when she saw him itching to be at her, lifted him up from the reclination on his side, and slipping under, not without art, directed him to her Fancie, the place so long desired and sought. Of that which happened after this, there was nothing done that was strange, nothing that was insolent: the Lady Nature and Lycaenium shewed him how to do the rest.

'I will be thy *mistris*' points precisely to the sexual connotations in *terpnon matheten*, 'sweet Schollar', as '*sanguin* youth' and '*burning* with desire', strengthen the amorous tone. But it is the move from

explicitness to indirectness that is most interesting. 'And slipping under not without art, directed him to her Fancie, the place so long desired and sought.' 'Her Fancie' is a bizarre, and as far as I have been able to discover, unparalleled turn of phrase, coyly marked as coy by its use of a capital letter.[46] Since it seems set in apposition to 'the place long desired and sought', it is possible to read it as if it were a slang term for a very physical and explicit expression. Yet it remains an arch and knowing translation exactly by the avoidance of such explicit physicality. It is, precisely, a suggestive usage. 'The Place' is, as ever, approached only in and through the displacements of language. By way of contrast, Turner's widely read and recommended Penguin translation is the most physically explicit of all at this point when he writes '[Lycainion] deftly guided him into the passage that he had been trying so long to find.' The medical term 'passage' removes any sense of the indirectness that Longus allows.[47] What is important, however, is that Thornley's term 'Fancie' not only means 'object of desire', 'whim', 'love', but also, of course, the process of (erotic) imagination that Longus and Thornley are necessarily provoking in this pastoral fantasy. The ambiguity is striking, and goes to the heart, as it were, of the problem I have been considering. (Imagine ...) For it is precisely an interplay of erotic fantasy and self-control that Longus' writing instigates, an interplay that is hard finally to control. Thornley's use of the term 'Fancie', then, neatly points to the way the reader becomes implicated in the erotic narrative.

Thornley's version of the final jokes of the paragraph, however, helps emphasize the trickiness of Longus' writing, his *techne*, by making specific additions to Longus' reticence. For, his translation of *ouden xenon* as 'nothing ... that was strange, nothing that was insolent', in the addition of the second gloss, specifies the sort of (sexual) strangeness the translator seems to wish to evoke. Finally, his translation of the final phrase, 'Nature itself taught what had to be done', for whatever reason, adds another subject: 'Lady Nature *and Lycaenium* shewed him how to do the rest.' This addition makes a less pointed joke and certainly serves to emphasize the ironic surprise of Longus' formulation.

Thornley's version is most often encountered these days in Edmonds' Loeb edition. Edmonds writes of why he chooses Thorn-

ley. Thornley 'always shows you that he has a complete grasp of the situation he is describing. He not only sees and hears, but he thinks and feels. He knows what it was like to be there.'[48] With such a charming belief in Thornley's knowing presence, it is not surprising that Edmonds says 'In my revision of Thornley's work, I set myself to alter only what was actually wrong.'[49] So what are we to make of his translation of the same passage?

'If then thou wouldst be rid of thy misery, come on, deliver thyself to me a sweet scholar, and I, to gratify the Nymphs, will be thy mistress.'

At this, Daphnis as being a rustic goatherd and a sanguine youth, could not contain himself for mere pleasure, but throws himself at the foot of Lycaenium and begs her that she would teach him that lesson quickly; and as if he were about to accept some rare and brave thing sent from the Gods, for her kindness he promised he would give her too a young kid, some of the finest beastings, nay, besides, he promised her the dam herself. Wherefore Lycaenium, now she had found a rustic simplicity beyond her expectation, gave the lad all his instruction. Iussit eum quam proxime ipsi posset sedere, necnon oscula figere qualia et quot consueverat, simul inter basiandum ruere in amplexus seseque humi reclinare. Ut ergo sedit et basiavit atque reclinato corpore iacuit, ipsa iam edocta cum ad patrandum et capacem esse et turgentem, ab reclinatione in latus facta eum erexit, seseque tum perite substernens ad viam diu quaesitam direxit; deinde nihil praeterea fecit, ipsa natura quod porro agendum restabat docente.

Thornley, without comment from Edmonds, slips gracelessly into the decent obscurity of a foreign tongue. No chance of the idle reader enjoying the lascivious experimentation and revolting hypocritical sophistication here. In trying to veil Longus' erotic narrative, Edmonds' Latin blazons forth the message: 'This is a dirty bit!' Even the preliminary instructions that have been enacted before – and in English (e.g. 2.9–11) – now are to be controlled. Is this reading with *sophrosune*? It is certainly a reading that recognizes the impossibility of an innocent reading of this scene and tries to enforce a bar to its access. It is – paradoxically – the reading that is most explicit about Longus' suggestiveness. The reading most sure of the threat of impropriety.

These two versions – from very different eras of propriety – show in a paradigmatic fashion how Longus' elegant and amusing manipulation of the knowing reader's inability to share innocence pro-

vokes a series of responses from translators, commentators and readers, each of which testify, collectively and severally, to the difficult question of *how far* to go in reading. How explicitly to understand Longus' suggestiveness; how controlled and self-controlled a reading is possible. How disgusted to be by its (im)proprieties. If the fiction of innocence establishes the question of the whence of desire, the erotic narrative establishes a question of the reader's fiction of mastery, of control and self-control. Or: to read a *double entendre* with *sophrosune* is to miss the joke. Recent advances in literary theory and gender studies have taught us to be acutely conscious of the assumptions and manipulations of a reader's position *vis-à-vis* the erotic text in particular. It is a lesson that *Daphnis and Chloe* teaches with every reading.

It is also extraordinary that Edmonds' recomposition of Thornley writes Chloe out of the negotiation: 'by which he should be able, as he would, to do Chloe',* has been transformed into 'that lesson'. ('I set myself to alter only what was actually wrong', writes Edmonds, 'but right and wrong being so often a matter of opinion, I cannot hope to have pleased all my readers' – the continuing interplay of *to terpnon*, pleas(ur)ing, and (Victorian) *sophrosune* is *one* lesson here ...) Such a redrafting of the sexual politics of this scene (a telling demonstration of the translator's rewriting of the text's writing of desire) has become especially marked since what happens to Chloe in this narrative provided the focus for a well-known and provocative essay by the late and much missed Jack Winkler, 'The education of Chloe: hidden injuries of sex'[50] – an essay which emphasizes above all the sexual politics constantly involved in interpreting *Daphnis and Chloe*, and which never allows the humour and pleasures of the text to obscure the novel's strategies of engagement with the cultural discourse of sexuality. Winkler is concerned not merely to offer a reading of the novel but also specifically to site it within a history of sexuality that is deeply informed by the model of Foucault. In particular, by focusing on the violence and power-play of penetration – that cornerstone of Foucauldian analysis of ancient sexuality – Winkler aims to uncover ways in which the novel can be seen not merely to confirm and conform to the stereotypes and

* δι' ἧς δ βούλεται δράσει Χλόην.

expectations of cultural norms, but also to pose questions to the patriarchal social order in which it is composed. The novel recognizes and holds up to the reader's recognition the violence done to women in and by male sexuality, argues Winkler; and by such a disturbing recognition of the hidden injuries of sex, the complacency of erotic norms may be challenged. This challenge is articulated through the narrative that leads Daphnis and Chloe from their state of innocence towards that most teleological of closures, the social institution of wedlock. Winkler reads this narrative as the constraining of the 'unconventional lovers' – unconventional because of their 'natural' state – by the 'protocols of desire', that is, by the 'fundamental conventions' of erotic discourse and behaviour. (Winkler uses the term 'protocols' to invoke not merely social norms as a set of rules, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the way in which such rules and conventions are redeployed in the negotiations of different social interactions.) Thus, for Winkler, the novel's move towards marriage reveals the violence and constraints of the norms of social life: *Daphnis and Chloe* is 'about the painful confrontation of unsocialized youth with the hostilities of real life ...' Thus what happens to Chloe is a painful instruction and induction into patriarchy: 'The lesson Chloe is taught is that "nature" itself (which I take to be the name for those *cultural* imparities that are usually regarded as unquestionable) seems to endorse the painful conventions of male-prominent, phallocentric society.'[51] So how does Winkler discover that lesson in this narrative? Is this what is being taught (to Daphnis, Chloe, the reader) here? Winkler's explicit methodological discussion and sensitive account of the sexual politics of violence may seem pleasantly removed from Edmonds' Victorian *sophrosune* as a response to the didacticism of the erotic narrative. Yet, as will be seen, 'We "Other Victorians"' are not so easily distinguished as exegetes of desire.

Let us trace first how Winkler uncovers his lesson on violence and sexuality. *Daphnis and Chloe* is different from the other novels (and from the history and epic it echoes) in the level of violence it represents. Where in Xenophon of Ephesus the heroine is thrown into a pit full of ravening dogs to be tortured to death, Daphnis falls into an animal trap and gets muddy. Where, in each of the other novels, violent pirates kidnap the hero, the heroine or both, and

enforce an odyssey around the Mediterranean, when Daphnis is captured he gets no more than a pipe's call from the shore, and he is rescued in a scene of rustic burlesque by the rustled cows sinking the pirate vessel. Dorcon attempts to rape Chloe, but again, pastoral burlesque and the inconsequentiality of humour are allowed to take over: he dresses in a wolf-skin and lies in wait for the girl. The dogs attack him, however, and Daphnis and Chloe help to cheer him up, unaware of the cause of his mishap (1.21). When Dorcon is finally killed by the pirates, he gives Chloe the pipe with which she rescues Daphnis, and receives a kiss in turn (1.30). Gnathon, a pederastic parasite, makes attempts on Daphnis' chastity, but he too, as we will see in the next chapter, slips in the mud as the scene turns to slapstick (4.11). Lampis, another herdsman, who has been denied Chloe's hand in marriage, destroys a garden the others have made for the Master from the town (who will turn out to be Daphnis' father). But even this desecration leads not to violent punishment, but eventually to recognition and the happy denouement of the plot. Three times significant myths of transformation, gender hostility and violent rape are told, and in one case acted out ritually by Daphnis and Chloe themselves: in book 1, Daphnis tells Chloe of Phatta, a girl who played the pipes beautifully, but when a boy lured away some of her herd by learning to play as beautifully as she, she prayed to the gods to be transformed into a bird, and became the Dove (*phatta*). In book 2, the story of Pan and Syrinx is acted out by Daphnis and Chloe and narrated by Lamo, Daphnis' foster-father. Syrinx, pursued by Pan, is turned into a reed, and thence, by Pan, who cuts her / the reeds, into the pan-pipes. In book 3, Daphnis tells Chloe a particular version of the story of Echo, where she is pulled apart by shepherds, driven mad by Pan, who is jealous of her virginity and her musical skill. Only her voice is left. These three tales have been often seen as structurally significant elements in the narrative of *Daphnis and Chloe*,[52] but the accounts of mythic dismemberment and transformation, each of which is told to the delight and pleasure (*terpnon* or a cognate is used in each case) of its audience in the text, serve to contrast the pastoral scene of the novel and its level of violence with the more bloodthirsty world of this other, more traditional mythic countryside. Winkler writes 'The children's ignorance [of what sexual violence is] should not be taken

as a model for the reader, which is in effect what those critics recommend who see the various types of violence in *D&C* as a simple rejected alternative to the blissful harmony which is Daphnis' and Chloe's "natural" birthright.'[53] 'Violence' is indeed misrecognized by the innocent lovers, and is indeed present in *Daphnis and Chloe* as a *donnée* of the sexual pursuit of females by males (and not thus a 'simple rejected alternative'), as it is in most Greek writing. But it remains crucial that in contrast to the other novels and to other contemporary and past erotic writing *Daphnis and Chloe* is distinguished by the fading of its threats of violence into burlesque, comedy and mythic distance.

Winkler, however, in his discussion of violence and gender focuses on two passages in particular, the first of which (3.19) is the chapter immediately after the passage of Daphnis' 'cozening' discussed above. As soon as the 'erotic teaching', *erotike paidagogia*, is over, Daphnis, with his 'shepherd's wit', *poimenike gnome*, is keen to run back immediately and show Chloe what he has learnt, as if, comments the narrator, he was afraid he would forget his lesson if he dallied. But Lycainion feels constrained to comment on the lesson she has taught, and offers the following warning (3.19, in Winkler's translation):

You must learn this also, Daphnis. Since I am a *gynē* (wife/woman-not-maiden) I did not suffer now. Long ago another man educated me, taking my virginity as his payment. But when Chloe wrestles with you in a bout like this, she will scream and she will cry and she will lie in a large pool of blood as if slain. You should not fear the blood, but at the time when you persuade her to offer herself to you, bring her to this place, so that even if she cries aloud, no one will hear, and even if she weeps tears, no one will see, and even if she is bloodied, she may wash herself in the spring. And remember that it was I who have made you an *anēr* (husband/man-not-boy) before Chloe.*

* ἔτι και ταῦτά σε δεῖ μαθεῖν, Δάφνι. ἐγὼ γυνὴ τυγχάνουσα πέπονθα νῦν οὐδέν. πάλαι γάρ με ταῦτα ἀνὴρ ἄλλος ἐπαίδευσε μισθὸν τὴν παρθενίαν λαβών. Χλόη δὲ συμπαλαίουσά σοι ταύτην τὴν πάλην, καὶ οἰμώξει καὶ κλαύσεται κὰν αἵματι κείσεται πολλῷ καθάπερ πεφονευμένη. ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸ αἷμα μὴ φοβήθῃς, ἀλλ' ἡνίκα ἂν πείσῃς αὐτήν σοι παρασχεῖν, ἄγαγε αὐτὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ χώριον, ἵνα κἂν βοήσῃ μηδεὶς ἀκούσῃ, κἂν δακρύσῃ μηδεὶς ἴδῃ, κἂν αἱμάχθῃ λούσηται τῇ πηγῇ. καὶ μέμνησο, ὅτι σε ἐγὼ ἄνδρα πρὸ Χλόης πεποίηκα.

Going all the way for Daphnis is not yet knowing it all. If the joke of Daphnis' fear of forgetting depends on the assumption that sex, like riding a bicycle, is unforgettable, Lycainion's comments also point out that it will not be the same with Chloe as with her. There is more to be learnt yet. Lycainion's employment of the normative terms of sexual transition is clear enough in this further lesson about the female: now she is a *gune*, woman/wife, because she has lost her *parthenia*, 'maidenhood' (an education, too); Daphnis is made a man-not-boy, *anēr*, by his education (and *she* was first). Chloe is to be made a woman by the same process. But the strongly worded warning of how Chloe will cry and weep and lie in a pool of blood (a reaction that will require him to take her to the seclusion of the woods) turns out to be an absolutely crucial piece of additional knowledge for Daphnis and the narrative, since this is the reason why Daphnis delays consummation of their love until the final paragraph of the novel. Where Lycainion and her teaching are significantly recalled (4.40, again in Winkler's translation):

> Daphnis and Chloe lay down together naked, embracing each other and kissing, awake during that night more than owls; and Daphnis did some of what Lykainion had taught him; and then Chloe for the first time learned that the things which had taken place in the woods were only the playful games of children.*

As the narrative recapitulates the transitions of sexual knowledge, from kissing to hugging to lying down naked together, when the moment to go beyond Philetas' instructions is reached, the recollection of Lycainion's teaching is explicit, and the emphasis on Chloe's new knowledge clear. So, Winkler asks, 'may we presume that Daphnis and the reader have not forgotten ... her careful description of defloration as trauma – the screams, the tears, the pool of blood?'[54] So, too, Chloe's education is by implication *not* the childish games of the woods: this final sentence is, says Winkler 'ominous'.[55] It is not the case that it is only for bad men like Dorcon, Lampis, or Gnathon, that sex and violence are integral, but also for 'the loving, protecting, and tender male': 'If he thinks about it,

* Δάφνις δὲ καὶ Χλόη γυμνοὶ συγκατακλιθέντες περιέβαλλον ἀλλήλους καὶ κατεφίλουν, ἀγρυπνήσαντες τῆς νυκτὸς ὅσον οὐδὲ γλαῦκες. καὶ ἔδρασέ τι Δάφνις ὧν αὐτὸν ἐπαίδευσε Λυκαίνιον, καὶ τότε Χλόη πρῶτον ἔμαθεν ὅτι τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης γενόμενα ἦν παιδίων παίγνια.

Daphnis must recognize that Chloe's pain is inextricable from his own desire: he has to acknowledge his own desire as, *inter alia*, a desire to hurt her.'[56] It is with this recognition in mind, argues Winkler, that the novel's attitude towards the patriarchal system in which it is composed, is to be analysed.

There is a great deal to be said about this provocative reading, and I want to begin with two points that Winkler – in his customarily scrupulous manner – makes about the parameters of his argument. Both are highly relevant to my discussion of erotic narrative. The first point concerns the figure of Lycainion. Winkler recognizes that Lycainion is no simple source: 'We must not, of course, take Lykainion's words as an authoritative revelation.' He continues, however, 'Nevertheless, the content of Lykainion's warning, even if the context shifts it into an ironic mode, is grim.'[57] We have indeed seen enough of Lycainion's tutorial practice to be cautious of taking her as simply instructive, however important she is in providing a necessary lesson for Daphnis. But can the 'content' of her remarks remain authoritatively 'grim', when the context is so ironized? Is not part of the joke precisely that Daphnis *does* take the message to heart and that *that* is a sign of pastoral innocence, his *poimenike gnome*? How serious a lesson does the humour of this erotic climax promote? One difficulty with Winkler's reading here is that it seems to ignore the pervasive imagery linking violence and penetration *throughout* Greek culture, and the pervasive imagery associating the wedding-night with violent seizure and even death. I will offer here three particularly interesting examples, from different genres, each of which has an important bearing on the issues of *Daphnis and Chloe*.

The first example is from Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*, a novel that is almost certainly later though very much in the same tradition as *Daphnis and Chloe*. I will discuss this novel further in the third chapter, but it is important to stress here that of all the novels Heliodorus' work places perhaps the strongest value on the maintenance of chastity between lovers until the holy union of marriage. The heroine, however, in between eloping and becoming embroiled in a battle, has become the object of desire of a brigand leader, who is really a nobleman, exiled by his evil brother (this *is* a *novel* . . .). The brigand leader, Thyamis, has a remarkable dream (1.18.4): he dreamt

he visited the temple of Isis at Memphis, and when he entered the shrine through the sacrifices and the crowds, the goddess herself appeared, leading the heroine by the hand. The goddess declared: 'Thyamis, I hand this maiden to you, and you shall have her and not have her; you will commit a crime and slay her; but she will not be slain.' The dream perplexes Thyamis, but, comments the narrator with characteristic interest in both the psychology of lovers and the hazards of interpretation, 'In desperation, he dragged the solution to match his own desire.' His interpretation is as follows: 'The words "you shall have her and not have her" he took to mean as a wife and not as a virgin; "you shall slay her" he guessed to be the wounds of defloration, from which Charicleia would not die.'* Although the interpretation is explicitly marked as led by the interpreter's desire, the vocabulary is itself telling. 'The wounds of defloration' declare a recognition of a violence in the transition from *parthenos* to *gune*. Indeed, Plutarch, in his dialogue on Eros, the *Amatorius*, when he is trying to find an analogy for philosophy's upsetting effect on a beginner, suggests it is like the 'wounding' that necessarily precedes pregnancy: 'wounding is the beginning of pregnancy too' (769e).† So, too, in Achilles Tatius' novel *Leucippe and Cleitophon* – a text much taken with images of the female body, violently penetrated – the heroine's overwrought mother describes her daughter's supposed loss of virginity as having her body 'cut up', 'a cut crueller than the dagger's' (2.24). Heliodorus' dream interpreter is drawing on a common analogy in his interpretation of defloration as a wounding and a slaughter that does not kill. Lycainion's language, then, is perhaps a slightly exaggerated version of a standard set of terms to image the act of penetration.

My second example is an epigram that shows in its brief compass both the complex manipulations of the language of bodily violence that surround ancient sexuality, and the specific interest in the death of a virgin and the marriage-night itself. It tells of the death of one Petal, who died a virgin, but in this case because of fear of the wedding-night (Antiphanes 3 G–P):

* τὸ μὲν γὰρ "ἕξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις" γυναῖκα καὶ οὐκέτι παρθένον ὑπετίθετο, τὸ δὲ "φονεύσεις" τὰς παρθενίους τρώσεις εἴκαζεν, ὑφ' ὧν οὐκ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τὴν Χαρίκλειαν.

† ἕλκωσις δὲ καὶ κυήσεως ἀρχή.

At the doors of the ill-fated chamber of Petal, bride of sorrow,
There stood not Hymen but Hades.
As she fled in terror, alone through the darkness, away from
Aphrodite's first yoking – a shared fear of maidens –
She was killed by the pitiless, house-guarding dogs. Our hope was
To see a wife; suddenly we had not even a corpse.*

The poem both states and relies on 'the protocols of desire'. It deploys a set of standard motifs: the fear of virgins; the death of a virgin imaged as taking Hades as husband; the violence of the wedding-night; the woman who flees; the bestial outside animals, who, instead of guarding the house, destroy its hope;[58] the worry of penetration, leading to the dismemberment of the body, so that the moment of transition does not merely confuse the *telos* of marriage and the *telos* of death, but also violently distorts the standard idea of the wedding-night as a specifically *bodily* transformation. Whatever the tone of this hard-to-read poem – and the only comment I have found on it is the grotesquely insufficient remarks of Gow and Page that 'This macabre and silly variation on a common theme ... is neatly and picturesquely phrased'[59] – it mobilizes the same set of terms as Lycainion in her manipulation of Daphnis' concern for Chloe. Where the worry of Daphnis is for the pain and bleeding of Chloe's transition from 'virgin' to 'woman/wife', this poem in its final line ('not *even* a corpse') contemplates and displays for the reader's pleasure the raw and complete consumption of the female body.

My third passage is from a different discursive practice, medicine. It comes from Soranus, and is probably slightly earlier than Longus (*Gyn.* 1.16):

In virgins the vagina is depressed and narrower [than in other women], because it has folds that are held by vessels originating in the uterus; and at

* δυσμοίρων θαλάμων ἐπὶ παστάσιν οὐχ 'Υμέναιος
ἀλλ' 'Αίδης ἔστη πικρογάμου Πετάλης·
δείματι γὰρ μούνην πρωτόζυγα Κύπριν ἀν' ὄρφνην.
φεύγουσαν, ξυνὸν παρθενικαῖσι φόβον,
φρουροδόμοι νηλεῖς κύνες ἔκτανον· ἦν δὲ γυναῖκα
ἐλπὶς ἰδειν ἄφνως ἔσχομεν οὐδὲ νέκυν.

defloration these folds are unfolded, the vessels break, which brings pain and results in the excretion of the blood that usually flows.*

Soranus is engaged in polemic here, for sure: he goes on in chapter 17 to correct the error (*pseudos*) that the pain and blood are caused by the rupturing of a hymen, which he says is anatomically unattestable.[60] This is, as Sissa points out, the first text in Greek medical literature to mention a virginal hymen (and it denies its existence[61]). What is important, however, is what he takes for granted, what he sees as 'usual', what he is setting out to explain: the spilling of blood and the pain of defloration. Soranus, however, goes further in his connection of physiology, desire and violence, in a passage that has not been widely discussed.[62] At *Gyn.* 1.10.37, he argues that conception requires a woman's *orexis* and *horme*, 'appetite' and 'impulse', if the seed is to stick and propagate. What then of rape? 'For if raped women conceive, it is possible to say in their case also that the experience of appetite in the full sense was present, but it was concealed by a mental judgement.'† Sexual appetite may be present in a raped woman (so conception proves), in the same way, he says, as hunger is still present in someone who fasts by effort of will. Soranus is stretching his argument about the need for a female appetite in conception to a limit case, and in so doing uncovers an ideological system that runs through the evaluation of rape and seduction in Greek writing – or provides the physiological basis for such ideology. For 'female appetite' is both a fundamental construction of the (need for) patriarchal control within the *oikos* ('for if a woman / Fly from one point, from which she makes a husband, / She spreads and mounts then like arithmetic; / One, ten, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand'[63]); and also that which founds the necessity of the virtue of *sophrosune*, the 'mental judgement' that enjoins chastity. Within the logic of this system, rape is a less worrying crime than seduction, and carries indeed in classical Athenian law a lesser punishment, because the violence of rape does not imply the

* συμπέπτωκε μέντοι γε καὶ στενότερός ἐστιν ἐπὶ παρθένων στολίσι κεχρημένος συνεχομέναις ὑπ' ἀγγείων ἀπὸ τῆς ὑστέρας τὴν ἀπόφυσιν εἰληφότων, ἅπερ καὶ κατὰ τὰς διακορήσεις ἁπλουμένων τῶν στολίδων ῥήγνυται καὶ ὀδύνην ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἀποκρίνεται τὸ συνήθως ἐπιφερόμενον αἷμα.

† καὶ γὰρ εἴ τινες βιασθείσαι συνέλαβον, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀρέξεως πάντως πάθος καὶ ταύταις παρῆν, ἐπεσκοτεῖτο δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχικῆς κρίσεως.

dangers of willing corruption, deception and insecure inheritance that comes with seduction and cuckoldry.[64] Where Winkler tries to find an acknowledgement that Daphnis' desire is a 'desire to hurt', Soranus finds even in rape evidence of female desire.

I have taken three passages that are less commonly quoted to make the point that across different registers of Greek the assumption of the pain of defloration, its association with male violence, the presence of blood, and the fear of the woman, is a commonplace, and validated as such. The vocabulary and imagery run through the other novels. In the case of Antiphanes' epigram, it is a fit subject for *Witz*, as rape is a common plot device in New Comedy, and a repeated scenario of, say, Ovid's poetry.[65] In the case of Soranus, it is a given – a natural, and thus ideological – fact of physiology. In fifth-century tragedy, too, the dangers of the tragic wedding, and, in particular the violent reversals of such ideas in the narrative of the Danaids, have been well analysed in recent years, as have the artistic associations of violent male pursuit of women.[66] So, Lycainion may be thought to be drawing on an extensive and multiform tradition: if she is 'grim' with her talk of a 'large pool of blood as if slain', it is the grimness of ironic exaggeration rather than a fresh and questioning perception of male sexuality. Indeed, it is hard to see Daphnis' hesitation as a sign of 'a very conscious and polemical stance towards the question of violence and sexuality',[67] rather than as an ironic manipulation of *and within* the terms of patriarchal narrative. For while it is indeed important both in terms of the narrative and in terms of social understanding that Daphnis follows the protocols by not consummating his relationship with Chloe – he will be asked pointedly by his new-found father if Chloe is indeed still a virgin (4.31) – does not the reason, *his* fear of Chloe's pain, in its version of 'rustic simplicity', construct a self-conscious and amused twist of the requirements of the social and narrative norms? The male who is afraid to penetrate his loved female because of her physical feelings is as much a (comic) figure of Greek patriarchal normative imagination as the *kinaidos*, or the parasitic man of uncontrolled appetites. Isn't it more difficult to challenge the protocols of desire than this fiction of a rustic sensitivity: *naturam* – 'which I take to be the name for those *cultural* imparities that are usually regarded as unquestionable' – *expelles furca, tamen* ...?

What Lycainion's lesson teaches, then, is hard to see as a radical provocation of patriarchal cultural protocols, as Winkler would have it. So what of the ending, where Daphnis demonstrates what he has learnt, Winkler's second crucial passage? Lycainion's parting shot had been 'Remember that it was I who made you an *anēr* (husband, man-not-boy) before Chloe' – and, as Winkler argues, this *is* to be remembered at the consummation of the wedding that allows Daphnis to be considered an *anēr* and Chloe a *gune*. For Lycainion's 'instruction' – *epaideuse* – leads to Chloe 'learning' – *emathe* – about 'children's play' – *paidiōn paignia*. (As we will see in the next two chapters, the argument about the desirability of boys as opposed to the desirability of girls often focuses on the fact that boys' kisses are 'untutored', whereas women's are 'sophisticated', 'tricky', 'learned': *Daphnis and Chloe* redirects this language through its own dynamics of innocence and learning.) The etymological connection between *paideusis* and *paides* and *paignia* – 'education', 'children', 'play' – is stressed in these pointed repetitions: as play is to seriousness, so childhood is to adulthood, and education is the transition – as enacted in the novel and its reading. As the completion of the novel marks the process of that transition, are we to see, then, a threat, 'an ominous tone' – a tone pointed by 'the harsh and unpleasant voice' of the rustic revellers outside the marriage chamber, 'as if they were breaking the earth with tridents, not singing a hymenaeal'? Or is there to be a recognition that to become an *anēr* or *gune* means leaving childhood behind, to be initiated out of childhood's ignorances – and the rustic singing acts as a final reminder of the frame of unsophisticated merry-making that has provided the necessary background for the love story as an education of innocence? Is Chloe – and the reader – to feel the violence of the patriarchal 'protocols of desire'; or is Daphnis – and the reader – to realize that Lycainion's teaching was a stage of ironic misprision, a humorous misunderstanding of the proper respect for a virgin's body, to be passed through on the way to the closure of a secure and loving marriage, the happy-ever-after of Romantic closure? Are these alternatives, or different sides of the same contract?

A final point on this passage may enable a slightly different sense of the play of innocence and experience to emerge here. Daphnis is

said to do to Chloe '*some* of what Lykainion had taught him',* as Winkler translates. If this is the correct way to understand the phrase,[68] what does this qualification imply? 'Nothing strange' had been done in the first encounter, but something is left out here. Again, the hint of arch knowingness – and it is only a hint – invites a cautious reading (as the pupil seems to have adapted his teacher's lesson). How far has to be gone, before knowing childish games are over? The narrative again has turned to euphemism ('and they stayed awake during that night more than owls') at precisely the moment of lying down naked together, as the reader is most properly excluded from the bedroom scene. Yet this may not be just a hesitation between the registers of explicitness, obscenity, coyness (etc.) with which the language of sexuality is constantly being expressed and contested. (What did Chloe do? Make love? Have intercourse? Lose her virginity? Fuck? She learnt ...) Rather, the veil of indirection by the very engagement of the reader's expectations ('one that has loved it will remember of it') becomes a factor in the deployment of the normative models of the natural. The text's knowingness is itself a force for complicity, a promotion of what we all always already know.

What this discussion adds to my problem of how far to go in reading erotic narrative is first an explicit question of what the sources of authority *in* and *for* narrative might be (especially for a dialogic text like this). There are evident difficulties raised – especially in a narrative that flaunts its interplay of sophisticated and innocent readers – when a reader as sophisticated as Winkler wants to take a teacher as self-interested, as framed as Lycainion, for an authoritative insight into the text's or the author's questioning stance towards conventional – patriarchal – attitudes and norms. In this work of *double entendre* and misunderstanding can explicitness be a guide – or is explicitness only a lure for the innocent? Learning 'the truth about sexuality', being *told*, promotes whose fiction of mastery?

Secondly, Winkler's analysis highlights the complex interplay between the ability of the literary text to provoke, question, challenge – to display otherness – and the ability of normative discourse

* τι ... ὧν αὐτὸν ἐπαίδευσε Λυκαίνιον.

to recoup itself – to frame otherness as the grounding of the self. What is being negotiated in Winkler's reading and in reading Winkler is the degree to which *Daphnis and Chloe*'s uncovering of the naturalness of convention and the conventionality of nature challenges and/or confirms the normative structures of cultural expectations. This is a dynamic which will be repeatedly explored in this book as the location and power of the didactic continues to be examined.

With customary (reckless and artful) candour, Winkler faces these problems head on, when he calls his analysis 'reading against the grain' – and this is my second, much briefer point on Winkler's approach to *Daphnis and Chloe*. He notes his own continuing doubts about to what degree the *critique* of violence he has outlined is part of the novel's world, but then goes on to assert that as modern readers we must not be 'solely in the service of recovering and reanimating an author's meaning' because 'then we have already committed ourselves to the premises and protocols of the past – past structures of cultural violence and their descendants in the bedrooms and mean streets and school curricula of the present'. He seeks 'an occasion to struggle against the tacit, the conventional and violent embrace in which we are held by the past' and takes to task critics who have discussed the violence in the novel but who, 'philosophically resigned to the "necessity" of male aggressiveness and violence, reproduce in their readings ... the very ideology of domination that Longus' text renders problematic'.[69] Now I, for one, hope that more and more people will be able to show the generosity, sensitivity and tolerance of Winkler's particular political aims; but it is hard to see quite how 'reading against the grain' is to be accommodated within his own anthropological stance – brilliantly exemplified in the opening chapters of his book – that states as a principle the avoidance 'of reading contemporary concerns and politics into texts and artefacts removed from their social context':[70] as he declares rightly, 'our own sexual categories ... make the moral and social meanings of Longus' world somewhat hard to recover'.[71] Winkler's desire to hear 'the laughter of the oppressed' seems to me here to lead to an unresolved tension between on the one hand the power of contemporary concerns to 'generate our questions and energize our work'[72] and, on the other, the danger of importing an

anachronistic and distorting horizon of cultural expectation, against which Winkler is concerned to stand. When Edmonds' *sophrosune*, his sense of 'what is right and wrong', leads him to silence Thornley's blunt expression of Daphnis' desire 'to do Chloe', and when Winkler reads 'against the grain' in order to escape the embrace of the past, the repeated process of rewriting (that is reading) of desire's narrative demonstrates the constant implication of the exegete in the history that is being produced. (And, of course, in both my account here, and in the very selection of the texts that count for me in this book, my reading against the grain (of the canon, of history, of Foucault) is part of the same continuing process ...)

I argued above that *Daphnis and Chloe* makes us acutely conscious of the assumptions and manipulations of a reader's position with regard to the erotic narrative. What is to be added from this discussion of Winkler's 'reading against the grain' is the expressly historical perspective of the otherness of an ancient culture, and what is ever an uneasy dialectic between appropriation and exploration. *Daphnis and Chloe* becomes a site of engagement with the historicity of the natural ... and with the historicity of reading. How much authority is to be granted to 'cultural models' and how is meaning to be determined within or against such paradigms? How, that is, to site a text's specificity within the lines of a map that cannot contain it?

Daphnis and Chloe takes a very particular stance towards innocence and knowledge, the protocols of sexuality, and the contested sense of *sophrosune*, those central concerns of so much normative writing of later antiquity, both Christian and pagan. Whereas in Methodius *sophrosune* is constituted as a virtue that leads the subject from an avoidance of transgression towards an ideal of self-control in virginity and the denial of the desires of the flesh, Longus not only plays (lasciviously) with a sense of erotic delay and fulfilment, transgression and ideal, but also, under the aegis of *sophrosune* as a care for propriety, manipulates the (patrolling of) relations between a subject and a text, the delights and self-regulations of reading and writing about desire. In Longus' sweet writing, sensual and narrative pleasure – *to terpnon* – overlap. The pleasure of this text is a real barrier – or lure – for a regulated reading within the Christian parameters inscribed paradigmatically by Methodius. Where

Methodius ends his *Symposium* with a hymn sung by a choir of virgins, lauding chastity and god, Longus leaves us not merely with a grating wedding song, but with a carefully constructed moment of veiled voyeurism, as he takes us to the bedroom door and invites – but bars – our gaze within. If for Methodius knowledge of nakedness is the result of man's fall, and flesh is thus 'rotten meat' to be 'purified of its putrefaction by the repeated application of the salt of *sophrosune*' (1.13), for Longus innocence and knowingness – of fleshly desire, of the naked body, its mechanisms – are playful terms in his manipulative contract with the reader. The narrator's opening prayer in *Daphnis and Chloe* for *sophrosune*, unlike Thecla's prayers for *sophrosune*, establishes not so much an ideal as a ludic complicity with the reader. Longus' erotics disrupt the regulatory force of a Methodius.

Foucault constructs a picture of ancient sexuality that depends to a large degree on a series of explicitly didactic texts that aim to produce and buttress a normative model of the erotic self. Similarly, Peter Brown's account of the growth of the Christian privileging of male and female virginity (and the desiring self and the loathsome body) is traced through a homiletic tradition. Longus' paraded language of didacticism has led many critics to read an instructive lesson in this novel too. Yet the multiform and repeatedly ironic scenes of teaching in the novel also require a recognition not merely of the reader's complicit position, but also of the complex interactions between the protocols of sexuality, humour, and narrative expectations, by which the lesson proceeds. How this novel of knowledge and innocence reveals, promotes, challenges knowledge (of sexuality and desire) necessarily involves a knowing manipulation of the reader and by the reader. (What lessons have been taken from *Daphnis and Chloe* is itself part of a history of sexuality.) Foucault's version of ancient sexuality does not attempt to account for this varied *engagement with narrative* – how desire is made up in fiction(s). What the discussion of *Daphnis and Chloe* shows, thus, is not just that Foucault's panoptic vision of ancient sexuality ignores much of the fun that is had with the knowledge and teaching of sexuality and desire in ancient erotic fiction, but also, and perhaps more importantly, that his avoidance of the intricate dynamics of reading erotic narrative leaves a fundamentally distorting gap in his

writing of the history of the discourse of desire. Foucault's project of locating the normative cannot hope to avoid the complexities of the strategies of engagement which are produced by the sort of ironic commentary on (teaching) desire and its mastery that the novel offers. For the formulation of the desiring subject is a process in which reading – with its hesitations, appropriations, fantasies and blindnesses – plays a fundamental role.

2

The Gay Science

Stand still, and I will read to thee
A lecture, Love, in loves philosophy.

John Donne

Thoreau, the great American essayist and countryman, begins an essay on walking with the brusque announcement, 'I want to speak a word for nature.' This chapter will examine a particular area of ancient erotic writing, the desire of men for other males, and in part certain less brusque affiliations to nature that run through the texts I will be considering. I have called this chapter 'the gay *science*', however, because I shall also be concerned with what might be called a philosophy of erotics, or rather the place of philosophy in erotics and erotics in philosophy. In the previous chapter, I looked at how the central philosophical concern with *sophrosune* and its expression in the ideals and idea of virginity was explored in the novel and other Greek *erotikoi logoi*. In this chapter, I shall be discussing how male desire for males brings the concept of philosophy and philosophical argument itself into the sphere of erotic writing. Indeed, not merely philosophy, but also art history, natural history, science, rhetoric, psychology – a full range of ancient intellectual disciplines – will be mobilized as I attempt to trace how the expression of male desire for males is not delimited to a narrow band of homiletic or erotic texts but disseminated throughout the discourse of the ancient novel and related genres. Seeing how male desire is articulated will involve a detour-filled journey round the formulation of the desiring male subject in the texts of his culture.

There is certainly a need for further discussion of the issue of male

sexuality and the philosophical writing in later Greek culture, a period which has not yet received the extensive and detailed attention accorded to the Classical period. Foucault, from one side, writes that 'in the first centuries of our era, compared with the lofty formulations of the classical period, reflection on the love of boys lost some of its intensity, its seriousness, its vitality'.[1] There was a 'deproblematization' – his word – of the issue, which testifies to its 'decline as a vital theme of the stylistics of existence'.[2] John Boswell, from the other side, sees a growth of 'complex debates on the subject ... examining (or purporting to examine) the validity, morality and aesthetic desirability'[3] of what *he* calls 'gay love'. This he sees as poignant testimony of an attitude whose extirpation finds its most significant moment in the Christian state legislation against male–male sexual relations in the sixth century CE. So Boswell finds that 'everywhere in the fiction of the Empire ... gay couples and their love appear on a completely equal footing with their heterosexual counterparts',[4] whereas Foucault finds the love of boys as 'only episodic and marginal themes. The love of a boy is never the principal object of the narrative.'[5] Since for both Foucault and Boswell – as for Peter Brown and others – later antiquity is a crucial period of development in Western attitudes to sexuality and the self, and since these two most influential contributors to the debate offer such different, even polarized, descriptions, an articulation of the place of the discourse of male desire for males may still be required. As in the first chapter, I shall be tracing this central topic of erotic discourse across a range of writings, a range of genres, from epigrams to philosophical treatises, from the novel to medical handbooks, since it is this complete field of *erotikoi logoi* that makes up the complex and revealing discourse of *eros* in later Greek writing.

By way of a link with the first chapter, let me return briefly to *Daphnis and Chloe* and the invasion of that eroticized pastoral scene by a man who, unlike the heroes of the novel, has been 'educated with regard to the full range of erotic discourse in the symposia of the profligate'.* The symposium is a prime scene of aristocratic education for the tradition of archaic poetry (where Theognis famously warns against profligate behaviour at the symposium and

* πᾶσαν ἐρωτικὴν μυθολογίαν ἐν τοῖς ἀσώτων συμποσίοις πεπαιδευμένος.

encourages the young always to spend time with The Good).[6] In general cultural terms no doubt the symposium continued to be the site of the socialization of the young male into the contests of Eros, as well as the position of Eros within other aspects of male social practice. With the spread of Greek culture throughout the Mediterranean the symposium becomes one of *the* signs of Greekness itself. It is such a tradition that is given a permanently philosophical turn within at least the intellectual tradition headed by Plato. Longus, here, with his talk of an education into *erotiken muthologian* at the symposium, evokes these traditions, much as the specification of this symposium as the gathering of the *asotoi*, 'the profligate', inverts such a high-minded educational model. We will return to this scene of education repeatedly in this chapter. This educated and invasive man is introduced as follows (4.10):

All this fellow Gnathon knew how to do was to eat and to drink till he was drunk and to be lecherous when he was drunk. He was nothing but a mouth, a belly and the bits below the belly ...*

Gnathon – or 'Jaws' – is a man who knows how to eat, to drink to drunkenness, and follow his drunkenness into debauchery. He is, in short, the figure of the *akolastos*, the male who cannot control his desires, that deprecated other of Greek moral discourse from the fifth century on. The negation of the *sophron* citizen. This figure of the *akolastos* goes back as far as Homer, where the distorted body and riling words of Thersites form a paradigmatic contrast to the best of the Achaeans in the *Iliad*.[7] In the Classical city there is a developed political version of the values and negations of the *sophron* citizen, which, as in modern society, parades social, sexual and intellectual categories in a complex normative rhetoric of public display in the Assembly, law courts, theatre and market-place. Plato develops the philosophy and psychology of the Good Citizen, and Aristotle, with his concern for the *phronimos*, the behaviour, views and education of the wise citizen, sets such concerns firmly as a fundamental element of the philosophical and rhetorical educational system to which Longus' novel is so closely affiliated. Gnathon's brief opening description epitomizes the rhetorical figure of the man

* ὁ δὲ Γνάθων, οἷα μαθὼν ἐσθίειν ἄνθρωπος καὶ πίνειν εἰς μέθην καὶ λαγνεύειν μετὰ τὴν μέθην καὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ ὢν ἢ γνάθος καὶ γαστὴρ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γαστέρα ...

of base appetites. And as Bakhtin would have us expect, particularly in a comic world, Gnathon's body is a grotesque version of his appetites – merely eponymous jaws, a belly and the bits below the belly. This Gnathon observes Daphnis with a more than casual interest and 'Since he was by nature a lover of boys, and had found a beauty such as he had not seen even in the city, he decided to make an advance, and thought it would be easy to seduce Daphnis since he was a goat-herd.'* The description of Gnathon as *phusei paiderastes*, 'by nature' or 'in his nature a lover of boys', is particularly striking. For the highly charged contemporary debate on whether the category 'homosexual', or 'gay', or 'lesbian', is transhistorically applicable has focused in particular on distinctions and overlaps between 'essentialist' definitions of an unchanging nature or sexual pathology on the one hand and historically specific, cultural formations on the other. The Classical world has been a particularly privileged and, consequently, most fiercely contested area in this debate. So John Boswell, partly because of his pervasive use of the term 'gay' (even to the point of phraseology such as a 'gay backlash' for the later Greek and Latin poetry which represents male desire for males approvingly), has been taken as an icon of essentialist definitions of a specific transhistorical 'nature' of homosexuality, and criticized as such by, for example, David Halperin, who sees a particularly modern stake – one hundred years – in the category of homo*sexuality*. Halperin has in turn been criticized – as Boswell has been defended – by Ralph Hexter.[8] Since much of this discussion revolves around the existence or non-existence in ancient Greek texts of 'a sexual nature oriented permanently in one specific direction (towards other members of their own sex)',[9] it is worth saying from the outset that one must be very careful indeed before assuming that *phusei* (here) can mean anything like an inherent psychological necessity, rather than a set of attitudes and behavioural patterns (perhaps to be associated with Gnathon's education in the symposia of the profligate, since despite the ready associations of male desire for males in, say, the pastoral world of Theocritus, this is the only appearance of such a desire in *Daphnis and Chloe*). In a way, this chapter will be

* φύσει παιδεραστὴς ὢν καὶ κάλλος οἷον οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως εὑρών, ἐπιθέσθαι διέγνω τῷ Δάφνιδι καὶ πείσειν ᾤετο ῥᾳδίως ὡς αἴπολον.

merely a gloss on these two words, but it will be a longer gloss than is usually provided.

First of all, one must recall the extensive plays on the term *phusis* in this novel that I discussed in the previous chapter. By book 4, there is a heightened awareness of the difficulty of determining exactly what sense of 'nature' is being appealed to here, exactly how 'natural' Gnathon's (transgressive) behaviour is. Indeed, as Gnathon's attempt to seduce Daphnis proceeds, we see how the man trained in the symposia of the profligate utilizes the language of nature and is rebuffed by it. He sidles up to Daphnis, praises his goats – always a good seduction technique – and his pipe-playing (and we should recall Chloe's interest in Daphnis' pipes) and promises to sue Daphnis' master for Daphnis' freedom (4.11): 'Softening him up, he began to praise his goats and requested a pastoral tune, and said he could swiftly make him free, as he was a person of consummate authority.'* Gnathon's technique, comments the narrator, made the boy *cheiroethes*, 'accustomed to the hand'. This is a term usually applied to animals, implying a certain domestication and training, though it is sometimes used of humans. As the city man addresses the beautiful creature of the countryside, it is a marked expression, that will be significantly echoed later in the passage, as we will see shortly. Since the boy is apparently compliant, Gnathon lies in wait for him as the goats are being returned from pasture, ambushes the lad, kisses him and asks him 'to present his rear as the nanny goats do for the billy goats'.† Daphnis responds to this analogy from the natural world as follows (4.11):

He thought slowly and said that it was good for billy goats to mount nanny goats, but no-one had ever seen a billy goat mounting a billy goat, nor a ram mounting a ram instead of the ewes, nor cocks mounting cocks instead of the hens.‡

When Daphnis' slow reasoning comes up with this argument from nature, Gnathon resorts to force (*biazesthai*), but as always in *Daphnis and Chloe*, as opposed to the other novels, the violence

* μαλθάσσων δὲ αὐτὸν τάς τε αἴγας ἐπῃνεῖ καὶ συρίσαι τι αἰπολικὸν ἠξίωσε· καὶ ἔφη ταχέως ἐλεύθερον θήσειν τὸ πᾶν δυνάμενος.

† ὄπισθεν παρασχεῖν τοιοῦτον οἷον αἱ αἶγες τοῖς τράγοις.

‡ τοῦ δὲ βραδέως νοήσαντος καὶ λέγοντος ὡς αἶγας μὲν βαίνειν τράγους καλόν, τράγον δὲ οὐπώποτε εἶδέ τις βαίνοντα τράγον, οὐδὲ κριὸν ἀντὶ τῶν οἰῶν κριόν, οὐδὲ ἀλεκτρυόνας ἀντὶ τῶν ἀλεκτορίδων ἀλεκτρυόνας.

turns to buffoonery and humour, as the drunken Gnathon falls over in the mud (4.11):

Daphnis pushed away the drunken fellow, who could scarcely stand, and tripped him to the ground. He ran away like a puppy and left him lying there, in need of a hand up from a man not a boy.[1]

Daphnis, the country boy who argues from what the animals do in order to rebuff Gnathon (as he had tried in vain to use the animals as models to bypass his ignorance of what to do with Chloe), runs off himself *'like a puppy'*, leaving Gnathon in need of a 'hand up from a man not a boy'. The word *cheiragogia*, which I translated as 'hand up', occurs only very rarely in Greek and granted the use of hands and touching in standard Greek erotic vocabulary, I take it that the strange phrase is used to allow a mildly dirty *double entendre* at the expense of Gnathon's fumblings. So in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* 672 the phrase *liparous cheirourgias*, 'persistent handiwork', appears to have an obscene sense ('of women masturbating men', as Henderson glosses it with characteristic directness[10]); certainly the verb *cheirourgein*, 'to do handiwork', is used in the more straightforward prose of Diogenes Laertius to denote the cynic Diogenes' celebrated masturbation in the market place;[11] more playfully, the verb *cheiromachein*, 'to fight by hand' is used of a jilted lover alone in bed (*AP* 12.22) and clearly implies a solitary pleasure (in contrast to the usual military language of love where 'fighting' is so common an expression for male–female sexual interaction). So, here, after Gnathon's hope of finding the boy *cheiroethes*, 'accustomed to the hand', he is left requiring *cheiragogia*, 'a hand up', but from a man not a boy. I find support for this reading in the fact that the phrase is not translated in the Loeb ...

What I wish to stress here, however, is Daphnis' slow response. The boy who has grown up 'in nature' but who has by now received Lycainion's education (where finally *phusis* took over), appeals to the natural world to avoid a figure who threatens the progress of the narrative towards its proper consummation (and who has asked him to behave like a goat). What are we to make of Daphnis' response? It

* ὁ δὲ μεθύοντα ἄνθρωπον ἑστῶτα μόλις παρωσάμενος ἔσφηλεν εἰς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ὥσπερ σκύλαξ ἀποδραμών, κείμενον κατέλιπεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐ παιδὸς εἰς χειραγωγίαν δεόμενον.

is standard here to point to two things – first, that any short period in the countryside would show that Daphnis is wrong, or at least disingenuous, about male animals mounting male animals – although I have found no explicit recognition of this animal behaviour in ancient authors ('No-one' says Daphnis 'has ever seen ...'); and second that other ancient authors used such an argument from nature to discuss love of boys (a point usually made in the form 'Cf. ...').[12] I will indeed be using other ancient authors to gloss this passage shortly, but first I wish to emphasize the complex and comic layering of rhetoric here, whereby the boy of the fields appeals tendentiously to the love of the fields (which has failed to teach him previously what he was desperate to know) in a parodic version of a common philosophical debate in order to outsmart and eventually simply outrun – like a puppy – the corrupt man of the city. It is the way that the argument from nature is thus framed and reframed – and certainly ironized as an argument – that I am concerned with. The question is: what are we to make of the philosophy of *eros* here? What is it to put such an argument in Daphnis' mouth in such a situation?

That the 'argument from nature' is a continuing strand of Greek writing on *eros* is clear. It certainly goes back as far as Plato, where in the *Laws* the Athenian stranger initiates a discussion on the difference between Crete, Sparta, and the other cities of Greece on the subject of *eros* ('It's just us here', he explains, defending his choice of potentially hot subject). In the course of this discussion, the Athenian Stranger comments (836c):

> For if someone following *nature* will propose the law that existed before Laius [the mythical inventor of pederasty], saying that it is proper that males ought not consort with young men as with females for sexual congress, adducing as proof the *nature* of the beasts and showing that a male does not touch a male for such purposes because this is not *natural*, perhaps he would be using a convincing argument, and yet in no way would it be in accord with your cities.*

* εἰ γάρ τις ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει θήσει τὸν πρὸ τοῦ Λαΐου νόμον, λέγων ὡς ὀρθῶς εἶχεν τὸ τῶν ἀρρένων καὶ νέων μὴ κοινωνεῖν καθάπερ θηλειῶν πρὸς μεῖξιν ἀφροδισίων, μάρτυρα παραγόμενος τὴν τῶν θηρίων φύσιν καὶ δεικνὺς πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐχ ἁπτόμενον ἄρρενα ἄρρενος διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοῦτο εἶναι, τάχ' ἂν χρῷτο πιθανῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ταῖς ὑμετεραῖς πόλεσιν οὐδαμῶς συμφωνοῖ.

I have printed and translated the manuscript text, as it is most commonly rendered. It has often been noted by editors, however, that to translate *kai* in the last sentence as 'and yet' is to put considerable strain on the normal use of the word. Consequently, with one of those moments that make classical texts such a joyous battleground, the expression *pithanos logos*, a 'convincing argument', has been emended by some modern editors to read *apithanos*, 'unconvincing'![13] John Boswell enthusiastically embraces this emendation (although he does not note it is one), claiming that Plato states it is 'completely unconvincing'[14] (no 'perhaps' about it ...) that the animal world could be used to prove the unnaturalness of male–male relations. This unnuanced reading requires some further tendentious understandings, particularly of a crucial earlier passage in the *Laws*. For at *Laws* 636c in a discussion of the role of erotic behaviour in the polis the Athenian Stranger explicitly calls male–male relations *para phusin* (636c), which, as Boswell properly notes, is 'traditionally rendered "against nature"'[15] – which might be thought to be a problem if the argument from nature here is to be 'completely unconvincing', although, of course, it is possible to term male–male relations 'unnatural' without being committed to the analogy with the animal world. So what does Boswell make of this turn to nature? First, he argues that by *para phusin* 'probably all he meant ... was "unrelated to birth" or "nonprocreative"'.[16] Now it is true that sexual desire in the earlier works of Plato is to a large degree assumed to be male desire for males, and that the language of procreation is often appropriated in a positive and quite novel way for philosophical rather than physical desire between males.[17] It is also true that the natural (*kata phusin*) pleasure of male-female relations, which is contrasted with the *para phusin* relations of male to male, is described specifically as 'intercourse for procreation' (*eis koinonian ... tes gennēseōs* 636c). Similarly, later in the *Laws* (841d), where the Athenian Stranger suggests all sexual contact between males should be banned (a telling passage surprisingly not discussed in detail by Boswell), male–male relations are called *agona para phusin* 'unproductive and against *phusis*'. Despite the connection – though scarcely synonymy – between *phusis* and procreation in these passages, Plato's use of *para phusin*, if the whole sentence is read, reveals a more condemnatory attitude than Boswell's selective

quotation and gloss as 'unprocreative' allow (636c): 'But on the contrary [to male–female relations] male–male intercourse or female–female intercourse is contrary to *phusis*, and this boldness was originally because of a failure of control in the pursuit of pleasure.'* Not only does Plato link what elsewhere might be taken as the philosophical love *par excellence* to the outrage of female–female desire, a sin ever deprecated by Greek male writers, but also he terms the practice a 'boldness' or 'daring' (*tolmema*) that stems from *akrateia hedones*, a failure to control one's attitude to pleasure, which both in this passage and more generally in Plato (as in much writing of the period) is a strongly negative evaluation.

Secondly, Boswell claims that 'Plato even introduces the idea of the "unnaturalness" of homosexual acts as something of a joke.'[18] This is because the Stranger prefaces his remarks on the 'unnaturalness' of male–male, female–female desire with the comment (636c1): 'whether such matters should be treated playfully or seriously' (*eite paizonta eite spoudazonta*). The Athenian Stranger, however, goes on to explicate his statement '*originally* because of a failure of control in the pursuit of pleasure' by telling the story of the Cretans who, he claims, invented the myth of Ganymede and his rape by Zeus to justify their own sexual practices,[19] practices which, from an Athenian perspective at least, were to be contrasted because of their violent pursuit of boys with the elaborate courtships of Athenian cultural norms. In part, it is this self-consciously tendentious turn to myth that explains the story's prefatory comment 'whether such matters should be treated playfully or seriously': Plato regularly uses the language of seriousness and playfulness to frame shifts of register between types of argument within a dialogue, particularly a turn to the category of *muthos*.[20] In part, the Stranger is also alluding to the commonly recognized difficulty of discussing erotic matters without blurring the distinction between the serious and the comic. The participants of Xenophon's *Symposium*, for example, including Socrates, are paradigmatically described as (4.28) 'they joked and were serious all mixed together'.† As we saw in the previous chapter, the seriousness and humour of discussion is an especially charged

* ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημ' εἶναι δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς.

† ἀναμὶξ ἔσκωψάν τε καὶ ἐσπούδασαν.

concern, and *eros* is a subject that crosses the boundaries of the most serious literature and the most comic. Indeed, the whole topic of *eros* and its institutions is introduced by the Athenian Stranger under the rubric not of 'something of a joke', but of a strong worry about the *corruption* (*diaphtharkenai*) of the pleasures of sex in the context of the nature of man and beasts (636b5).[21] It is difficult, then, to see Plato's comments on nature and male desire for males as 'something of a joke'.

It may be surprising that the Athenian stranger appears to stigmatize here what is taken for granted or even strongly valorized elsewhere in Plato. It is worth noting, however, as we will discuss in the next chapter, that Plutarch at least can construct a series of quotations from a range of Platonic texts to illustrate the master Plato's opposition to the naturalness or acceptability of male–male desire, despite the importance of, say, the *Symposium* to the tradition in and against which Plutarch is writing. When Boswell terms the phrase *para phusin*, then, a 'chance remark' (which 'perhaps introduced ... the idea that homosexuality is "unnatural"'[22]), it is an assertion that can be maintained only by repressing the argument in which the phrase plays a part. Whatever one might think of Boswell's commitment to ideas of nature and what he calls 'gay history', it is clear that the discussion of *phusis* and male desire for males elsewhere in the *Laws* has been considerably strained to support Boswell's understanding of a Platonic view of the non-persuasiveness of the analogy from nature.

Let us return, then, to the link between the 'perhaps [un]persuasive argument' and the 'social practice of Greek cities', the textual problem which has prompted this brief excursus through the *Laws*. It is crucial to this passage, I would suggest, that *pithanos*, 'convincing', 'persuasive' (together with its cognate forms) is a marked term in Plato's rhetoric: it is a key expression in the distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, and between philosophy and myth, and implies not so much a necessary truth as an argument in need of further philosophical work to uncover its real motives and force. Describing the argument from 'nature' as 'perhaps convincing', 'perhaps persuasive', is a less than wholehearted endorsement, and the remainder of the sentence may perhaps be best construed as wryly aware of the distance between such a philosophi-

cal or rhetorical position and the general practice of Greek culture: the argument is 'perhaps persuasive – and in no way in accord with the actual practice of your society' (and notice 'your' rather than 'our'). Rather than indicating a strong affiliation to the analogy from nature and, consequently, a strong disjunction between the argument and the social practice ('and *yet*'), Plato constructs a more delicate awareness of the interplay between persuasion, argument and practice. In this way, with typical sophistication, Plato's writing already testifies to the complex self-positioning involved in the manipulation of the argument from nature.

David Cohen in his recent book *Law, Sexuality and Society* begins from the same passage of the *Laws*. Cohen argues at length that there is a strand of Greek thinking which regarded male–male sexual relations not merely as *para phusin*, 'unnatural', but also as *hubris*, a violent outrage – and in the course of constructing this argument he interprets the manuscript reading of Plato's text as enthusiastically as Boswell ignores it: '[Plato] argues that, as it is natural for a male and female to mate, and natural that male animals do not seek other males, so it is unnatural when men do not follow their example (836c).'[23] Once again, the careful framing of the Platonic text slips into an oversimplified syllogism. Cohen, however, also seeks to place the Platonic passage within a wide range of philosophical texts, not only from the Platonic corpus but also from Xenophon and Aristotle. These passages certainly testify to a repeated and charged interaction between concepts of 'the natural' and sexual ideology in Greek writing: sexual behaviour, ancient and modern, seems to attract the rhetoric of the natural.[24] Indeed, it is hard to imagine either a sexual discourse that did not appropriate the idea of the natural to itself, or a critique of such a discourse that did not question the boundaries of the natural; that did not attempt to denaturalize those boundaries by a recognition of cultural conventions.[25] Such rhetorics of (de)naturalization are a central complication in the exploration of a specific investment in *phusis* in ancient writing on *eros*. A central text for Cohen, for example, as it is for Boswell and Halperin before him, is Aristophanes' famous speech in the *Symposium*. This celebrated mythological aetiology of the multiform expressions of desire is of particular importance – not least to my argument, as I continue to gloss *phusei paiderastes*, 'by nature a

lover of boys' – because in his attempt to explain sexual behaviour in a fashion analogous to the way mythology accounts for the natural world and man's place in it, Aristophanes deploys the language of nature in a novel and complex way. In Aristophanes' wonderful myth, humans are descended from the splitting of original double-bodied figures. Those who are descended from figures where both halves were male have the following characteristics (181e6–192a5):

All those who are split from a male, pursue males. While they are boys, because they are slices of the male, they feel affection for men and enjoy lying with and embracing men, and these are the best of boys and youths, because they are in their nature most manly. Some do say that they are shameless, but they are wrong. They do this not from shamelessness but from bravery and manliness and maleness of look, rejoicing in what is like themselves.*

The proof then offered for this claim of the supreme excellence of the males involved in such pederastic relations is the fact that only such boys when they reach maturity enter public life ...

There are three points I want to make about this highly contested passage.[26] The first is about homophobia and gossip. For Cohen (and indeed for Boswell), the phrase 'some do say that they are shameless', indicates the existence of an Athenian prejudice against male–male relations that needs to be countered: the remark, Cohen argues, 'testifies eloquently to the power of the norm felt to be implicit within the traditional view'[27] – a view summed up as a 'profound ambivalence and anxiety about male–male sexuality'.[28] Yet Aristophanes' point is not aimed simply at 'homoerotically inclined youths' and even less at homoerotically inclined adult males, but more specifically at *boys* who *philousi kai chairousi*, 'feel affection for and rejoice in' the sexual attentions of men. Although, as Halperin remarks, 'the paederastic ethos of classical Athens did not prevent a willing boy from responding enthusiastically to his lover's physical attentions',[29] the boundary between what Halperin

* ὅσοι δὲ ἄρρενος τμῆμά εἰσι, τὰ ἄρρενα διώκουσι, καὶ τέως μὲν ἂν παῖδες ὦσιν, ἅτε τεμάχια ὄντα τοῦ ἄρρενος, φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ χαίρουσι συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπεπλεγμένοι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, καὶ εἰσιν οὗτοι βέλτιστοι τῶν παίδων καὶ μειρακίων, ἅτε ἀνδρειότατοι ὄντες φύσει. φασὶ δὲ δή τινες αὐτοὺς ἀναισχύντους εἶναι, ψευδόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀναισχυντίας τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θάρρους καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀρρενωπίας, τὸ ὅμοιον αὑτοῖς ἀσπαζόμενοι.

calls 'enthusiasm' and any response which indicated specifically *sexual* interest was most carefully articulated and thus most manipulated by the contests of reinterpretation and slander. The dramatization of the subject position of the object of desire is always especially problematic in Athenian ideological projections: the apparent injunction to the object of desire to indicate no sexual desire while at the same time expressing 'willingness', and to accede to seduction without showing signs of 'submission', requires that terms such as *philein* and *chairein*, 'to feel affection' and 'enjoy', 'rejoice in', must attempt to remove any suggestion of what would be a dangerous or shameful emotion or response. Plato especially in the *Phaedrus* strains against this asymmetry of expression of desire between lover and beloved in a famous passage (255cff), where he analyses the dynamics of attraction between partners in a pederastic relationship.[30] Plato there allows the beloved boy (*eromenos*) first 'to feel *eros*' (*erai* 255d2), but to be ignorant of its source: he thinks it is *philia*, 'friendship', 'affection', 'duty'. Then, the boy has a 'counter-desire' (*anterota* 255e1 – an apparently coined word for this novel analysis of a dynamics of feeling), which is the 'image of desire', *eidolon erotos*. This 'counter-desire', this privilege of the beloved, a longing to 'see, to touch, to kiss, to lie down together' is still a weaker (*asthenesteros*) sensation than that of the lover. This emotion of the beloved may lead him to concede sexual favours to the lover in the initial scenario (255e3–256a7), but – and this is a fundamental 'but' – this image of pleasure attained is rapidly subsumed to a view of philosophical *askesis* where *sophrosune*, 'self-control', and *aidos*, 'shame', are the ruling principles of the relationship (256a8ff). An active (once it is activated) desire to 'lie down with men', even as Plato parades its possibility in a radically challenging fashion, is thus controlled and restructured within the world of philosophical mentorship. The boundary of propriety is maintained only by challenge and defence. It is this boundary and the recognition of its difficulty in Athenian cultural practice that Aristophanes' remark recognizes. As Aeschines' speech against Timarchus shows, pederastic relationships were particularly open to the accusations of shamelessness and impropriety that characterize the agonistic world of Athenian contests of status.[31] 'Some do say . . .' (So, as Cohen writes elsewhere, there were 'serious risks for the boy, for his

reputation (and even his civic rights) may be compromised by incorrect inferences and irresponsible gossip'.[32]) 'Some do say they are shameless' is not, then, a concession of the existence of a prejudice against male desire for males so much as a comment about the social practice of evaluating the behaviour of the objects of desire in Athenian culture.

It is, however, and this is the second point, also important that the introduction of the idea of shamelessness here also acts as a foil to a series of etymological plays on the gendered nature of value terms in Greek. These slices of maleness are acting not from shamelessness (with the assumption of 'less than male behaviour', 'feminization', that is ever the slur against perceived transgression in the polarized world of Greek gender evaluation) but 'from *tharrous*, *andreias*, and *arrenopias*'. If *tharros* is a general term for courage, *andreia* specifies the quality of the adult male (*anēr*), and the apparently coined word *arrenopia*, 'with a male look', not least by its very strangeness, emphasizes the point that the descendants of the two halves of a male whole are *phusei* andr*eiotatoi*: 'most *man*ly in their nature', and thus pursue what is 'like themselves' – men. This, thirdly, leads to the proof that only the objects of pederasts' sexual attentions become politically active. (Or as the comedian Plato puts it less delicately (fr.202): 'You've been buggered?! Then you'll be a politician.'*) To judge precisely the irony with which Aristophanes characterizes the polis and its politicians here is as difficult as in the playwright's plays themselves.[33] The political gibe, however, colours with a retrospective smile the discourse of manliness that precedes it. The ready association of *phusis* with male–male relations is framed by the irony of the mythic narrative (with its particularly bizarre aetiology of the natural) and the playful manipulation of the values of 'manliness'. While Aristophanes' speech seems to associate *phusis* with the institutions of male–male desire, and even with an individual's 'nature', not only is it hard to generalize from such a speech to Athenian culture as a whole, but also it is hard to judge the place of Aristophanes' speech within the *Symposium* itself – one ironic and challenging voice in the polyphony of the dialogue – as the argument moves towards not merely Diotima but also Alci-

* κεκολλόπευκας· τοιγαροῦν ῥήτωρ ἔσει.

biades' invasion of the party and his description of Socrates' complex positioning within the dynamics of (erotic) mentorship.[34] Does Aristophanes' speech express a position to be qualified by the continuing articulation of what *eros* is (not least since the object of desire is precisely what is to be redefined by Socrates)? The comedian's (Platonic) myth of origins, introduced under the sign of the laughable, appropriates the structures of mythology and the language of *phusis* as it attempts to *naturalize* its new and bizarre account of desire. Thus when Cohen concludes that Aristophanes' speech 'reveals that Athenians were prepared to categorize human beings according to the dichotomy homosexuality/heterosexuality, both in the biological *and* socio-sexual spheres',[35] his revelation of Athenian cultural attitudes depends on a repression of the rhetoric of (de)naturalization (and irony) which informs Aristophanes' account.

Aristophanes himself – the author of the *Clouds* – demonstrates some of the penetration of the argument from nature into the discourse of the fifth-century city when he has Pheidippides justify beating his own father with the example of 'the fowl and other animals, how they retaliate against their fathers. What difference is there between the animals and us, except they don't propose decrees?' (*Clouds* 1427–9). David Cohen, however, traces the argument further in the texts of the philosophers. He claims that the argument from nature which specifies the animal world as the basis of human 'natural behaviour' is to be traced in particular in Aristotle, who has the most developed ideas on the natural, ideas which also offer the most complex articulation of the relation between nature and a teleology. (As Irigaray writes: '*phusis* is always already an act of appropriation towards a *telos*'.[36]) Cohen argues that what underlies the entire project of the treatise *On the Generation of Animals* is the assumption that 'in their procreative capacities human beings are like animals and it is natural for male to mate with female – natural in the sense of instinctual'[37] (although, as Lloyd has pointed out in his fundamental study of Aristotle's zoological taxonomy, Aristotle is '*especially* interested in the differences that mark man out from the other animals'[38] and there is in his writing a 'pervasive theme of man as a model or as a supreme, paradigmatic animal'[39]). There may be in Aristotle's zoological treatises (where

procreation rather than erotics is the dominant concern) a common assumption that male and female naturally mate together (and that this represents a hierarchical relation, with the male, the active force, on top). There is also an ethical thrust to such claims: so in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1162a) Aristotle claims *philia* between a man and a woman is natural (*kata phusin*) because a household is a necessary part of human existence, and child-production is a common trait of all creatures. But it is significant that as conclusive evidence for this assumption, Cohen quotes a passage not from *On the Generation of Animals* but from the *Problems* (896b10), which he translates as 'it is natural for a man to desire a woman sexually, just as it is natural for a horse to desire a mare'. What Aristotle writes, however, is 'Why is it that a horse delights in and feels desire for a horse, a human for a human, and generally species for species and in like manner?'* – a question which does not involve gender at all, but is about the mating of like kinds! Indeed, the problem continues with a proof (*semeion*) that runs:

> For even grown men appear to us as beautiful, when we look at them without an idea of sexual intercourse. Do they appear beautiful in such a way as to give our eyes more pleasure than those who are of an age for sexual intercourse? There is no reason why not, if we don't happen to feel desire for them.†

This proof assumes precisely the traditional norms of the institutions of Athenian male–male desire – the beautiful man distinguished from the desirable boy as an object of (visual) pleasure rather than as a sexual object. It takes such behaviour as an example of the normal processes of desire of like species. As in much Greek writing, however, Aristotelian texts certainly find the actions and pleasures of the *passive* male deeply unsettling and largely unacceptable.[40] It is in such a light that the one passage in Aristotle which seems directly to allude to the 'unnaturalness of male desire', should be read. In a list of corrupt and degenerate behaviours (*akolasia*), Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1148b) lists *aphrodisia*, 'the

* διὰ τί ἵππος ἵππῳ χαίρει καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὰ συγγενῆ τοῖς συγγενέσι καὶ ὁμοίως;

† δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἄνδρες καλοὶ εἶναι <οὐ> πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν βλέψασιν. ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἡσθῆναι ὁρῶσι μᾶλλον τῶν εἰς συνουσίαν; οὐδέν γε κωλύει, εἰ μὴ ἐπιθυμοῦντες τύχοιμεν.

sexual act', between males. Since he goes on to specify that such behaviour stems either from nature or from habit, caused by such suffering as sexual abuse (*hubrizesthai*) as a child; and that if such behaviour stems from nature one cannot blame such people any more than one blames women for being penetrated rather than penetrating, Winkler is almost certainly right to see the *kinaidos*, the passive and pleasured male, as the figure of degenerate behaviour here.[41] Uncovering Aristotle's assumptions about what is natural, then, needs to take careful account of the complex interplay between his explicit discussion of *phusis* and what is taken for granted in such discussions, his tacit knowledge. For despite Aristotle's elaborate account of *phusis*, procreation and the animal world, the strategic step to stigmatize male desire for males is not explicitly made.

The Classical period shows, then, even in this brief survey not only the growth of interest in ideas of *phusis* and manipulations of the rhetoric of *phusis*, but also the specific argument from nature that seeks to make an analogy between men and animals in terms of sexual behaviour, the argument that Daphnis offers Gnathon. It is also evident how complex the rhetoric of such appeals can be and how difficult to read (and the degree to which they have been appropriated by and read according to modern critics' particular concerns). After the Hellenistic philosophy schools become major educational institutions, however, such arguments have become so formalized and so familiar that Plutarch can open a treatise as follows (*On Affection for Offspring* 493b–c):

> philosophers, because of their disagreements with one another, refer some of their problems to the nature (*phusis*) of irrational animals (*aloga zōia*), as if to a foreign power for arbitration, and submit the decision to the emotions, characters and habits of those creatures, since they cannot be influenced or bribed. Or is this not also a common charge against human evil – that when there is a doubt about the most necessary and important matters, we seek among horses, dogs and birds how we should marry and procreate and raise children (as if there were in ourselves no clear proof of Nature (*phusis*))?

Plutarch here takes as a well-known general trend the willingness of philosophers to adduce the world of the beasts as a paradigm for human activities to do with 'marriage, procreation and child-rearing': it is a *topos* of philosophical reasoning.[42] They take the

phusis of the 'natural world' as a guide for men, as if there were no clear proof or indication (*deloma*) of Nature (*phusis*) in humans themselves. (Plutarch here stresses the equally standard philosophical requirement of introspection.) Yet Plutarch also goes on in this treatise to contrast the 'simple unmixed nature' (*amiges, haplous*) of the beasts with the quite unmediated nature of plants, and the mixed, complex nature of men for whom 'reason is in control (*logos autokrates*) and, as it finds now one sort of deviation and novelty, now another, leaves no clear or certain trace of nature (*phusis*)' (493d–e). So, like the philosophers he begins with, Plutarch turns back to 'simple nature' to find paradigms for the 'complex nature' of humans, and discovers in the animal world examples of 'affection for offspring' to teach humans how to behave.[43]

Let me offer two less commonly read versions of this argument on animals and sexuality that show something of the pervasion of the idea beyond the philosophical and medical tradition through the general literary discourse of the Empire. The first is an epigram from book 12 of the Anthology, Straton's *Musa Puerilis*, by Straton himself (*AP* 12.22):

> Every unreasoning animal just screws; but we have reason
> And excel the other animals in this:
> We have discovered buggery. All who are ruled by women
> Have no more going for them than the unreasoning beasts.*

Here, within the sympotic or pseudo-sympotic frame of the circulation of epigrams, the argument of Longus' Daphnis is inverted to a progressive, evolutionary view. Man's triumph over the beasts, over nature, is his invention of *pugizein*, 'buggery'. To be ruled (*kratountai*) by women is to put a man at the level of the beasts. I will discuss the evident construction of a polarized, exclusive alternative between 'screwing women' and 'buggering boys' later in this chapter, and the representation of the female in such writing in the next chapter. For the moment, I just wish to note that the anthropology and philosophy of man's superiority to the *aloga zōia* – dependent on man's power of reason, *logos* – is a central tenet of

* πᾶν ἄλογον ζῷον βινεῖ μόνον· οἱ λογικοὶ δὲ
τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τοῦτ' ἔχομεν τὸ πλέον,
πυγίζειν εὑρόντες. ὅσοι δὲ γυναιξὶ κρατοῦνται,
τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων οὐδὲν ἔχουσι πλέον.

Stoicism,[44] and here it becomes the comic support for the celebration of a rampant sexuality.

From probably slightly earlier in the second century, my second version of the argument from nature is taken from a little read dialogue of Plutarch, the *Gryllus* or *peri tou ta aloga logōi chresthai*, 'concerning the use of reason by the beasts'. The speakers in the dialogue are Circe, Odysseus and a pig called Gryllus, 'Grunter'. Odysseus wants Circe to turn the pig back into a man – he could not suffer a man to grow old in such an unnatural (*para phusin*, 985e6) condition; she insists that he consult the pig first, and the pig gives a series of careful arguments about why it's better to be a pig than a man, and Odysseus of the many wiles is left groping for responses to this *deinos sophistes*, this 'awesome professional word-monger'. Gryllus repeatedly sets the natural propensities of the beasts in contrast with the nature of man, especially when it comes to sexual matters, which are placed under the general heading of *sophrosune* (988f2). Some desires, says Gryllus (989b10–c5) are 'natural and necessary' like eating and drinking, others 'natural but not necessary', like sex, which can be forgone without much inconvenience. So when it comes to sex, animals find no place for added, made-up, novel desires. Rather:

> For the most part our life is controlled by necessary desires and pleasures; and we engage in what is not necessary but natural only in a manner neither disorderly nor excessive.*

Consequently, for animals there is no coquetry, no exchange of money, no make-up. The animals copulate only for procreation, and after conception, says Gryllus the Pig, neither does the female receive the male, nor does the male make attempts on the female. So, he concludes ringingly: 'so slight and weak is the honour that pleasure holds for us; nature is everything'.† Now it is the distinction on the one hand between sex for mere pleasure and sex for procreation, and, on the other, between indulgence in pleasure and restriction in the search for pleasure, that underlies the polarized categories of the *sophron* lover and the *akolastos*, just as it is control

* τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς διοικεῖται, ταῖς δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαίαις ἀλλὰ φυσικαῖς μόνον οὔτ' ἀτάκτως οὔτ' ἀπλήστως ὁμιλοῦμεν.

† οὕτω μικρὰν ἔχει καὶ ἀσθενῆ τιμὴν ἡδονὴ παρ' ἡμῖν, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἡ φύσις.

of desire, *enkrateia*, that from the fifth century onwards links sexual desires to other areas of moral concern such as food and drink. 'Weakness', 'honour', 'pleasure', 'nature' are four catchwords of such debate combined here with high rhetorical righteousness. Gryllus the Pig knows how to display his moral categories. He continues:

Therefore to this very day the desires of beasts do not countenance intercourse of male with male or female with female. But there's lots of that among your high-minded and great. I forbear to mention the worthless classes.*

So, animals have no desire for same-sex mating – unlike humans, especially the *semnōn kai agathōn*, the 'high-minded and great', the upper-class philosophically educated men. (The pig will not deign to mention the low.) The term *semnos*, 'high-minded', as we will see, is especially associated with the self-projection of the philosopher; so too the term *agathos* implies both a social and a philosophical 'goodness'. The social and intellectual smear is nicely placed in the mouth of the Grunter. Thus, the pig after some examples of human heinousness draws the moral conclusion that (990e12–f3) 'even men themselves confess animals' superiority in *sophronein*', 'self-control', and in 'regulating their desires in accordance with *phusis*'. Beasts are best ...

The prose dialogue on desire inevitably recalls Plato, and Plutarch – contrary to the common image of him – happily and ironically plays the tricks of sophistic reversal on the Stoic and Platonic language of nature in defence of the apparently *aloga*, the irrational beasts, over and against the reasoning ape, man. If the criteria of judgement, on the one hand, seem absolutely conventional – self-control, respect for *phusis*, suspicion of artifice and of excess – there is none the less a certain sharpness in the satire not only in the *reductio* that puts such arguments in the mouth of a pig reasoning *against* a man, but also and more importantly, in the mocking of man's philosophical self-positioning with regard to desire: the *logos* of this *alogon* cocks a snout at the pretensions of those, the *semnoi*

* ὅθεν οὔτ' ἄρρενος πρὸς ἄρρεν οὔτε θήλεος πρὸς θῆλυ μῖξιν αἱ τῶν θηρίων ἐπιθυμίαι μέχρι γε νῦν ἐνηνόχασιν. ὑμῶν δὲ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν· ἐῶ γὰρ τοὺς οὐδενὸς ἀξίους.

kai agathoi, who seek to link a philosophy of erotics to man's superiority to the natural world. A typical ruse of satire and parody, this. The parasitic reliance on the very arguments and values it seeks to mock.

I have juxtaposed these two brief passages on nature, rationality and sexuality, to suggest something of the familiarity and manipulation of this philosophical discourse within the literature of the Empire. It is such familiar philosophical positioning that gives part of the bite to Daphnis' remark, as the boy who lives in nature seems naturally to discover the argument of the philosophy schools about natural desires. It is, however, again elsewhere in the corpus of the ancient novel where the most extensive and interesting framing to such debates is found,[45] and I want to focus for a while on one of the greatest products of late Greek, Achilles Tatius' novel *Leucippe and Cleitophon*. I will not try to recount all the ins and outs of the plot here – it is as complex as a baroque opera – save to say that Cleitophon, our hero, desires Leucippe, who loves him in return; he elopes with her; he loses her, believed dead; they both have a series of adventures before they meet again, and their relationship is consummated in marriage at the end of the novel. It is a remarkable work in many ways, which fully deserves its place in the category of Sophistic Novel. It parades scientific, anthropological and art historical knowledge in as flamboyant a way as Longus conceals such concerns in his veils of naivety. Unlike all the other extant Greek novels, it is almost completely the first-person narrative of Cleitophon, the hero. This first-person narrative changes the novel's structure of authorization, revelation and explanation – a process analysed with particular flair for the ancient Latin novel, Apuleius' *Golden Ass*, by Jack Winkler.[46] (The *Golden Ass* finds a fundamental source in Lucian's *Ass*, a first-person short story: there are many first-person accounts and narratives in genres related to the Greek novel,[47] and the influence of, say, first-person love lyric, with its sense of persona and irony is evident for Achilles Tatius.) The importance of this strategy of first-person narration to the story of the desiring subject will become clear as my analysis proceeds. I shall be concerned in this chapter with two major areas of *Leucippe and Cleitophon*. First, with the explicit discussion of male desire for males that comes at the end of book 2 of the novel, and second, with

how such philosophizing about erotics plays a continuing part in the narrative. Let me begin with the build-up towards the extended debate on the desirability of boy-love and woman-love that ends the second book. For as with Gnathon's appearance in *Daphnis and Chloe*, there is an elaborate preparation for the representation and discussion of male desire for males, that involves for Achilles Tatius a whole range of intellectual discourses in its multifaceted expression of the desiring subject.

Leucippe has come to stay in the house of her uncle, Cleitophon's father. Cleitophon, although he is engaged to his half-sister Calligone, as soon as he sees Leucippe, falls into passionate *eros*. 'As I saw her, I was destroyed,' he relates (1.4.4.), with the customary fall into passion at first sight (see above, p. 7–11). A first welcoming dinner party immediately takes place – to Cleitophon's delight he is placed where he can observe the object of his desire – and for the after-dinner entertainment a slave is brought in to sing to the lyre. He sings of how Apollo loved and pursued Daphne, who was turned into the laurel tree, destined to provide Apollo with his garlands. Cleitophon's response to the song is as follows (1.5.5–7):

This lyrical interlude fanned higher the fire in my soul, for stories of love are fuel for passion. In spite of all our admonitions to moderation, models excite us to imitation, particularly a pattern set by our betters. And more, the shame we feel at wrongful deeds is changed by the good repute of superior people to saucy freedom of speech. So I said to myself: 'Look here, Apollo himself feels love and for a maiden; unashamed of his love, he pursues her – while you hesitate and blush: untimely self-control! Are you better than a god?'* (Translation by Winkler, slightly adapted)

'Erotic literature – *erotikos logos* – is the fuel of passion', comments the hero, 'and even if a person has schooled himself to continence – *sophrosune* – an example – *paradeigma* – provokes imitation – *mimesis* – especially if it is an example of someone greater.' So Cleitophon will decide to pursue Leucippe. There are three general

* τοῦτό μοι μᾶλλον ἀσθὲν εἰς τέλος τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξέκαυσεν· ὑπέκκαυμα γὰρ ἐπιθυμίας λόγος ἐρωτικός· κἂν εἰς σωφροσύνην τις ἑαυτὸν νουθετῇ, τῷ παραδείγματι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν ἐρεθίζεται, μάλιστα ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος ἡ τὸ παράδειγμα· ἡ γὰρ ὧν ἁμαρτάνει τις αἰδὼς τῷ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀξιώματι παρρησία γίνεται. καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἔλεγον· "ἰδοὺ καὶ Ἀπόλλων ἐρᾷ, κἀκεῖνος παρθένου, καὶ ἐρῶν οὐκ αἰσχύνεται, ἀλλὰ διώκει τὴν παρθένον· σὺ δὲ ὀκνεῖς, καὶ αἰδῇ, καὶ ἀκαίρως σωφρονεῖς; μὴ κρείττων εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ".

points I wish to explore that arise from this brief but programmatic passage. First of all, *erotikoi logoi* – of which the novel itself is a prime example – are seen as stimulants, 'fuel for love'. One ancient doctor, Theodorus Priscianus, even recommends reading novels as a cure for impotence (if a boy or girl is not obtainable ...).[48] This awareness of the erotic stimulation of stories will be followed through on one level as Cleitophon woos Leucippe: he tells her a set of stories designed explicitly to make her think erotically: 'To lay the ground for Leucippe's more amorous inclination, I began speaking ...' (1.16). To begin, Cleitophon discourses to his slave and confidante, Satyrus (in the presence of Leucippe and her maid) about peacocks . The peacock – 'because he is a lover', *erotikos* – displays his tail to attract a mate. 'Does love have such power?', asks the disingenuous Satyrus, and Cleitophon proceeds (1.17) to offer four examples of *eros* in nature,[49] first, the magnet which 'loves the iron',[50] so that the contact and attraction between metal and stone may be termed 'a kiss between the lover stone and beloved iron.'* We will return to the scene of the lover's kiss shortly. Second, he moves to the plant world to tell the fable of the palm, which experiences such a passion that if the male tree is separated too far from the female tree it – he – begins to wither away. The gardener who realizes this is to graft a shoot of the female tree into the heart of the male palm, so that it recovers 'since it rejoices in the embrace of its beloved'.† Again, the highly charged erotic language of courtship and consummation is marked, especially here for plants which, it will be recalled, Plutarch described as 'unmixed and simple nature' precisely because of their lack of any desire and emotion.[51] Third, the flowing together of the river, Alpheus, and the spring, Arethusa, is described as a 'marriage' *gamos*, where the watercourse that links them is the 'marriage-broker', *numphostolei*. The common representation of the liaisons of river-gods and nymphs of the fountain helps the development of the imagery here. Fourth, and at greatest length, Cleitophon tells of the viper, a land-snake, and his passion for the eel, or water-snake. When they wish to come together in marriage, the land-snake hisses a welcome to the eel, who slithers on to the shore. They then wait, 'both staring at one another,

* ἐρώσης λίθου καὶ ἐρωμένου σιδήρου φίλημα.
† χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ἐρωμένης συμπλοκῇ.

the continental lover and island beloved',* while he vomits out his poison from his fangs. Then and only then do the two snakes embrace as lovers, since 'she no longer fears his kisses'. The poison of love, a common image of the sickness of desire – transmitted by the bite of the mouth, the kiss[52] – is here both literalized and played with, as the two lovers, alone on the liminal space of the shore, stare at one another and finally embrace in a fearless kiss. This piece of serpentine natural history is well known in ancient writers. Aelian (1.50, 9.66) tells the story and sees the hissing of the snakes as a marriage hymn, and imagines the viper reloading with his discarded poison before slipping off. Oppian (*Hal.* 1.554ff) declares that the snake loses his poison, and gives himself up to a disgraceful death, since 'he is ashamed to be a snake without his weapons'. Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* 9.76) calls it a 'common story', before turning to the more Roman history of how Pollio threw condemned slaves to pools of lampreys to watch men's bodies destroyed in an instant. Achilles Tatius has playfully turned his account – in contrast to the equally manipulative natural histories of Aelian, Oppian and Pliny – to emphasize the oral contact and, above all, the *kiss* of the eel and the snake. We have seen the extensive tradition of the connection between desire in nature and the natural desire in men: here Achilles Tatius offers a playfully eroticized version of the natural world as a different sort of model for human intercourse. His verbal foreplay seems to have the requisite effect – he notes she was listening to the erotic account *ouk aēdōs*, 'not without pleasure' (1.19) – and the book ends with Satyrus and Cleitophon congratulating themselves, Satyrus for his helpful hints, our hero for his *muthologia*, his use of *muthoi* in the process of seduction: Longus' Gnathon, it will be remembered, had been trained in, precisely, the *erotike muthologia* of the symposia of the profligate. The erotic effect of stories, such as the novel itself, is thus self-reflexively highlighted in the course of the narrative.

There is a further level, however, at which the stimulus of stories is recognized in *Leucippe and Cleitophon*. For just as the effects of erotic *logoi* and their role in seduction are emphasized, so too in Achilles Tatius the image of the reader in the text, the interpreter of

* ἀμφότεροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους βλέποντες, ὁ μὲν ἠπειρώτης ἐραστής, ἡ δὲ ἐρωμένη νησιῶτις.

erotic *logoi*, is a constantly played with motif. This is especially evident with a series of set-piece descriptions – *ecphrases* – particularly of works of art, which often provoke further analysis and comment from the narrator or other characters. These descriptions not only prompt action in the novel, but also repeatedly turn out to be programmatic in a variety of ways for the erotic narrative of the novel itself. Shadi Bartsch, following the lead of Jack Winkler on Apuleius, has written extensively on this aspect of Achilles Tatius' work: on how the programmatic images of desire, beginning with the prologue's lengthy description of the picture of the rape of Europa which prompts Cleitophon's narration, lead the reader into a hermeneutic game – a hermeneutic game that matches the play of chance, foreknowledge, control and disaster in the narrative of the novel.[53] The readers in the text prompt and complicate the interpretive processes of the readers of the text. I will be returning to Bartsch's analysis later. Here, I will offer just two brief points which seem particularly germane to this aspect of the novel. The first is to note an extraordinary passage not discussed by Bartsch, which occurs the first morning after the dinner party at which the song of Apollo and Daphne has been sung.[54] After a night of erotic dreams, interrupted cruelly by the entrance of the servant (just as Cleitophon's attempts at consummation outside his dream will be repeatedly interrupted), Cleitophon decides to try and catch a glimpse of his love (1.6.6.):

I began to walk purposefully in the house in sight of the girl. I was holding a book and reading, bent over it. But whenever I was by the door, I rolled my eye upwards to look at her. After a few such circuits, I was so completely drenched with desire from the sight that I went away with a real sickness in my soul.*

This marvellous scene – familiar from many a library – of the man glancing over a book with a pretence of reading to catch glimpses of the object of desire constructs an elegant counterpoint to the pointed telling of erotic tales. The hero's own erotic narrative and concerns distract him from the act of reading, which has become

* ἐβάδιζον ἐξεπίτηδες εἴσω τῆς οἰκίας κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς κόρης, βιβλίον ἅμα κρατῶν, καὶ ἐγκεκυφὼς ἀνεγίνωσκον· τὸν δὲ ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ κατὰ τὰς θύρας γενοίμην, ὑπείλιττον κάτωθεν, καί τινας ἐμπεριπατήσας διαύλους, καὶ ἐποχετευσάμενος ἐκ τῆς θέας ἔρωτα, σαφῶς ἀπήειν ἔχων τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς.

itself just a blind for ogling the girl of his dream. The story of the desirous eye – its physiology, activity and reactions – runs throughout this novel, and epitomizes Achilles Tatius' increasingly sophisticated and baroque treatment of the traditional elements of the erotic narrative.[55] Here, where telling stories is a purposeful part of seduction, the sight of the beloved seduces the reader away from his text. As we will see, 'distraction' for the eye as much as 'seduction' of the soul is an integral factor of the narrative of this novel.

My second area of concern with regard to 'the reader in the text' is with the extended descriptions of pictures that occur at significant junctures of the story (not least, its inception), and with the 'distraction' such images provide. Bartsch writes at length and with sophistication on these *ecphrases*. There are two brief points I wish to add to her discussion of the different ways such descriptions function both as programmatic signs for the narrative and also as hermeneutic lures for the reader. As Bartsch notes, only the picture of Philomela and Tereus receives an explicit interpretation by a character in the text.[56] In Alexandria, Cleitophon, Leucippe and their friends are about to visit Pharos, the lighthouse off the coast, little realizing that an ambush has been set there by a pirate who has fallen in love with Leucippe and wishes to abduct her. As they are leaving the house, a hawk chasing a swallow hits Leucippe with its wing. This is immediately seen as an omen, and Cleitophon, like Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, waking on the day of revenge and seeking divine backing, asks Zeus to provide a second confirmatory omen. Rather than thunder from a clear sky – the Odyssean confirmation – in this sophistic visit to Alexandria the confirmation comes from art historical exegesis. Turning round, Cleitophon finds he is standing by a painter's studio which is exhibiting a painting of the whole story of the rape of Philomela, including the tapestry she weaves telling her own story after her raper, Tereus, has cut out her tongue. First, one of Cleitophon's companions looks at the painting and advises that the trip be delayed because the painting is so full of (sexual) miseries. Then Leucippe herself – 'the race of women is, I suppose, fond of stories' (*philomuthon*), comments Cleitophon knowingly – asks for an exegesis of the painting – which Cleitophon provides, complete with moralistic commentary on the images of sex and violence. The picture which includes as a central motif the idea

of weaving an image to be read as a message, is thus read and re-read as a significant sign of the future by the characters of the story (and as Bartsch argues, by the readers of the novel). What the reading and re-reading of the erotic image also does, then, is to delay the progression of the erotic events. The distraction of erotic art – and talking about erotic art – here functions as a distraction to the progress of the narrative itself.

The other paintings do not receive explicit interpretation in this way. This leads Bartsch to write that 'the descriptions of the other ... paintings ... are inserted into the narrative in such a way that no indication is given that they are Clitophon's descriptive efforts; rather, the author seems to have forgotten that we are listening to a first-person account, and to have placed in this account "independent" descriptive passages'.[57] Each of the paintings – following the lead of the opening description of Europa – is given a highly emotive and usually eroticized account. The diptych of Prometheus and Andromeda – incidently, the first example in Western art history of a pair of paintings being analysed precisely as a diptych with significant links, which shows well Achilles' interest in using such images as productive of further meanings for the reader – focuses on the sexualized image of the body of Andromeda, tied up, dressed in transparent silks, and threatened by a monster (as her rescuing hero appears); which is set parallel to the tied-up Prometheus whose tortured body and grim visual expressions of pain are carefully anatomized. Yet the lack of markers of specifically first-person description in this emotive account cannot be simply because Achilles Tatius has 'forgotten' his first-person narrative strategy. Rather, not only is such a focus on heightened and often lovingly explored emotional response typical of Hellenistic and later *ecphrasis*,[58] but also the more generalized descriptive strategy encourages the reader of the novel towards a shared indulgence in the 'unabashed voyeurism' of erotic gazing/reading. The scene of viewing also focuses the reader's erotic response to the narrative. The descriptions of works of art thus contribute tellingly to the self-reflexive narrative of ocular distraction.

That the song of Apollo and Daphne is seen as 'fuel for love' is, then, programmatic in its highlighting of the concern with erotic stimulation of stories. The effect of *erotikoi logoi* self-reflexively

becomes a theme of the novel itself, as the relations between readers/listeners and erotic language is explored. This element of *Leucippe and Cleitophon* is a fundamental frame for the discussion of male desire towards which we are still travelling.

The second major way that Cleitophon's response to the song is importantly programmatic is the way his own comments focus on his moral attitude to the erotic effects he is feeling. For Cleitophon's reaction is placed under the aegis of a schooling in *sophrosune*, that dominant *askesis* of Greek philosophies of *eros*; but it is a schooling that slips in the face of *erotikoi logoi*, as the lure of imitating an exemplum proves too strong, especially when the example is provided by *tou kreittonos*, 'one of the greater ones' (a term which Heliodorus uses absolutely to mean 'god'). The language of *paradeigma* and *mimesis* is also deeply implicated in moral philosophy (again, at least since Plato), and in the educational tradition of Cynicism, say, the figure of Heracles as the archetypal hero repeatedly plays the role of a *paradeigma* of *sophrosune* to be imitated by humans.[59] As in so many Christian homiletic texts of the period, where men and women are urged to take Jesus as a paradigm and construe *sophrosune* as virginity, so here Cleitophon takes a god as his paradigm – but of slippage. Thus in this marked language of moral philosophy he draws out the parallels between himself and the god, concluding to himself, 'But you hesitate and show shame and untimely continence' – *akairos sophroneis*. 'Surely you're not greater – *kreissōn* – than god', the exemplary 'greater' figure. The self-confessed slippage in *sophrosune*, set up and then undercut as a philosophical term *par excellence*, is another theme we shall return to in this novel. The moral self-positioning of characters in the novel through the rhetoric of the philosophy schools, as we will see, is a fertile source of irony and humour.

Central to this irony – and this is my third and final point on Cleitophon's reaction to the song of Apollo and Daphne – is the strategy of first-person narration. The argument Cleitophon uses refers not merely to philosophical argumentation but also to many literary versions of arguments about chastity and control. 'Do not think yourself greater than the gods' is the advice that the sophistic and dangerous nurse in Euripides' *Hippolytus* famously offers the doomed Phaedra, as she counsels the willing indulgence of desire –

and it is a sentiment repeated in different guises throughout the fifth century.[60] Yet for all this rich texture of echoing of the arguments of past and contemporary texts, Cleitophon's expressions are ironized, as self-defence and self-deceit link in the self-interest of the lover. The heightened awareness of the legacy of the past that characterizes the Second Sophistic (as it does the earlier Hellenistic writers) becomes here not merely a way of linking Cleitophon's erotic feelings to the traditions of erotic narrative, but also an ironic image of the manipulation of the lover's self in and against such a tradition. Cleitophon's first-person account thus stages 'the cultivation of the self', that central process in Foucault's construction of ancient sexuality, but stages it as a cultivated irony about self-representation. It is not by chance that first-person narratives have so little place in Foucault's studies: his normative model – for all the self-awareness presupposed by the notion of 'care of the self' – repeatedly represses the mirrors and fictions of the autobiographical stance, which would significantly transform the sense of 'cultivation' or 'care' of the self as a process.

Cleitophon's reaction to the song of Apollo and Daphne, then, is not merely programmatic in a set of complex ways for the narrative of the novel, but also provides a linkage between the novel and the traditions of erotic writing it manipulates. A similar self-conscious manipulation of the traditions of erotic discourse is seen in the scene that follows. For Cleitophon, racked by desire, goes for help and advice to visit his cousin Cleinias, a man two years older and one of love's initiates, *eroti tetelesmenos*. The *erotodidaskalos*, 'teacher in *eros*', is one of the central players in the cast of erotic narrative. In philosophical circles, Diotima from Plato's *Symposium* and Socrates himself lead to a set of philosophical works, now largely lost: Diogenes Laertius refers, for example, to works on *eros* by Theophrastus, Persaeus, Antisthenes, as well as two contributions from Aristotle.[61] The correct social and psychological behaviour of the lover, the physiology and symptomology of *eros* are transmitted as initiation into the 'mysteries' of *eros* by a specific teacher. The physiology and symptomology of desire were also the subject of sexual handbooks, of which Philaenis appears to have been the best-known writer. She is said to have lived in the fourth century BCE, and her works are sneeringly referred to as teaching bizarre

sexual positions in the *Erotes* attributed to Lucian, a work I shall be discussing at the close of this chapter.[62] She is also known to the Christian apologist Clement of Alexandria, who complains that pictures of her sexual efforts are purchased more readily than pictures of the labours of Heracles; and a Hellenistic epigram by Aeschrion – a mock epitaph – reascribes her work to a man, the sophist Polycrates.[63] (This is presumably an insult to Polycrates rather than merely a comment on textual tradition.) Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* draws on both traditions of erotic mentorship for his marvellously ironic account of Roma as a city of Amor. The Greek novel repeatedly stages a scene of teaching about *eros*, usually from an older male. We have already seen in the first chapter how the ignorant Daphnis and Chloe turn first to Philetas, whose aposiopesis leaves them frustrated pupils, and then to Lycainion, whose teaching knowingly transgresses the boundary between the theoretical and the practical. Cleitophon's cousin, Cleinias, loves young men, however, and previously has been the butt of Cleitophon's humour for being a 'slave of erotic pleasure' (1.7.2.).* This expression may suggest the figure of the *akolastos* who is unable to control his pleasure (though Cleinias replies to such a gibe simply that 'you too will soon be a slave', a state of affairs that has now come to pass); and the first thing we are told of Cleinias is that he has bought a horse as a most extravagant present for his beloved. As the novel progresses, however, Cleinias repeatedly plays the role of trusted friend and mentor to Cleitophon, demonstrating a sensibleness and control that belies any suggestion of the *akolastos* that may be evoked by this opening description of him. Cleinias is to play the role of *erotodidaskalos* here, but he is a teacher carefully framed as a figure of authority. For although Cleitophon wants advice on how to woo his love, before he can tell his story, Cleinias' lover comes in with the terrible news that his father intends to arrange a marriage for him to a rich woman. This prompts an outburst from Cleinias and the lover on the horrors of marriage – the music, torches and banging of doors at a wedding would make one think the miserable bridegroom is being sent into war (which neatly reverses the 'lover as soldier' *topos*) – and a homily on the race of women in particular,

* δοῦλος ... ἐρωτικῆς ἡδονῆς.

complete with standard examples of murderous females from myth and literature, Phaedra, Clytemnestra, Philomela ... a catalogue of the monstrous regiment which concludes ringingly: 'O women, women, they stop at nothing! If they love, they kill; if they don't love, they kill.'* This speech against the race of women stands as a significant (and comic) prelude to Cleinias' advice to Cleitophon on how to win *his* woman.

The advice is a fascinating and characteristic piece of Achilles' prose, that shows well how desire becomes diffused and articulated through a range of intellectual stances. It begins with Cleinias pointing out how lucky Cleitophon is to be able to observe his beloved regularly, since they are living in the same house. (Indeed, many erotic narratives are driven by the difficulty of the lover gaining access to his beloved, as many stories begin with the brief, stolen glance at a festival.) But this piece of encouragement quickly turns into a physiology of the desiring eye (1.9.4):

> For the eyes receive each others' reflections and they form therefrom small images of bodies as in mirrors. Such emanation of beauty flowing down through them into the soul is a kind of copulation at a distance. This is not far removed from the intercourse of bodies – it is in fact a novel form of intimate embrace ... eyes are the ambassadors of love, and the habit of daily sharing helps achieve reciprocity.†

This extraordinary account of the gaze as copulation not only eroticizes to the utmost degree the description of what is a standard element of the erotic encounter, but also blends together the language of medicine and science – *antanaklomenoi*, 'reflecting', *apomattousi*, 'form impressions', 'images', *aporrhoe*, 'emanation' – with the abstract language of ethical philosophy – 'the habit of daily sharing helps achieve reciprocity' (a phrase which also implies in *charis* the physical 'reciprocity' of 'achieved' sexual pleasure) – to concoct a finely intellectualized image of what we have already seen described as peeping over a book at a girl. Cleinias goes on to

* ὦ πάντα τολμῶσαι γυναῖκες· κἂν φιλῶσι, φονεύουσι· κἂν μὴ φιλῶσι, φονεύουσιν.

† ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντανακλωμένοι ἀπομάττουσιν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ εἴδωλα· ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή, δι' αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν καταρρέουσα, ἔχει τινα μίξιν ἐν ἀποστάσει. καὶ ὀλίγον ἐστι τῆς τῶν σωμάτων μίξεως· καινὴ γὰρ ἐστι σωμάτων συμπλοκή ... ὀφθαλμὸς γὰρ φιλίας πρόξενος καὶ τὸ σύνηθες τῆς κοινωνίας εἰς χάριν ἀνυσιμώτερον.

promise that a woman's heart can be tamed as a wild beast is, by habit, an argument that dimly recalls the language of nature and 'taming' with which the encounter of Daphnis and Gnathon is articulated. And this process of 'taming' is then outlined with the specific advice to tell a virgin she is beautiful and loved, since she wishes to be thought beautiful and to be loved, and only the lover can provide her with the testimony she needs. When Cleitophon worries that he does not know the words for such seductions, his teacher tells him not to seek to learn from another, 'For the god is a self-taught scholar.'* On the one hand, it is ironically disingenuous for the teacher to disavow the need for teaching as he plays the role of authority figure. Cleinias indeed goes on with lengthy maxims, as if from an *Ars Amatoria*, about how to approach a virgin, how to turn her natural shame to your advantage, and how to discourse in such a way as to make her *euagogon* (1.10.5.), 'tractable'. (It is precisely to make Leucippe *euagogon* that Cleitophon begins his tale of the peacocks, 1.16.1, quoted above p. 68.) Eros as the teacher of persuasive language, however, will be returned to specifically when Cleitophon becomes in turn the object of an attempted seduction (5.27.1). On the other hand, the remark is a carefully attuned literary introduction. Euripides famously wrote in his *Sthenoboea* that 'Eros, then, teaches the poet even if he were previously without inspiration (*amousos*).'† This remark, which may also be the literary basis for Alexis' comment that 'lovers must be poetical',[64] is in turn echoed by Nicias, who in response to Theocritus' eleventh *Idyll* (which is addressed to him), a poem about the Cyclops performing love poetry, wrote: 'For the Erotes have taught many poets who were without inspiration (*amousos*) previously.'‡ So Callimachus, also writing on how the Cyclops sought to salve his love by singing poetry, comments 'he was no ignoramus, the Cyclops'§ – where the foolish monster of myth, with whatever Hellenistic irony, earns Callimachus' recognition of his education because of his experience of desire and composing in response to desire.[65] So too, the word *autodidaktos*, 'self-taught', occurs only once in Homer, a famous

* αὐτοδίδακτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς σοφιστής.
† ποιητὴν δ' ἄρα Ἔρως διδάσκει κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρίν.
‡ οἱ γὰρ Ἔρωτες ποιητὰς πολλοὺς ἐδίδαξαν τοὺς πρὶν ἀμούσους.
§ οὐκ ἀμαθὴς ὁ Κύκλωψ.

passage where the bard Phemius pleads for his life before the vengeful Odysseus. Phemius continues (22.347–8): 'god has implanted all sorts of paths of song in my mind'. The god himself is said to be self-taught here, although the implication seems to be that the divinity will implant the paths of song required in the lover's mind when the occasion requires it. This god of desire, though, is no Homeric bard. Rather he is a *sophistes*, a professional scholar, a professional word-monger. So, Plato's Diotima famously calls Eros a *sophistes* (*Symp.* 203d7) who is always 'doing philosophy' and plotting other devices (although, as she explains, no other god is a philosopher, since they *are* wise, and have no need to seek wisdom). In this sophistic novel of desire, it should come as no surprise that *the* sophist is Eros himself.

Cleinias concludes (1.10.7) that if Cleitophon wants to win his Love, he should, in Winkler's nice translation, 'spare nothing in staging whatever elaborate production will bring your drama to its intended climax'.* The marked language of theatre is a common strand of Achilles Tatius' generic self-awareness, as it is in Heliodorus. (The ancient novelists, unlike the English, love to 'make a scene'.) Bartsch writes 'theater in Achilles Tatius is equated with deception or persuasion rather than revelation, and it is usually associated with false rhetoric'.[66] But theatre is also associated with a self-conscious playing of roles, which is nowhere more marked than in the case of the lover aware of his position within the literary tradition, through and in which his language and gestures inevitably seem to be rehearsals of *topoi*, as mimesis of a role model. The recognition of a social and literary script in the drama of passion – the *topoi* of the self – links the allusive texture of Achilles' prose, the manipulation of generic devices, and the rhetoric of self-positioning encouraged by the first-person narrative, in a playfully sophistic rhetoric of self-reflexiveness.

Cleinias' erotic lesson, then, combines a fine blend of science, literary self-awareness, humour, and a subtly layered rhetoric of the nature of things. To appreciate the lesson requires such an awareness of the complex texture of this writing about *eros* from within the history of writing about *eros*. This first formal discussion of Eros is a

* χορήγησον τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, μὴ ἀπολέσῃς σου τὸ δρᾶμα.

crucial prelude to the formal debate on desire for males and desire for females towards which I am still travelling. What I want to emphasize most strongly, however, is how Cleitophon describes the dialogue: *tauta* ephilosophoumen *peri tou theou*, 'thus we were philosophizing about the god'. The novel represents here a first dialogue between men on desire that is described as '*doing philosophy*'. It is the relation between that sense of 'philosophy' and the knowing discussion of seduction that I will be continuing to discuss.

Now Cleinias' lover is killed in a horrific riding accident – his first and last use of his lover's gift – and his funeral takes place immediately. The boy's father laments his death as the loss of an opportunity for marriage, where the funeral dirge has replaced the marriage hymn – language most commonly associated in Greek tradition with the death of a *parthenos*. *Oichomai*, 'I am dead', 'done for' was the first word the boy had used to describe prospective marriage; and Cleinias has denounced the fatal attraction of the race of women, killers all. This association of death and marriage has now been grimly instantiated, although not as the lovers had expected. The figure of the teacher about desire has had a harsh lesson to learn, as the novel thus immediately reframes the authority figure as subject to the narrative of reversal. This is emblematic of a central tension in the novel's narrative strategy from Cleitophon's first announcement that he has 'suffered many outrages from *eros*' (1.2.1) and is thus exemplary. For the play between the generalizing, predictable models of *eros* – what we all know – and the (un)expected twists and turns of the love story – the surprises of the make-believe – is a driving narratological force in the novel as we move towards the expected conclusion in marriage, though not the expected closure, as the novel ends unexpectedly without returning to the frame of the scene in Sidon to explain why Cleitophon is at the temple of Astarte telling strangers his life story. Cleinias, set up as a teacher about desire, thus becomes – with typical novelistic *mise-en-abyme* effect – a particularly telling example of the question of how a love story may be said to teach a (general, exemplary) lesson, how it tells the truth about *eros*. What is there to be learnt from a love story? How things are/were / should be / could be / will be? What is it to claim to be in control of a love story, to be an authority on love stories, especially when you feature as the subject of one? Can *experto*

credite be *just* a sign of the authority of experience, avoid standing as a warning of the unreliability of a partial witness? The narrative here – the theory followed by the practical – leads the reader to evaluate, explore, manipulate the relation between the generalized advice and the specifics of a narrative. As in *Daphnis and Chloe*, where the scene of teaching constantly implicates the reader's knowingness, so in *Leucippe and Cleitophon* the scene of teaching about desire becomes a privileged moment for displaying also the reader's commitment to the normative models and narratives of desire.

The death of Cleinias' lover, however, not only offers a black commentary to the discussion of desire that precedes it, but also has a function in the narrative to clear the way for Cleinias in his role of adviser and confidant to accompany the lovers when they elope. And indeed the affair of Cleitophon with Leucippe (in contrast with Cleinias' doomed love) proceeds apace towards the crisis of elopement. The advice of Cleinias has been followed through. A first kiss (as we will discuss later) has been stolen; Leucippe has reciprocated Cleitophon's feelings. Indeed, things advance so quickly that by the middle of book 2 Cleitophon has agreed a midnight tryst in Leucippe's bedroom to consummate their passion. It looks as if the unthinkable in novelistic terms is about to happen – not only the hero having an extra-marital affair with the heroine, but in book 2 already! The purity of novelistic convention is preserved, however, with Achilles' customary narratological panache. Leucippe's mother has a tellingly violent nightmare (2.23.5):

She dreamt a bandit with a naked sword took her daughter and led her off. He threw her down on her back, and sliced her in two all the way up from her stomach, making his first insertion in her vagina.*

The mother dreams a robber sticks a sword into Leucippe's vagina and rips it through her body; and consequently she screams and runs into the bedroom in time to prevent the penetration so violently imaged in the dream. (This image of violent penetration could well have been an example in the discussion of the violence to Chloe in the first chapter: we will see further images of such penetration

* ἐδόκει τινὰ λῃστὴν μάχαιραν ἔχοντα γυμνὴν ἄγειν ἁρπασάμενον αὐτῆς τὴν θυγατέρα καὶ καταθέμενον ὑπτίαν, μέσην ἀνατέμνειν τῇ μαχαίρᾳ τὴν γάστερα κάτωθεν ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς.

shortly.) Cleitophon, consummation of his love deferred for the first of many times in the novel, flees unrecognized through the night, and Leucippe is left to face her mother. The mother laments that Leucippe had not simply been hurt in a war; calls the 'wound' she imagines her daughter to have experienced crueller than the cut she saw in her dream – again the language recalls Lycainion's description of penetration; and, with somewhat bathetic class-consciousness, hopes the perpetrator at least was not a slave. Trouble is clearly brewing for Leucippe and Cleitophon, and the next day on the advice of Cleinias, who comes along to support the lovers, Cleitophon and Leucippe elope, to begin the series of adventures that take them all round the Mediterranean before finally they will be reunited at the very end of book 7. They first board a ship to Alexandria, and it is on board that they meet Menelaus, an Egyptian. (Menelaus' name inevitably evokes stories of beautiful women, elopement, separation, and trips to Egypt.) This Menelaus has killed his male lover by mistake in a hunting accident and is in miserable exile – a history of *eros* that he briefly recounts, as erotic stories within the erotic story begin to build up. Throughout the Greek novel, the inset erotic tale is a common narrative device. In the Romance, each character has a defining tale of *eros* to tell. On the one hand, these 'nested' narratives have often been analysed as providing a particular counterpoint to the framing tale – as foreshadowing events to come in the narrative, offering thematic focuses, constructing paradigms which help articulate the place of the hero and heroine within the realm of erotic discourse. On the other hand, Winkler in his fine analysis of Apuleius and Bartsch in her account of Achilles Tatius have analysed this *mise-en-abyme* narrative structure as a site for the exploration of the hermeneutics of reading itself. Yet there is something particular to the inset narrative of *eros* specifically. ('At the origin of Narrative, desire', writes Barthes.[67]) For the story of *eros* overlaps the exchange that is the erotic encounter with the exchange that is narrative – in such a way as to promote the love story as a privileged telling scene. ('By a dizzying device, narrative becomes the representation of the contract on which it is based ... One narrates in order to obtain by exchanging, and it is this exchange that is represented in the narrative itself.'[68]) Here, Menelaus' tale reduces Cleinias to tears (another

emotive response to a story), and both Cleinias and Cleitophon respond by telling Menelaus their stories. It is after this exchange of (failed) love stories that Cleitophon provokes a discussion about whether love for males or females is preferable, in order to cheer up the two like-minded males whose lovers have thus died before their time. The exchange of erotic tales is thus to be followed by an exchange of philosophies about *eros*. In the same way as the language and strategies of rhetoric and philosophy are integral to the texture of Achilles' prose, so the formal (rhetorical and philosophical) debate on *eros* – a *sunkrisis* – even as it is marked specifically as a distraction, is thus integrally linked into the narrative of Achilles Tatius' novel.

Leucippe has gone below deck to snooze (2.35.1): the debate is for the men, even if it is not a 'symposium of the profligate'. 'I don't know why', begins Cleitophon with a smile, 'desire for males is fashionable these days' (2.35.2). He makes this remark in the hope of prompting a *logon erotikes echomenon psuchagogias*, 'a discussion aimed at erotic mental stimulation' or 'distraction'. The term *psuchagogia* has a long history in the philosophical discussion of rhetoric and erotics (in particular stemming from Plato's attack on rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* (261aff), although, as ever, it is Gorgias and, in particular, his striking description of language's effect on the soul as *hedones epagogon, lupes apagogon*, 'stimulant of pleasure, destimulant of grief', that lurk behind Plato's argument[69]). Menelaus' response is suitably couched in similarly familiar and philosophically influenced terms. Boys, he says, are *haplousteroi*, 'simpler' than women; and their *kallos*, 'beauty' or 'nobility', is a 'sharper' cause of pleasure. We have already seen Plutarch's use of *haplous*, 'simple', as a evaluative term in his discussion of nature and erotics, and Aristotle, when he lists the traits of the female and the male (*HA* 608a11–609a18), describes the female as 'more deceptive' and the male as 'simpler', *haplousteron*. This word becomes particularly associated with the love of boys when opposed to the love of women, as the values of 'simplicity' (set against the artifice of make-up and decoration) are used to challenge the claim of 'naturalness' for male–female desire. So Straton begins a bizarre poem on a similar theme with 'A girl has no sphincter (*sphinkter*), no simple

kiss, no natural smell to her flesh ...'* What exactly is missing in a girl? Does *sphinkter* imply 'anus' as so often in the medical writings? Or 'tightness', 'muscle-tone', as in the common attack on females' flabby flesh, though this would be a particularly odd usage of *sphinkter*?[70] Here, the standard attacks on perfumed skin – stigmatized as 'unnatural', *ou* phusi*ke* – and on over-educated kissing are joined in a pseudo-medical list to an extraordinary anatomical account of the female body that seems to depend solely and obscenely on the desire of the author: so he concludes that 'girls are frigid when taken from behind because there is nowhere to put your wandering hand'. The 'nowhere' marks what a woman, as Freud would put it, lacks. The absence of 'simplicity' in a girl's kiss is here part of a full anatomy of missing parts.

Even the 'sharpness' of desire – a very common image, of course, that we have seen with Chloe's symptomology – is specifically utilized in the context of a contrast between desiring males and desiring females by the Hellenistic epigrammatist Asclepiades who concludes (37 G–P) that to the same degree that men are more powerful than women, so desire for men is 'sharper', *oxuteros*. 'How can the love of boys be sharper', worries Cleitophon in provocative response, 'if it is destined to fade and disappear, like the drink of Tantalus?' Cleitophon, too, here draws on familiar argumentative ploys both in his mythological exemplum of Tantalus for the tantalizations of desire, and in his recognition that love of boys is traditionally limited to the period before the first beard grows. (There are many poems regretting the onset of hairiness in young males.) And thus set up in such traditional language, as part of a series of erotic encounters and erotic tales, and indeed as only the most formal of a set of theorizing remarks on desire and its effects, the dialogue proceeds with Menelaus producing an epideictic speech in favour of desiring males; Cleitophon interrupts with a speech in favour of females and kissing females; and Menelaus replies with a speech in support of male kisses. Let us look at this formal exchange.

Menelaus' first speech begins by answering Cleitophon's point on the brevity of a boy's desirability with some fine words on the intensity of brief and unsatisfied desire that is never cloyed by the

* οὐ σφιγκτὴρ ἔστιν παρὰ παρθένῳ, οὐδὲ φίλημα ἁπλοῦν, οὐ φυσικὴ χρωτὸς ἐϋπνοΐη.

excess of satisfaction (2.36): 'You do not know the main point (*kephalaion*) of pleasure: for to be unsatisfied is always a desirable state. Constant recourse to anything makes satisfaction shrivel into satiation.' And to these grandly expressed sentiments, he offers the classic example of the rose: 'The rose is the most beautiful flower precisely because its beauty fades quickly.' This leads to a second point: Men pursue two sorts of beauty, heavenly and vulgar, *ouranion* and *pandemion* – a thoroughly Platonic distinction (as now the arguments of the philosophy school are directly brought to bear). Indeed, the argument appears to be taking a Platonic turn (particularly towards the *Symposium*): 'Heavenly beauty is oppressed at her implication in mortal beauty and seeks quickly to mount to heaven; the vulgar gravitates downwards and luxuriates among bodies.' In this case, however, it is not exactly an escape from the physical that characterizes desire for 'heavenly' beauty; for Menelaus makes his case rather through the mythological exemplum of Ganymede, snatched to be Zeus's 'heavenly' cup-bearer. Zeus's female liaisons in contrast end in disaster: Alcmene ends in sorrow and exile, Danae was put in a chest and thrown into the sea and Semele became mere firewood (*puros trophe*). The grand tones of Menelaus' opening remarks on satiety, and the philosophical claim of the 'two sorts of desire' turn out to be foils for a self-consciously manipulative, mythological distinction between Zeus's male and female rapes, constructed with a wilful rhetorical verve.

At this point, Cleitophon interrupts with a neatly sophistic reversal of Menelaus' points. He too begins with some general and theoretical sounding remarks. Women's beauty, he claims, is more 'heavenly', because it does not perish so quickly (2.37.1):

> For non-degeneration is close to divinity. That which is changeable in its degeneration imitates human nature, and is not heavenly but vulgar.*

That which degenerates 'imitates human nature' not the divine (and note the appeal to nature conjoined with the philosophically charged vocabulary, in terms that a Christian like Methodius would have read with clear if different understanding). This grand opening also reverts immediately to mythology, however, as Cleitophon

* ἐγγὺς γὰρ τοῦ θείου τὸ ἄφθαρτον. τὸ δὲ κινούμενον ἐν φθορᾷ θνητὴν φύσιν μιμούμενον, οὐκ οὐράνιόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πάνδημον.

exemplifies his point by bandying exempla with Menelaus. If Ganymede was taken to heaven, women's beauty brought Zeus to earth. Ganymede can pour the wine, but Hera is at the party. If Ganymede was snatched to heaven, it was as outraged victim, not as honoured lover. Semele, however, was transformed by fire, like Heracles, not manhandled by a bird. The sophistic delight in the variable exemplification of mythology is evident. As the seduction of Leucippe had involved the manipulation of mythological exempla, so the formal discussion of desire requires its journey through the resource of mythology.

Now, however, Cleitophon develops his argument explicitly in a new direction. Let us leave *muthologia*, he says, and let us talk of *ten en tois ergois hedonen* 'pleasure in the thing itself'. In best rhetorical style he begins with an 'Unaccustomed as I am' *topos* (2.37.5):

I am a neophyte when it comes to women; I've only consorted with those who sell themselves for sex. Perhaps someone else who has been more deeply initiated might have more to say. Yet a speech there will be, even if I am but moderately experienced.*

'I am', says Cleitophon, 'a neophyte when it comes to women, since I've only slept with prostitutes.' Unlike Daphnis or Theagenes in Heliodorus or the Ninus fragment, there is no fetish of sexual innocence here, merely a rhetorical disclaimer of not being quite an initiate *memuemenos*. ('Initiation' here implies more than a first act of sexual intercourse, as in so many modern romances. Nor is there any talk or implication of 'love' as opposed to 'sex', that other favourite of the modern romance.) Although he has consorted with prostitutes, he doesn't regard himself as having 'gone all the way', the full experience. And indeed he goes on to deliver quite a speech, which although long deserves to be quoted here in full; for it is a quite remarkable account of 'pleasure in the thing itself' (2.37.6–10):

A woman's body is moist in the embrace, and her lips are tender and soft for kissing. Therefore she holds a man's body wholly and congenially wedged into her embraces, into her very flesh; and her partner is totally encompassed with pleasure. She plants kisses on your lips like a seal touching

* ἐγὼ μὲν πρωτόπειρος ὢν εἰς γυναῖκας, ὅσον ὁμιλῆσαι ταῖς εἰς Ἀφροδίτην πωλουμέναις· ἄλλος γὰρ ἂν ἴσως εἰπεῖν τι καὶ πλέον ἔχοι μεμυημένος· εἰρήσεται δέ μοι, κἂν μετρίως ἔχω πείρας.

warm wax; she kisses with art and makes her kiss sweeter: for she wants to kiss not only with her lips but also with her teeth, grazing all around the mouth of the kisser, and her kisses nip. Her breasts too, when fondled, have their own special pleasure. When the height of Aphrodite's act is reached, she is frantic with pleasure, and kisses with her mouth wide open, and goes crazy. Tongues during this time come together in caresses, and struggle violently to kiss as much as possible. You make the pleasure greater by opening your mouth to kisses. When a woman reaches the very climax of Aphrodite's act, she naturally gasps with that burning pleasure, and the gasp rises quickly to the lips with the breath of love, and there it meets a wandering kiss that is looking for a way down: this kiss turns back with the gasp, and mingles with it, and follows down and strikes the heart. The heart confused by the kiss throbs. If it were not firmly bound in the chest, it would drag itself upward to the kisses. The kisses of boys are not educated. Their embraces are untutored, their love-making lazy, and devoid of pleasure.*

Even for an admittedly (or inevitably) male version of female pleasure, this frankly eroticized account is hard to parallel in the ancient Greek world at least. In the medical texts of the Hippocratic corpus, for example, female pleasure in sex is scarcely noted, and even female desire is represented usually as desire for procreation: the word *eros* does not even occur.[71] (The contrast with, say, Victorian medicine is striking.[72]) In New Comedy, whose influence on the novel is immense if hard to trace in detail because of our lack of sources, the result of the plot is regularly a happy-ever-after marriage between a young man and a young woman of similar class

* γυναικὶ μὲν οὖν ὑγρὸν μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μαλθακὰ δὲ τὰ χείλη πρὸς τὰ φιλήματα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει τὸ σῶμα ἐν τοῖς ἀγκαλίσμασιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς σαρξὶν ὅλως ἐνηρμοσμένον, καὶ ὁ συγγιγνόμενος περιβάλλεται ἡδονῇ· ἐγγίζει δὲ τοῖς χείλεσιν ὥσπερ σφραγῖδας τὰ φιλήματα, φιλεῖ δὲ τεχνῇ καὶ σκευάζει τὸ φίλημα γλυκύτερον. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐθέλει φιλεῖν τοῖς χείλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὀδοῦσι συμβάλλεται καὶ περὶ τὸ τοῦ φιλοῦντος στόμα βόσκεται καὶ δάκνει τὰ φιλήματα· ἔχει δέ τινα καὶ μαστὸς ἐπαφώμενος ἰδίαν ἡδονήν. ἐν δὲ τῇ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκμῇ οἱστρεῖ μὲν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, περικέχηνε δὲ φιλοῦσα καὶ μαίνεται· αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον φοιτῶσιν ἀλλήλαις εἰς ὁμιλίαν καὶ ὡς δύνανται βιάζονται κἀκεῖναι φιλεῖν· σὺ δὲ μείζονα ποιεῖς τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀνοιγῶν τὰ φιλήματα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ τέρμα αὐτὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἡ γυνὴ γινομένη πέφυκεν ἀσθμαίνειν ὑπὸ καυματώδους ἡδονῆς, τὸ δὲ ἄσθμα σὺν πνεύματι ἐρωτικῷ μέχρι τῶν τοῦ στόματος χειλέων ἀναθορὸν συγτυχάνει πλανωμένῳ τῷ φιλήματι καὶ ζητοῦντι καταβῆναι κάτω· ἀναστρέφον τε σὺν τῷ ἄσθματι τὸ φίλημα καὶ μιχθὲν ἔπεται καὶ βάλλει τὴν καρδίαν· ἡ δὲ ταραχθεῖσα τῷ φιλήματι πάλλεται. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῖς σπλάγχνοῖς ἦν δεδεμένη, ἠκολούθησεν ἂν καὶ ἀνείλκυσεν αὐτὴν ἄνω τοῖς φιλήμασι. παίδων δὲ φιλήματα μὲν ἀπαίδευτα, περιπλοκαὶ δὲ ἀμαθεῖς, Ἀφροδίτη δὲ ἀργή, ἡδονῆς δὲ οὐδέν.

and age. But expressions of sexual desire do not occur in the mouths of well-bred Athenian maidens, nor are there discussions of female pleasure in New Comedy: rape is a commoner causal factor in these stories.[73] Even in Aristophanes, where the insatiable desire of women is a *topos* easily placed in a history of male writing on female instability, there is, amid the many slurs, gibes, and even scenes that depend on the (excessive) sexual desire of women, nothing that comes even close to Cleitophon's detailed tracing of physical response. There are several points to be made about this extraordinary account. First, the opposition of art and nature that was so developed in *Daphnis and Chloe* is also present, if less emphatically, as it is in most commentaries on female desire. Here we see privileged the *techne* of a woman as opposed to the lack of education punningly ascribed to the *paides*, whose kisses are *apaideuta*, whose embraces are 'untutored', 'unschooled', *amatheis*; but at the same time, the naturalness – *pephuken* – of a woman's gasping with pleasure is also underlined. Her physical response is based in *phusis*. Second, one way in which the discourse about sexuality is said by recent critics to change in the Common Era is a move towards a symmetry and mutuality between men and women. I shall be looking at this invention of romantic love in the next chapter. It is true especially in the novel that the hero and the heroine are often represented as symmetrical in age, background, attitudes, and as figures transformed by mutual desire – which is in striking contrast to most earlier Greek writing. Even in New Comedy, as I have just noted, there is little mutuality in the expression of desire or in the expectations of the narrative. Since the earliest representations of male–male liaisons, moreover, the response of the *eromenos*, the male object of desire, is marked by an asymmetrical commitment to control and pleasure, where the willingness of the *eromenos* to indicate pleasure or sexual attraction is often stigmatized as a sign of the *akolastos*, the youth who will not grow into a proper citizen. Even Plato's untypical treatment of a lover's response, part of which I discussed earlier in this chapter, does not attempt to remove – indeed it relies on – the asymmetrical relations between lover and beloved. In Cleitophon's heightened prose, there is an echo of such arguments in the paralleling of male and female response, the emphasis on shared pleasure, and even satisfaction in shared pleasure

set in contrast with the lazy and untutored response of boys, in whom there is no pleasure. This final comment of Cleitophon in its dismissive brevity is directed specifically at the male lover's expectation of a negligible sexual response from the *eromenos*, and draws its force from the novel expectations of the Romance of a mutual desire between hero and heroine. Yet this is an account that moves far from any standard exposition of mutuality (with its usual reliance on the model of chaste marriage) to an erotic revelling in its representation of sexuality, as any philosophical point becomes the occasion for the 'story of the kiss' from embrace to orgasm.

This leads to a third and most important point. The dialogue is introduced under the aegis of erotic psychagogia. As the lover in the absence of his loved one describes what he has not yet fully enjoyed, whose *psuchagogia* is involved here? What response is the reader to have towards such an account? The erotic kiss has played a distinctive role in the progression of Leucippe and Cleitophon's affair. It will be recalled that when Cleitophon wants to excite desire in Leucippe, he tells her the story of the sea-snake, the murray, and the viper, the land-snake, who when they fancy each other have to wait for the sea-snake to discharge his poison on the ground so that they can finally kiss with impunity. The iron and the magnet too kiss (as 'stone' and 'iron', those conventionally hard-hearted objects, fall under the erotic novel's softening spell). Shortly after these *histoires d'amour*, Cleitophon sees Leucippe mumble an Egyptian charm over her maid's hand, when the girl is stung by a bee. So he pretends to be stung on the lip and requests the same cure. (As Adam Phillips writes in his delightful analysis of kissing, 'At certain periods of our lives we spend a lot of time plotting for kisses ...'[74]) 'She moved closer and put her mouth near mine in order to mumble the charm over the wound. In whispering the formula, she lightly grazed my lips with hers' (2.7.4–5). This brief though scarcely casual grazing turns into a first stolen kiss, carefully taken and described by Cleitophon (2.7.5): 'I silently kissed her in return, just suppressing the noises kisses make. And as she formed the words, opening and closing her mouth, she transformed that incantation into a steady stream of kisses.' The *topos* of the 'enchantment' of a lover's kiss is here literalized as the spell turns into a kiss, as the lover's words become in the opening and shutting of the mouth a sexual contact.

('Truly infectious, kissing may be our most furtive, or most reticent sexual act, the mouth's elegy to itself.'[75]) This slow anatomy of the birth of a kiss finally reaches a climax as, with suitable phrases from Cleitophon and only token resistance from Leucippe, a first mutual embrace takes place. This event, interrupted immediately by the entrance of the servant, prompts the following response from Cleitophon (2.8.1):

I could feel her kiss still resting on my lips like a foreign body, and I carefully guarded it as a secret source of pleasure. For a kiss is a premier pleasure, love-child of the mouth, and the mouth is the loveliest member of the body, for it is the organ of speech, and speech is the shadow of the soul itself. The union and commingling of two mouths radiates pleasure down into the bodies and draws up the souls towards the kissing lips.*

Plato in a famous epigram talks of how his soul came to his lips to escape his body when he kissed Agathon (*AP* 5.78, P. no. iii). But here Achilles Tatius has Cleitophon reflect in a general, physiological manner on a previous erotic moment, a reflection constructed in his own particular blend of scientific, philosophical and medical terminology, as the slow-motion story of the first kiss prompts a retrospective account in a different analytic register.

In book 4, there is a further wonderful conjunction of Achilles Tatius' peculiar oral poetics. First, there is an extraordinary description of why it is good if frightening to put your head in an elephant's mouth because of the curing sweetness of an elephant's breath (4.4–5): Elephant's breath 'is an excellent cure for headaches. Now the elephant is aware of the values of his services and does not open its mouth *gratis*, but like a quack doctor insists on prior payment. So if you give it to him, he agrees and keeps his part of the bargain, opening his jaws wide and waiting as long as the man wants. He knows he has bartered his breath.' The explanation of this remarkable power is then given at length, and it is because of the elephant's diet of the 'dusky rose of India' whose spiciness generates 'an intensely fragrant inward vapour that is the perfumifacient principle of their breath'. This is followed by a further disquisition by

* καὶ ἐφύλαττον ἀκριβῶς ὡς θησαυρὸν τὸ φίλημα τηρῶν ἡδονῆς, ὃ πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐραστῇ γλυκύ. καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν τοῦ σώματος ὀργάνων τίκτεται· στόμα γὰρ φωνῆς ὄργανον· φωνὴ δὲ ψυχῆς σκιά. αἱ γὰρ τῶν στομάτων συμβολαὶ κιρνάμεναι καὶ ἐκπέμπουσαι κάτω τῶν στέρνων τὴν ἡδονὴν ἕλκουσι τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς τὰ φιλήματα.

Cleitophon on the wondrousness of a lover's kiss (4.8.2–3): 'Three most beautiful things come from the mouth: breath, voice and the kiss. We kiss one another with the lips, but the spring of pleasure is the soul.' Thus, he concludes, since Leucippe is a virgin, except for his kisses, and his wife only by his kisses, if anyone else kissed her, it would be – an extraordinary phrase this – an 'adultery of the kiss'.* As the theory of the kiss becomes more and more involved, the playing with erotic stimulation and deferral is as self-aware as in Longus and as engaging of a reader's response. *Erotike psuchagogia*, 'erotic distraction', is a central narrative device of Achilles, in which his medical, philosophical, psychological theorizing plays a constitutive and self-conscious role. Cleitophon's speech in favour of desiring women with its story of the kiss and female sexual response is, then, elaborately framed by the erotic narrative of the novel and plays an integral role not only in the discourse of *eros*, but also in the narrative's games with hesitation, stimulation and engagement by which the reader is drawn into *le plaisir du texte*. 'Tout lecteur de livre licencieux est un libertin en puissance.'[76]

It is perhaps not surprising that Menelaus begins his response by pointing out that Cleitophon seems to be no neophyte but 'an old, a very old pro at Aphrodite's business – such female superfluities (*gunaikōn periergias*) have you poured over us!' And he prepares to speak on behalf of boys. His argument has two parts, first a brief attack on women, and second a lengthier praise of kissing boys. He starts by accusing women of being 'made up' – *epiplasta* – in all senses, an accusation of false appearances, deceptiveness, and artifice that goes back at least to Hesiod and his Pandora[77] (2.38.1): 'Women are false in every particular from coquettish remarks to coy posturing.'† This leads to the expected attack on a woman's unguents and perfumes and cosmetics, which are to be contrasted with the sweat of a boy, which owes nothing to such art. And he continues with the expected eulogy of firmness as opposed to the moist and the soft, the love of the wrestling school as opposed to the boudoir (2.38.4.): 'The softer sex are flabby opponents in Aphrodite's ring, but boys' bodies are firm in response, striving like athletes whose

* μοιχεύεταί μου τὰ φιλήματα.

† γυναικὶ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἐπίπλαστα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα καὶ τὰ σχήματα.

mutual goal is pleasure.'* As Cleitophon had praised the 'moistness' (*hugron*) of female bodies, so here Menelaus disparages such flabbiness (*hugroteti*) as lamentable softness and weakness (*malthassei*). The wrestling school as site of male *eros* here extends its metaphorical sway over the erotic encounter as male lovers 'are firm in response' (*antitupei*) and 'strive' (*athlei*). (Winkler's translation adds 'like athletes' to make this point clear.[78]) So, in a conclusion to match Cleitophon's account of the female kiss, he praises boys' kisses precisely because they have no female *sophia*, no *techne*, 'no devastating spell of lips' deceit'; rather, they are kisses of nature, *tes* phuseōs *ta philemata*. The appeal to nature which for Cleitophon had meant the natural physical response of the female – a response framed by those kisses of animals' mouths and the physiology of snogging – here becomes reconstituted as the 'naturalness' of boys as opposed to the cultured deceptiveness of women. So, finally, Menelaus offers his special image to sum up what is a boy's kiss (2.38.5): 'Take nectar, crystallize it; form it into a pair of lips – these would yield a boy's kisses. You could not have enough of these: however many you took, you would still be thirsty for more, and you could not pull your mouth away until from the very pleasure you flee the kisses.' And this ecstatic, ecphrastic image closes the 'erotic distraction' of the discussion of male and female kissing with the telling phrase 'until from the very pleasure you flee the kisses' ...

It is striking that the book ends with Menelaus' speech: no judgement between or even comment on the two positions. This significant silence – since Hellenistic literature at least, book divisions are part of the literary artist's arsenal – this closure helps prompt the question of the place of this dialogue in the narrative. It is not enough to declare, as Anderson does, without exposition or implication, that Achilles Tatius sees 'himself as a Plato *eroticus* and much of the first two books as an anti-Phaedrus'[79] – though, of course, the parodic debt to Plato is clear enough and the philosophical bent of the dialogue marked. We have already seen – and will see further below – how there is a far more complex self-positioning of Achilles Tatius with regard to intellectual traditions and, specifically, the philosophy (morality, medicine) of *eros*. Nor, I suspect,

* οὐ μαλθάσσει τὰς ἐν Ἀφροδίτῃ περιπλοκὰς ὑγρότητι σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' ἀντιτυπεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ σώματα καὶ περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀθλεῖ.

does Shadi Bartsch go far enough, though her narratological reading is one of the best available studies of Achilles' descriptive technique. She argues that in Achilles the descriptions of works of art and the digressions on other spectacles and scenarios are designed by their very gaps, obscurities and surprising effects to engage a reader in a necessarily failing process of interpretation, where in an ironic version of tragic misreading of oracles, the signs and prophecies uttered by the author or his characters mislead the reader into error. And leave the author on top. Thus to read Achilles Tatius' narrative is to be lured and duped by his narratological techniques into feelings of uncertainty which 'compel the readers to question their ability to read'.[80] Now, Bartsch does not attempt to analyse this precise passage except to note the pointedness of the book-ending – a device, she correctly notes, that Achilles uses elsewhere too. Bartsch offers a range of other comments on how Achilles uses 'such paradoxographical and philosophical digressions' but none, I think, helps with this passage. It is important to go beyond her very general suggestions that such so-called digressions are included 'perhaps simply because their readers found them interesting or of genuine educational value' or because they are erotic 'tone setters for the story as a whole'.[81]

There are three ways I would like to suggest the narratological insights of Bartsch and others can be extended. First, in Achilles Tatius both his narratological twisting of readers' expectations on the one hand, and his constant turn to generalized description with its characteristic blend of (pseudo-)science, rhetorical formulation, and self-conscious slyness on the other, depend on *and* distort a specific discourse of *to eikos*, the probable, natural, likely. The narrative is organized not simply as an Aristotelian schema of cause and effect, nor simply as a rhetorical pattern of *narratio* and *descriptio*, so much as an ironic or even parodic gloss on such narratives, *and*, what's more, on the values that produce, organize and control such narratives. In short, in Achilles Tatius there is at stake a view of the world and its narratives. Thus the rhetorically loaded – but smiling – return to 'nature' and 'artifice' as terms in the debate on sleeping with boys or women is a constitutive element in the production and questioning of the narratives of expectation and control by which the novel proceeds. (Hence, the difficulty of using the

term 'digression'.) Achilles Tatius in this way explores, as it were, the connections between the artifice of a woman making up and the artifice of making up a story, or between the naturalness of sexual response and the naturalness of reader response. The self-conscious games with narrative and the self-conscious games with philosophical, physiological or psychological digressiveness are part and parcel of the same concern with that central category of ancient thought, *to eikos* – the probable or the natural. When Foucault sees this and the other novels ('these long narratives with their countless episodes') as merely a repository of 'some of the themes that will subsequently characterize erotics'[82] (as if the novel were just a stage on the journey from Plato to Jerome), his argument depends on a misrecognition of the complex and sophisticated ways in which these fictions engage with the real, how the strategies of mapping the natural are mobilized, how the novel's bricolage is itself a particular construction of the 'arts of living and the care of the self'.

The second point follows directly from the first. The ironical way that a view of the world is constructed produces a particular scenario of reader engagement. Critics indeed have been particularly exercised by suggestions of humour in Achilles Tatius, and critical responses have varied from the straight-faced discovery of a serious mystical religious meaning in the text, to an account of him as a 'virtuoso saboteur' revelling in 'carefully calculated sick humour',[83] to the more cautious who find 'a touch of humour . . . totally missing in the other romances'[84] (so much for *Daphnis and Chloe*)! The challenge of finding an appropriate response to Achilles' dangerous straining of the boundaries of the genre is instructive. As Bracht Branham writes of Lucian, 'a serio-comic text or performance works by revealing to the audience as problematic the appropriateness of laughter or seriousness in a given context'.[85] Indeed, the uncomfortableness that Achilles Tatius has provoked suggests a particular positioning *vis à vis* the *sophia* of the period and the traditions of *sophia* in and against which his text is written. For it is in particular the rhetorical, philosophical, physiological discourses, and the characters' mobilization of them, that produce the most acute worries of appropriateness for readers. Thus what Achilles Tatius provokes is not just a question of 'Is this funny?', but, more scrupulously, a question of how seriously or how comically he challenges or sup-

ports the acknowledgement of secure communal values, the proprieties of intellectual discourse.

When Foucault sees the novel as a sign – or the demonstration – of the growth of the austere ethics of chaste union of male and female where 'the fulfilment and reward of ... purity [is] a union that has the form and value of a spiritual marriage',[86] this more difficult and amusing attitude to the normative is quite excluded. It is not merely that Foucault misses (out) the jokes, irony and playfulness of Achilles Tatius' paradigmatically ludic use of the narratives and language of a 'spiritual union', but also that his teleological account distorts both the relation of the novel to other didactic or homiletic texts, and the relation of the novel to the reader. For, on the one hand, the novel's humour displays a disruptive delight towards the homiletic and didactic, challenging with its irony both the security of the boundaries of what is normal, and the very process of teaching about desire itself. On the other hand, the novel promotes through such ironies an especially self-aware and oblique attitude towards the process of 'constituting oneself as the subject of one's sexual behaviour'. It is this attitude which is so hard to fit into Foucault's teleology of austerity.

This leads to my third point. How does the text itself articulate its use of the high discourse of philosophy? We have already seen how the verb *philosophein*, 'to do philosophy', was used of Cleinias and Cleitophon's discussion of seducing virgins. This verb and related terms occur frequently elsewhere too. Here we must introduce Melite. She is a rich widow who falls in love with Cleitophon. He believes Leucippe to be dead, and so is persuaded easily by Cleinias that he might as well marry a wealthy, beautiful and available woman. But he can't bring himself to consummate the marriage. First, he says he can't do it in the city where he lost Leucippe (5.12.3). So, they set sail for Ephesus, Melite's home town. On board ship, Melite tries again. Cleitophon argues that it would be quite unsuitable to consummate a marriage at sea in a moving bedchamber. (The stability of, say, Odysseus' marriage is famously troped by the stability of his unmoving bed.) *Su men*, she replies (5.16.3.), *sophizēi*, 'You're being a sophist ... Every place (*topos*) is a bedroom for lovers. There is none where the god cannot penetrate. Is there a more fitting spot for the mysteries of Aphrodite and Eros than the

sea? Aphrodite is the daughter of the sea.' Despite her manipulation of the *topoi* of erotic language here – as she searches for the correct *topos* for consummation – Cleitophon holds out: *philosophesomen*, he says (5.16.7), 'let's be philosophers till we get to land', and he 'persuades her with his kisses', an activity he has already noted (5.13) is not without pleasure for him. Again the kiss has its place in 'doing philosophy' ... When they get to Ephesus, he pretends to be ill, and still won't comply with her desperate pleas – luckily as it turns out, since Leucippe has actually survived, and, shaven, enslaved, unrecognized, sees Cleitophon with his new wife. She writes him a bitter letter accusing him of unfaithfulness, to which he replies begging her not to accuse him too hastily since (5.20.5) 'you will learn that I have imitated your virginity, if there is such a thing as virginity in men,'* – a fascinating remark, especially in the light of his experience with prostitutes, that we will return to. At this point, Thersander, Melite's husband, *also* presumed dead, *also* turns up and, enraged by his wife's apparent adultery, starts beating up Cleitophon. Cleitophon comments (5.23.7.): 'When he grew tired of thumping me and *I of being a philosopher* (*philosophōn*), I said "Who are you?" ...' And Cleitophon is promptly and illegally thrown into prison by the irate husband.

Languishing in prison, Cleitophon is visited by Melite, who once again tries to seduce him. In a long speech (5.26) she first upbraids him for ignoring the instructions of Eros and his own promises. She recognizes that she can never have Cleitophon for herself, now that Thersander and Leucippe have returned. She begs him to give himself to her for a first and last time (5.26.10): 'Imagine Eros himself saying to you "Grant me this favour, as your mystic mentor (*mustagogos*); do not depart and leave Melite uninitiated (*amuetos*). My fire is burning in her too."' She follows this plea for initiation into love's rites (which again clearly does not imply simply a first act of intercourse) with a promise to release his bonds and help him escape. *Eros* is often termed *lusimeles*, 'limb releasing': here Melite invokes Eros and promises to set free Cleitophon in a further ironic literalization of the metaphors of erotic discourse. Melite's is a long speech of seduction, concluding with a repetition of her central

* μαθήσῃ τὴν σήν με παρθενίαν μεμιμημένον, εἴ τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι παρθενία.

point: 'All I ask is that you give me yourself.' Cleitophon comments (5.27.1):

'So she did her philosophy. (Desire teaches arguments too.) And she undid my bonds, and kissed my hands and put them on her eyes and heart ...'*

Seduction is described as 'doing philosophy', and, as Cleinias had promised Cleitophon in book 1, the lover does not find it hard to discover the required argument. As Melite proceeds with her persuasion, Cleitophon's response to her arguments is carefully recorded – and it is a marvellous piece of writing where the self-representation of the first-person narrative is central to the humour. *Epathon ti anthropinon*, 'I experienced a natural human response', he begins (with his characteristic awareness of the general in the specific) and ... (5.27.2):

And I was truly afraid that the god Eros would exact a terrible vengeance; and in any case I had now recovered Leucippe; and very soon I would be separated from Melite; and the act was no longer a marriage, but rather like the curing of a sick soul.†

The different explanations are amusingly piled together ('and', 'and', 'and', 'and') in a parody of a reasoning response to the 'philosophical arguments' offered: the acceptance of Melite's claim that he should beware offending the god is marked with what seems to be ironic seriousness by the adverb *alethōs*, 'truly', and the heroic echo of Hector's warning to Achilles that the 'gods would exact a terrible vengeance' if he fails to hand over *his* body to the Trojans‡, *Il.* 22. 358; the reason that he has recovered his true love, Leucippe, scarcely constitutes an argument for sleeping with Melite; that the act will not be a marriage but the 'cure of a sick soul' disingenuously recalls his own seductive talk to Leucippe in book 2, where their first kiss takes place not only as a charm for a bee sting but also as a 'cure for a wounded heart' (2.7.6–7). With such a careful pattern of reasoning ('His slip is satisfactorily motivated ...',[87] says Vilborg)

* ταῦτα φιλοσοφήσασα (διδάσκει γὰρ ὁ Ἔρως καὶ λόγους) ἔλυε τὰ δεσμά καὶ τὰς χεῖρας κατεφίλει, καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ προσέφερε ...

† καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐφοβήθην τὸν Ἔρωτα, μή μοι γένηται μήνιμα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἄλλως ὅτι Λευκίππην ἀπειλήφειν, καὶ ὅτι μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς Μελίτης ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἔμελλον, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ γάμος ἔτι τὸ πραττόμενον ἦν ἀλλὰ φάρμακον ὥσπερ ψυχῆς νοσούσης.

‡ μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι.

Cleitophon allows himself to commit the act so long deferred. And as the act is undertaken, it is reflected upon with his usual ironic and self-reflexive generalizations about the suitable preparations for consummation of desire: they did not miss a suitable bed or other accessories, he comments (5.27.4):

> For love is handy and resourceful, a clever sophist, who can turn any place into a chapel for his mystic liturgy. The casual in sex is far more sweet than the carefully prepared. For its pleasure is natural and simple.*

Eros once again is the sophist, the teacher of cleverness and resourcefulness. And the man who denied Melite's arguments on board ship that every *topos* is available to lovers, now with a politician's insouciance notes that indeed every place (*panta topon*) can be a chapel for love's mysteries (as the language of initiation also continues, and extends the high tone of the 'satisfactorily motivated' slip). So he describes the end of the long deferral of consummation of his marriage with Melite as 'casual' – and the pleasure of such casualness is 'natural and simple', *autophue*. The ironies of his change of heart are doubled by the grand inconcinnity between his generalizations and the narrative. As Cleitophon fails to keep an adequate distance from the lures of an argument, so the irony of this passage, with its requirement of a reader's complicity, compromises the distance of the reader from the erotic scenario.

Thus the central irony of the last section of the novel is set up. As we will see in the next chapter, Melite escapes charges of adultery and Cleitophon gets his bride precisely because their adultery was committed only after they knew they had recovered their respective partners and not when they both reasonably thought their partners were dead! Shortly after this philosophical interlude, Cleitophon has to explain to Leucippe and her father 'the story so far' (8.5.2). He emphasizes Melite's desire for him and his *sophrosune*, without, he says, actually lying, and stresses the assaults on his 'virginity' (without mentioning exactly how he escapes from prison). He goes on to tell Leucippe's father of their elopement and its *sophrosune*. He concludes (8.5.7):

* αὐτουργὸς γὰρ ὁ Ἔρως καὶ αὐτοσχέδιος σοφιστής, καὶ πάντα τόπον αὐτῷ τιθέμενος μυστήριον. τὸ δὲ ἀπερίεργον εἰς Ἀφροδίτην ἥδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ πολυπράγμονος· αὐτοφυῆ γὰρ ἔχει τὴν ἡδονήν.

We were philosophers, father, in our time away from home. Love sent us away; it was the flight of lover and beloved. But we were like brother and sister in our exile. If there is such a thing as virginity in a man, that's what I preserve for Leucippe up to now.*

The repetitions of his claim of *parthenia* frame his 'curing' of Melite's soul; the conditional, 'if there is such a thing in men', has become very conditional indeed. The repetition points neatly not merely to the sliding sense of 'to do philosophy', its connotation of 'to be chaste', but also to the sophistry that underlies the self-representation. Although indeed Leucippe and Cleitophon have not yet had sex (he has his virginity *pros Leukippen*, *'for Leucippe'*), we have seen in his seduction by Melite different possible instantiations of 'doing philosophy', *philosophein*.

At crucial points in this narrative, in other words, 'to be a philosopher', *philosophein*, means 'to be committed to sexual chastity and its supporting arguments', or in one case 'to suffer in silence', 'stoically', just as such terminology is set in humorous tension with the arguments and behaviour of the characters. This ironic or humorous sense of *philosophein* can be seen in other late Greek writers, who often poke fun at the pretentious philosophical stand against sexual activity. Thus we can trace a repeated discussion on whether it is better to spend time with a prostitute or a philosopher. Lucian's *Dialogues of Prostitutes* 10 dramatizes a conversation between Drosis and Chelidonium, two prostitutes. Drosis has lost Cleinias, her young client, to the clutches of a philosopher, Aristaenetus. The boy has written a despairing letter to her, outlining how he is being forced into a life of virtue and writing sadly that he has been promised happiness by the sober life. Chelidonium promises her friend that she will go and write graffiti where the boy's father walks that 'Aristaenetus is corrupting Cleinias'. The verb for this corruption, *diaphtheirein*, is the wording of the capital charge against Socrates. A similar counter-accusation of corruption is found in Satyrus, as reported in Athenaeus (13 584a). Glycera, a prostitute, is accused by Stilpo, a philosopher, of corrupting the young. She replies 'We are faced by the same charge, Stilpo, then.

* ἐφιλοσοφήσαμεν, πάτερ, τὴν ἀποδημίαν· ἐδίωξε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἔρως καὶ ἦν ἐραστοῦ καὶ ἐρωμένης φυγή· ἀποδημήσαντες γεγόναμεν ἀλλήλων ἀδελφοί. εἴ τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς παρθενία, ταύτην κἀγὼ μέχρι τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς Λευκίππην ἔχω.

They say you corrupt all you meet by teaching useless eristic sophistries (*eristika sophismata*), while I likewise teach erotic (*erotika*) ones. Therefore there is no difference in corruption and bad experience whether you spend time with a prostitute or a philosopher.' A letter of Alciphron (4.7 (1.34)) gives the most extended version of this *topos*. Thais, a prostitute writes to Euthydemus, her erstwhile lover, to complain that now he has taken up with philosophers and become all *semnos*, 'high-minded', he no longer visits her. She points out that the philosopher's claim of abstinence is a hypocritical pose (since his own teacher has been pestering her for an appointment); that both philosophers and prostitutes work for gain, but that prostitutes are more religious, since they provoke many oaths by gods, whereas philosophers deny the existence of god. What is more, prostitutes never promote incest, and no one consorting with a prostitute aims at tyranny or sedition. So as Aspasia taught Pericles, the great statesman, but Socrates taught Critias, the evil tyrant, it is clear that the prostitute is a better teacher than the philosopher. This debate takes the concern with *paideia* that we have seen ironized in *Daphnis and Chloe*, and the mocking of philosophical claims about erotic control that informs Achilles Tatius, to construct a satirical formal debate that mocks the very teachings which allow the audience to comprehend the satire. The political slur against Pericles – that he was dominated by Aspasia, his mistress;[88] the rhetorical bugbear of 'aiming at tyranny';[89] the challenge that philosophers teach anti-social behaviour, and do not believe in the gods; these are all familiar *topoi* of basic rhetorical training. The delight of the letter is not only in the prostitute's knowing manipulation of such *topoi* in support of herself as a teacher, someone who 'makes people better', but also in watching the good-time girl overturn the master of pleasure, like Phyllis riding on Aristotle.[90]

So finally, this notion of a young man's corrupt training is mobilized by Achilles Tatius in that paradigmatic site for the exploration of a citizen's history of *sophrosune*, the law court. Nicostratus, the priest of Artemis who defends Leucippe and Cleitophon against Thersander, gives an account which is explicitly said to rival Aristophanes for comedy (thus turning our discussion full circle). When Thersander was young, said the priest, he had the look of *semnotes* –

which can now be recognized as almost the technical term for 'like a philosopher'[91] – and he counterfeited *sophrosune*. But, says the priest in a series of increasingly sexualized *double entendres*, Thersander was 'used' by his noble 'escorts' in many ways. Indeed, he set up home apart from his father to facilitate his *homerizein*, his 'Homeric studies' / 'thigh to thigh research',[92] and his 'companionship with men', *pros*hetair*izesthai*. In this way, concludes the priest, Thersander thought himself to *askein ten psuchen*, 'to practise the *askesis* of the soul'. The rhetorician's attack ironically links the great claims of philosophy's *askesis* and highmindedness to the understanding of philosophical training as sexual hypocrisy: the accusation of disabling youthful behaviour, familiar from the case of Timarchus in the fourth century BCE, has been here reformulated by the ironic and comic representation of philosophical practice.

Achilles Tatius thus picks up the contemporary use of the word 'philosophy' to mean 'sexual abstinence' and ironizes its application to the action and language of his figures, even as Leucippe fights for her chastity. The explicit language of evaluation, then, the privileged terms of 'high' discourse enter the playful arena of worry about appropriateness that characterizes Achilles' narrative. *Sophrosune*, sexual control, truth-telling, self-knowledge, the central terms of contemporary philosophical *askesis* are all objects of Achilles' sly rewriting. Philosophy itself as a term and as a practice slips and slides in the erotic narrative. Foucault's account of the development of the philosophical care of the self, however, largely ignores how 'doing philosophy' is represented across the texts of the period, as if the role of philosophy could be determined just from what philosophy says about itself. (As any academic should know, the effect, scope and authority of a discipline depends on more than self-appraisal.) Foucault's history – nuanced though it is – needs careful blinkers about its central category to maintain its purposeful trajectory from Plato towards the Church.

The difficulty of locating a secure didactic message in Achilles Tatius, a secure cultural comment on 'the high value attributed to virginity and ... the complete union in which it finds perfection', as Foucault puts it,[93] can be seen most neatly in a poem from the Palatine Anthology, attributed to Photius, the Byzantine patriarch (or by some to Leon, the philosopher). In later writers, Achilles

Tatius, like Heliodorus with whom he is frequently compared, was said to be a Christian Bishop (which helps upright people to read him), and indeed the parents of St Galaction are significantly if bizarrely reported to have been called Cleitophon and Leucippe.[94] Photius writing as a Christian (or Leon as a philosopher) tells us how to read the novel (*AP* 9.203):

> Cleitophon's story shows
> A bitter love, but a chaste life.
> Leucippe's life, however, is most chaste of all,
> How she was beaten,
> Shaven and outraged,
> And, what is most, thrice she suffered death.
> If you too, friend, wish to be chaste,
> Do not look at the images that surround the story,
> But focus on the outcome of the plot.
> For it leads to marriage those who desired properly.*

In each case, my translation 'chaste' represents that central moral value of *sophrosune*. Cleitophon's life history may be *sophron* , but it is the beaten, shorn and misused body of Leucippe that evinces – like a martyr – the acme of *sophrosune*. Photius adds the fascinating comment, 'If you want to be *sophron*, friend, don't look at the incidental sights, *parergon thean*, just learn the general message about chaste marriage.' In other words, to discover the 'panegyric of chastity'[95] in Achilles, you must not give in to *erotike psuchagogia*; you must consider such viewing, such distraction, to be secondary, *parergon*, superfluous. Policing the digressive turns out to be a central move in the moral reading of Achilles Tatius. To follow its erotic psychagogy could lead you to lose your *sophrosune*. Most surprisingly of all, Foucault in seeing the novel as 'an odyssey of double virginity' – a paean to 'proper desire' – rehearses precisely

* ἔρωτα πικρόν, ἀλλὰ σώφρονα βίον
ὁ Κλειτοφῶντος μὲν παρεμφαίνει λόγος·
ὁ Λευκίππης δὲ σωφρονέστατος βίος
ἅπαντας ἐξίστησι, πῶς τετυμμένη
κεκαρμένη τε καὶ κατηχρειωμένη,
τὸ δὴ μέγιστον, τρὶς θανοῦσ' ἐκαρτέρει.
εἴπερ δὲ καὶ σὺ σωφρονεῖν θέλῃς, φίλος,
μὴ τὴν πάρεργον τῆς γραφῆς σκόπει θέαν,
τὴν τοῦ λόγου δὲ πρῶτα συνδρομὴν μάθε·
νυμφοστολεῖ γὰρ τοὺς ποθοῦντας ἐμφρόνως.

the sort of reading Photius recommends: paradigmatically, and apparently with as little irony as the patriarch, Foucault finally describes Cleitophon's night with Melite as 'an honourable, minor lapse' in the pious pursuit of 'symmetrical and reciprocal relationship of a man and a woman'. Foucault's reading indeed unswervingly focuses, like a good Christian, on the outcome of the plot. The distortions that can arise from a teleological account are wonderfully highlighted as Foucault lines up with Photius in the chaste reading of the novel.

There are many other relevant works that could be mobilized at this point to extend my argument: other writers bear testimony to the difficulty of reading Achilles Tatius from a standpoint of *sophrosune*, and the viewing of the novel (like the viewing in the novel) could lead to an interesting discussion of critical practice (or of tourism).[96] To finish this chapter, however, I will turn briefly to just one splendid piece, perhaps contemporary with Achilles Tatius, namely, the pseudo-Lucianic *Erotes*. This is another post-Platonic dialogue, that again sets in opposition arguments for and against desiring boys and desiring women. It is introduced by two characters called Lycinus and Theomnestus. Theomnestus has been entertaining Lycinus all day at a festival with the 'sexy, sweet persuasion of wanton stories' (1) – the symposia of the profligate again. Now that Theomnestus has run out of tales to add to his Hesiodic catalogue, he challenges Lycinus (4) to judge whether desire for males or for females is better. Lycinus, with a characteristic Lucianic (even if this is a pseudo-Lucianic dialogue) gesture of self-consciously destabilizing the consistency of tone, points out (5) that even if Theomnestus thinks this is a subject for sport and joking (*paidia*, *gelos*), there is a serious thrust to his response; and he offers to report a dialogue he was once present at between an Athenian who took excessive pleasure in boys and thought women 'a pit', and a Corinthian who was holy (*hagneuon*) when it came to male love, but loopy for women.

Although as so often in Plato this is thus a dialogue reported in a dialogue, it turns out to be indebted also to the novel and to other Hellenistic genres, as Lycinus tells the story of his sea journey (6–8) to Rhodes, where as he was sight-seeing he met his friends (9), the Athenian and the Corinthian. They party together (10) and decide to

sail on to Cnidos (11) together. The reported conversation takes place when the boat puts into Cnidos, and he and his two friends visit the famous temple of Aphrodite with its statue by Praxiteles. As in Achilles Tatius, the debate will be an interlude in a journey replete with the distractions of sight-seeing. This is not just a point about literary mixing of genres; but a point about the framing of the dialogue, the eroticization of that framing. For much as the dialogue is introduced as a contribution to a festival day of dirty talk, so the conversation will take place in the sanctuary of the goddess Aphrodite (and since Plato's *Phaedrus* the background of erotic discourse is repeatedly seen as significant, to the extent that when Plutarch begins his dialogue on love, that I will discuss in the next chapter, the narrator is told to cut out the 'Platonic *topoi* about plane-trees and all that'). Indeed, the debate is preceded (10) by descriptions of the two men's households, where the Athenian is surrounded by beardless young male servants, while the Corinthian is escorted by dancing girls and female musicians and scarcely a male figure, except an old cook and a young child, both beyond suspicion of masculine urges. Furthermore, the participants in the discussion proceed towards the temple where the debate will take place via potters' shops where sexy images can be bought, 'pottery pornography (*akolasia*) as befits Aphrodite's city' (11). Then the temple precinct itself receives a lengthy *ecphrasis* (12): there are all those trees 'which partake of beauty' which even if old in years 'are swollen (*sphrigonta*[97]) with fresh sprays and in the prime of condition'. Between every tree creeps the ivy, 'friend to desire' (*phileros*). There are couches set between the trees for visitors to celebrate Aphrodite's festivals. Finally, from this eroticized landscape they move into the temple itself and the famous statue of Aphrodite by Praxiteles (13).[98] The Corinthian is sent into ecstatic transport by the marble image of the goddess, and rushes up to kiss it. The Athenian is likewise affected – but only when he gets to see the rear of the statue (14): 'How delicately moulded the flesh on the buttocks is ... Those precious parts sealed in on either side by the hips, how irrepressibly sweetly they smile', he enthuses, as a tear runs down his cheek. As these two lovers emote before the statue, Lycinus notes a stain on the thigh of the goddess. This prompts a famous story from a temple attendant of how a man fell so in love with the Aphrodite that he had

himself locked in the temple at night and consummated his passion with the statue – hence the odd stain on the thigh of the otherwise unflawed marble. (After the extreme reactions of the Athenian and the Corinthian, a story of true extremism . . .)[99] It is this story that finally sets up the formal debate, since the Corinthian immediately exclaims (17) that 'even in stone the female form excites love', but the Athenian smiles and offers a counter-claim that even this Aphrodite proves his case. His argument – called with whatever irony by Lycinus *agan pithanos*, 'exceedingly persuasive' – is that the man had all night to do what he wanted to the statue but had clearly used it *paidikōs*, 'like a boy', to avoid being faced by the female parts. In response to the growing argument, Lycinus agrees to set up and judge a formal debate between the two men, to prevent having to hear such bickering the whole journey. My point here is a simple one: there is in this dialogue a pervasive erotic framework – a series of frames, conversational and of setting, each of which eroticize the speaker's and listener's response to the world. Where for Plato the symposium as a privileged site of erotic encounters is a paradigmatic place to discuss *eros* (although the cicada-filled landscape on the outskirts of Athens forms a fundamental frame for the discussion of loving in the *Phaedrus* which is echoed here in the cicada-filled grove the Lucianic debaters choose for their conversation), this dialogue is informed not merely by such a philosophical tradition but also by the journeying around the Mediterranean of the Romances, the ecphrastic accounts of the rhetorical masters, the countryside as reinvented by Hellenistic bucolic verse. There is, in short, a complete rewriting of the setting of the symposium and the polis in the light of Hellenistic pastoral, art history, novel narrative. The setting of the work itself with its bricolage of generic influence is a sign and symptom of its complex relation to the past, and its self-aware work of self-placement. It is within such a framework that the debate on male and female desire takes place.

The arguments of each man are developed at length. The Corinthian speaks first (19–28) with great passion, and the Athenian follows with an even longer and more strongly expressed speech (30–49). Each extends arguments and counter-arguments that I have outlined already. I want to focus here in particular on the two major aspects I have been discussing, namely, the argument from nature,

and the role of philosophy. For this dialogue shows a finely extreme version of the concerns I have been tracing.[100]

The Corinthian speaks first in favour of women and his argument is based precisely on *phusis* – on the naturalness of procreation and thus sexuality between men and women. He returns to the origin of the human race to found his sense of the natural (19): 'I mean the sacred Nature (*phusis*) of all things.'* This he expounds to be the role of the male to ejaculate and the woman to receive the seed so that the race can continue. Thus sacred Nature laid down a holy law of necessity that (19): 'each should remain within its own nature, and neither should the female, contrary to nature, become male, nor should the male improperly be feminized'.† Staying within nature means that a woman should not behave 'like a man' (as with Aeschylus' monstrous Clytemnestra: I will return to this in the next chapter). Nor should a male be feminized: the sense of *malakizesthai*, 'to be feminized', is, as ever, deeply disparaging and slurs male–male desire with the charge of womanliness. Thus same-sex relations are constructed only as the outcome of a degeneracy that stands against – and is a fall away from – nature: 'luxury (*truphe*) that dares all, transgressed the laws of Nature herself'. Indeed, luxury has gone so far as to countenance the making of eunuchs for male pleasure. Finally (22), with a series of highly rhetorical questions, he brings the argument from nature back to the animals, and offers a catalogue of beasts who do not mate with beasts of the same sex. Unlike the other examples of the argument from nature that I have been tracing, then, the Corinthian's speech begins with the origin of things, circles through the degeneracy of man away from nature, and concludes with the animals as the clinching and contrary case to humans' self-destructive luxury. As Foucault writes, 'the love of boys is placed in turn on the three axes of nature, as the general order of the world, the original state of mankind, and a behaviour that is reasonably adapted to natural ends'.[101]

The reliance on the rhetorical and philosophical tradition is clear enough here, and it is to the philosophers that the Corinthian now turns with an attack on philosophy itself. He attacks *hoi Sokratikoi*,

* λέγω ... τὴν ἱερὰν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν.

† μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως ἑκάτερον, καὶ μήτε τὸ θῆλυ παρὰ φύσιν ἀρρενοῦσθαι μήτε τἄρρεν ἀπρεπῶς μαλακίζεσθαι.

'the Socratics', for their 'extraordinary argument' that 'they love souls and call themselves lovers of virtue'. So, he asks with brilliant expostulation (23):

> What is wrong with you, O high-minded philosophers, that you scornfully dismiss what has for a long time given evidence of its quality, and bears witness to its virtue in its suitable grey hair and old age? Why does all your Wise Love flit to the young, although their reasoning has not yet determined to what they will turn?*

If philosophers love virtue, why not pursue the old and virtuous? Is ugliness incompatible with beauty? This superb *reductio* is exemplified at some length with an *ad hominem* attack on Plato and his amours. Philosophy is construed here merely as a shameful veil for unnatural desires, where young men and not virtue is the pursuit. The philosophers' claim of *sophrosune* is seen as just one more example of the charlatanry so often mocked in Lucian.[102]

Finally, the Corinthian, in similar vein to Cleitophon in Achilles Tatius, praises the shared and lasting pleasures of a relationship with a woman in contrast with the transitory and non-mutual experience with a boy, which ends in a high emotional state with a closing tirade that if men are to desire men, one might as well condone that perversion of perversions, female desire for females, and care nothing for the continuation of the human race. The role of pleasure will be central to the final scene of the dialogue, and it is not by chance that it forms the basis of the turbulent peroration of the Corinthian's speech.[103]

The Athenian replies point by point to the Corinthian – though not before appealing to the spirit of Socrates and Phaedrus to help him against 'a speech minded to do philosophy (*philosophein*) on behalf of women'. Indeed, the Athenian uses (his) philosophy not only to defend against the Corinthian's attack on philosophers but also to counter the argument from nature (as the two strands of my interest here come together). For while he readily confesses the necessity of marriage to ensure the perpetuity of the race, 'only male

* τί γὰρ παθόντες, ὦ σεμνοὶ φιλόσοφοι, τὸ μὲν ἤδη μακρῷ χρόνῳ δεδωκὸς ἑαυτοῦ πεῖραν ὁποιόν ἐστιν, ᾧ πολιὰ προσήκουσα καὶ γῆρας ἀρετὴν μαρτυρεῖ, δι' ὀλιγωρίας παραπέμπετε, πᾶς δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἔρως ἐπὶ τὸ νέον ἐπτόηται, μηδέπω τῶν λογισμῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἃ τραπήσονται κρίσιν ἐχόντων;.

love is the noble injunction to a philosopher's soul' (33).* To prove this point, he develops an extensive evolutionary argument on how man's triumph over the beasts includes a philosophy of *eros*. So, he argues, one cannot expect desire for men in the earliest days, when the struggle for subsistence left man scarcely above the animals. Such appeals to origins are flawed, since they appeal to a world without culture or civilization. It is progress that counts. Of course, *animals* don't sleep with animals of the same gender, and the reason is (36):

For what a person would choose rightly by reasoning, it is not possible for those who cannot reason to have, because of their lack of mental power.†

The value of reason is turned against the unreasoning beasts, for the creatures who cannot reason, *logizesthai*, cannot rationally choose a better form of life. So, Nature has deprived animals of male desire as it has of reason (36):

Lions are not lovers, because they are not philosophers. Bears are not lovers, because they do not have knowledge of the Good of friendship.‡

Man's evolution means that philosophy and pederasty are co-extensive.

From this treatment of the argument from nature, the Athenian, with great misogynist flourish, launches into a tirade against women's made-up beauty, their 'artificial devices' (*epikteta sophismata*) with which 'they deceive the unsightliness of nature'. Once again, the *techne* of female beautification is set against the claims of *phusis* for male–female relations. The corrupt, perfumed behaviour of such women – catalogued with obsessive abhorrence by the Athenian – is finally set in contrast with the idealized image of the sweaty male *askesis* of the gymnasium and philosophy school. Interestingly, the love of such a boy is likened to the relationship of Alcibiades and Socrates (who, the Athenian reminds us, was called wisest of men by Delphi itself) (49): 'One should love youths as Alcibiades was loved by Socrates, who slept like a father with him

* μόνος δ' ἄρρην ἔρως φιλοσόφου καλόν ἐστι ψυχῆς ἐπίταγμα.

† ἃ γὰρ ἐκ λογισμοῦ δικαίως ἄν τις ἕλοιτο , ταῦτα τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις λογίζεσθαι δι' ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἔχειν.

‡ οὐκ ἐρῶσι λέοντες, οὐδὲ γὰρ φιλοσοφοῦσιν· οὐκ ἐρῶσιν ἄρκτοι, τὸ γὰρ ἐκ φιλίας καλὸν οὐκ ἴσασιν.

under the same cloak'. With this chaste ideal in mind, brief pleasures should be dismissed, *sophrosune* cherished, and a blessed existence after death should be pursued as the prize of virtue.

The Athenian's defence of philosophy as transcendence over animals and women, as much as the Corinthian's attack on it as hypocritical pederastic pursuit, seems to offer a rhetorically or comically exaggerated claim. Their speeches are indeed described by Lycinus, the narrator, as 'heated', 'passionate' and in the last case *semnologesamenos*, 'full of high-minded talk'. Again, the word *semnos*, 'high-minded', is the marker of the possible hypocrisies of philosophical self-positioning. The scene of judgement between the men, however, also plays with this slippery sense of 'doing philosophy' and its *sophrosune*. For Lycinus, after praise of both men's eloquence, first reports that he voted in favour of the Athenian, recognizing marriage as necessary, but love of boys as the action solely of philosophers: 'everyone should get married, but pederasty is to be allowed to only the wise'.* We might worry about the tone of Lycinus here, as he repeats the Athenian's *semnoi* arguments for the necessary connection of pederasty and philosophy.

Second, he asks Theomnestus if he would have voted thus. Theomnestus says that he experienced the 'heights of pleasure' listening to the report of the debate, and could not possibly disagree with such a judgement. But (53):

> But nevertheless – for there is nothing said in a festival that is rude, and every joke, even if it is over the top, seems right for the celebration – I was amazed at the high-mindedness of those so very elevated sentiments about the love of boys. Except . . .†

Once again, the tone of a speech to come is elaborately set up. He hints that what will follow may be thought unseemly, though it shouldn't be so regarded in a festival; that it is humorous, but a qualification of the previous judgement; that he found the speech of the Athenian amazing for its high-mindedness and all too elevated sentiments, but that there was something missing in the account. And he proceeds in a couple of pages of highly erotic prose to

* διὸ δὴ γαμητέον μὲν ἅπασιν, παιδεραστεῖν δὲ ἐφείσθω μόνοις τοῖς σοφοῖς.

† ὅμως δ' οὖν – οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπρεπὲς ἐν ἑορτῇ λέγεσθαι, πᾶς δὲ γέλως, κἂν περίεργος ᾖ, πανηγυρίζειν δοκεῖ – τοὺς ἄγαν ὑπὸ τοῦ παιδεραστεῖν κατωφρυωμένους λόγους ἐθαύμαζον μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ σεμνότητι, πλὴν . . .

wonder about what happened to the hand slipping inside the shirt, across a chest swollen with passion, to a throbbing belly and so forth. 'I hope I don't have to love boys like Tantalus and drink' he says (53), employing the same image as in Achilles Tatius: 'all looking and no touching.' Indeed, after he has given his highly lascivious account of what he likes to do with boys, he goes on to mock the philosophers' claim that Alcibiades rose from Socrates' bed like a son from his father (54):

> Well, that is how I hope to love boys. Those with their thoughts in the air and their philosophical eyebrows raised above their foreheads can beguile the untutored with the boasts of their high-minded expressions. For Socrates was a lover, if any one ever was, and when Alcibiades lay down under one cloak with him, he did not get up without being attacked.*

Socrates himself was an *erotikos* ... Aphrodite of Cnidos, the erotic force and frame, has the last word, as philosophy's grand claims, for all that they are said to have triumphed, give way to *erotike psuchagogia* and the delights of erotic talk. The phrases of the *semnoi* are once again scorned for their inability to deal with the pleasures of *eros*, and even to recognize the erotic urge of their master and teacher. Theomnestus' highly erotic account laughs at the philosophers, and irreverently rewrites the primal scene of Socrates and Alcibiades under the blanket. And it is here the dialogue ends, as Lycinus proposes that they return to the market-place for the remaining ceremonies of the festival. Theomnestus invites the reader to join in his irreverent and sexy laughter at philosophy's expense, to share in the symposium of the profligate. If in Achilles Tatius we see an ironization of the philosophy of chastity, in the Lucianic *Erotes* we see its constant comic eroticization.

Let me conclude. These explicit discussions of male desire for males are elaborately framed. They are framed not merely by a particular construction of what is to be understood by philosophy, the *askesis* of the self, *sophrosune*, sexual abstinence, but also by the ancient practice and theory of rhetoric. Above all, they are written within narratives that diffuse a sense of the desiring subject across a

* ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτω παιδεραστεῖν γένοιτο. μετεωρολέσχαι δὲ καὶ ὅσοι τὴν φιλοσοφίας ὀφρὺν ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς τοὺς κροτάφους ὑπερήρκασιν, σεμνῶν ὀνομάτων κομψεύμασιν τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς ποιμαινέτωσαν· ἐρωτικὸς γὰρ ἦν, εἴπερ τις, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ ὑπὸ μίαν Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῷ χλανίδα κλιθείς, οὐκ ἀπλῆξ ἀνέστη.

range of disciplines from art history to physiology to mythology. This dissemination of male desire is part and parcel of the involved interweaving of genres, traditions, and narratives which make up the novel, and which provide the context for the other types of writing I have been considering. Each discussion is intricately positioned within a complex narrative and a complex intellectual tradition. To extract a particular discussion of male desire from such framing in order to write 'gay history', as John Boswell does, will inevitably lead to distortions, not least by the oversimplification of how the male desiring subject is articulated. (It will, for example, be clear that the representation of male desire for males in these texts is also in constant dialectic with the representation of the female, which will be the subject of the next chapter.) The 'digressions' of the novel, and my tracing of such digressions, map the involved and extended contours of the formulation of male desire.

Foucault's treatment, however, also seems quite insufficient. I am not rehearsing the familiar criticism that he demonstrates an insufficient coverage of texts, not least because although I have been focusing on texts scarcely analysed by Foucault, I too have been partial. Nor do I wish to broach the more difficult issue of Foucault's sense of the historical import of his texts, not least because I too have not offered any developed sociological perspective on these texts. (It is far from clear how detailed a sociology could be constructed from the present state of knowledge of the dates, place, and cultural milieu of the texts I have mobilized.) Like Foucault's, my argument is focused on reading and writing about sexuality. Rather – and I take this to be a more telling criticism of Foucault's project – it is his very understanding of what constitutes the discursive field here that seems insufficient to me, that is, what the constitution of a normative discourse is, and how its boundaries are articulated. The texts I have been discussing ironize and eroticize as well as represent and explore the relations between philosophy, sexuality and nature. 'Philosophy' (as much as erotics) informs and is the subject of this writing: what 'doing philosophy' means in later antiquity is not only determined by the normative, philosophical disciplines, but also by these ironic, erotic versions of the relations between philosophy and sexuality. Humour here is not just a strategy of resistance to a dominant ideology. Rather, the extensive intellectual traditions of

epigram, prose discussion, dialogue, novel, together alter the possibilities of the self-authorization of philosophy and the 'different way[s] of constituting oneself as the ethical subject of one's sexual behaviour'. As the first-person narrative of Achilles Tatius strikingly shows, 'constituting oneself as the ethical subject of one's sexual behaviour' is a process open to wry self-consciousness, sly manipulations and the duplicitous playfulness of narrative irony. That Foucault needs to repress the amused disruption of this sexy Greek writing for his history of Greek erotics demonstrates most clearly the dangers and distortions of the teleological thrust of his project.

Foucault indeed merely laments the loss of seriousness and intensity of these later discussions of male desire. Yet the reader engagement here is quite different from the Aristotelian treatise or the Christian homiletic or classical law case. For the ironic detachment, the oblique recognitions of the power of past narrative models, the comic and serio-comic perspectives on the question of how one should live and love, are testimony to a different set of cultural negotiations among the literate of Empire society, to which a modern audience with its sense of contemporary fragmentation and past tradition should be especially attuned. This is a writing practice which parades the bricolage of cultural and normative traditions in the process of self-positioning. Not so much a lack of 'moral seriousness' as an acute awareness of the difficulty of unmediated seriousness and didacticism with regard to erotics (as if the provocations of Achilles Tatius' prose could be contained by keeping your eyes firmly on the conclusion). It seems strange and sad that while Victorian propriety has been fundamental in removing these texts from the classical canon, it is their oblique, self-aware and ironic stance towards the process of constituting oneself as an ethical subject which still continues to be misrecognized or devalued – as histories of this crucial period in the development of Western sexuality continue to be written under the aegis of Basil, who wrote programmatically that (*Ep.* 22) 'the Christian ... ought not to laugh nor even to suffer laugh-makers'.

3

How Like a Woman

What kind of tales did men tell men,
She wondered, by themselves ...

Tennyson

In the previous chapter, I discussed how we can understand the formal debates on whether it is better for men to desire men or women, what the space for such arguments is within the intellectual world of late Greek writing, and how it relates to the intellectual traditions of classical Greek *sophia*. In this final chapter, I shall turn to look more specifically at how desire for women is framed by a set of representations of women – a set of representations written, inevitably, almost exclusively by men of a particular class and education. For the discussion of male sexuality is ineluctably linked to a representation of the female, and although for largely heuristic purposes I have separated the discussions of male and female desire, the intertwining of topics is necessary and will be evident throughout what follows. I have called this chapter 'How like a woman ...' in the hope of evoking an ambiguity between the certainty of exclamation, 'How like a woman!', and a more doubtful questioning, '*How* like a woman?', 'How? Like a woman?' It is the space of representation mapped by these expressions that I wish to explore, as I travel towards that central text in the history of desire, Plutarch's *Amatorius*.

To help focus what is a huge topic, I shall be concentrating on two sets of interlocking questions, first the problem of female chastity and knowledge, and second the problem of how sexual difference – the degree to which men and women are alike – is articulated with

regard to chastity. Both sets of questions will prove central to the idea and ideals of marriage, that key institution of normative sexual discourse and social practice. Indeed, throughout the late antique, marriage was a battleground of ideology. From Augustus' legislation on marriage and adultery,[1] through the rise of Christianity with its violent debates on the proper place of sexuality within marriage,[2] marriage as the cornerstone of society became a key area of *contest* in social and intellectual discourse. Where the historians who have treated this question have argued largely from laws, inscriptions, documents, moral treatises and birth-rates to a view of the practice of marriage in society,[3] I shall be turning to a different set of written materials to explore how the questions of chastity and sexual difference play a founding role in such a discourse; I want to explore how difficult it is to move through such writing towards cultural practice. If the literary critic seems to be interested mostly in how sexuality is written about, and the historian in the social practice of antiquity, I hope that what I have to say about the difficulty of reading the writings of the past and the range of relevant material will provide at least a provocation for the standard methods of producing historical accounts of ancient sexuality.

By way of a transition and a first version of the phrase 'How like', I offer first another telling epigram from the symposium of the profligate, this by Argentarius (10 G–P):

> Desire for females is best of all –
> For those mortals who have an upright attitude towards love.
> If you feel a longing for males also, I know how to teach you
> A cure by which you will stop that sickness of corrupt desire.
> Turn over Menophila of the fine hips, and imagine in your mind
> You are holding to your breast the male Menophilos himself.*

Cleitophon, it will be recalled, was persuaded to 'cure' Melite. In this poem, it is a 'cure', or at least a *pharmakon*, for male desire for males that is being touted. (Theocritus offers the most extensive

* θῆλυς ἔρως κάλλιστος ἐνὶ θνητοῖσι τέτυκται
δσσοις ἐς φιλίην σεμνὸς ἔνεστι νόος.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀρσενικὸν στέργεις πόθον, οἶδα δίδαξαι
φάρμακον ᾧ παύσεις τὴν δυσέρωτα νόσον·
στρέψας Μηνοφίλαν εὐίσχιον ἐν φρεσὶν ἔλπου
αὐτὸν ἔχειν κόλποις ἄρσενα Μηνόφιλον.

ironic expression – Sophocles and Euripides the most tragic – of the possible ambiguities in the search for a *pharmakon* for desire, a pursuit where the positive and negative senses of 'drug' turn out to be most alluringly and misleadingly intertwined.[4]) All you need to do is find a girl with good hips, take her to bed, turn her over, use your imagination, and your Jill will seem a Jack. There is in this epigram a rehearsal of many of the central terms of the last chapter's texts now in the service of a comically blasé version of what is elsewhere a more extended debate: *thelus eros*, 'female desire', is opposed to *arren eros*, 'male desire'; the *semnos*, 'high-minded', attitude marks the serious application of *sophia* and social propriety which together with the medicalization of the discourse of desire (and the grand echo of Sappho's pronouncement on the object of desire[5]) and the promise of 'teaching' construct the moralistic tone of the opening lines – the straight-man set-up for the bathetic and comic advice of the final lines. Interestingly, the same advice – turn over and think *paidikōs* – is given in an earlier[6] epigram by Dioscorides to a man who has difficulties making love to his *pregnant wife*, that most archetypal of normative female figures (7 G–P; *AP* 5.54):

> Never lean her, when pregnant, face up on your bed,
> Taking pleasure in the procreative act of love.
> For there is a huge swell in the middle, and it will be no small labour
> For her to be rowed and you to ride at anchor.
> Rather, turn her round, take pleasure in her rosy arse,
> And think of your wife as male-boy sex.*

Pointedly, here it is the specific link between gender difference and the normative world of marriage and procreation that is transgressively inverted. The central conceit of sea-borne metaphors, suitable for Kupris herself,[7] is framed by the opposition of 'procreative love' (*paidogonos kupris*) and 'male-boy love' (*arsenopais kupris*, where the very rare term *arseno*pais,[8] rendered as 'male-

* μήποτε γαστροβαρὴ πρὸς σὸν λέχος ἀντιπρόσωπον
παιδογόνῳ κλίνῃς Κύπριδι τερπόμενος,
μέσσοθι γὰρ μέγα κῦμα, καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγος πόνος ἔσται
τῆς μὲν ἐρεσσομένης σοῦ δὲ σαλευομένου.
ἀλλὰ πάλιν στρέψας ῥοδοείδει τέρπεο πυγῇ,
τὴν ἄλοχον νομίσας ἀρσενόπαιδα Κύπριν.

boy'/'child' seems specially designed to echo the 'child-bearing', paido*gonos*, of the opening description of marital sex). It is the juxtaposition of the pregnant wife in the marriage-bed (*lechos ... alochon*) and the bluntly comic erotic advice that gives the epigram its sharpness (as family values are turned upside down). That the version of 'male love' offered here depends on a particular representation of the female and the wilful use of her body is clear enough; but there is more. For one question that is raised by these epigrams – and will be raised at several points in this chapter – one thing you are asked to imagine, is 'How like?', 'How like a man is a woman?'

But that is to get ahead of ourselves. Let us first return to Achilles Tatius, and his Leucippe and Cleitophon, Melite and Thersander. For much as the arguments in favour of boys must be seen within their narrative frame, so too must Cleitophon's ecstatic account of the female kiss. After Cleitophon and Leucippe have been reunited, and Cleitophon has been joined with Melite finally for their one night of passion, Thersander, Melite's husband, is still on the social and legal warpath. The plotting is once again as intricate and as unsummarizable as a Handel opera. The crucial point is that with a characteristic Greek turn to the law court and the formalities of public debate, Thersander finally makes a formal challenge in court to the two women to undergo a ritual test of sexual purity. He accuses Leucippe of being a *pseudoparthenos*, a 'false virgin', and a prostitute, and he accuses his wife of being an adulteress (8.11):

> Thersander challenges Melite and Leucippe (*I have heard that is the whore's name*). Melite, if she has not consorted sexually with this stranger during the time of my absence abroad, is to enter the sacred water of the Styx, take the oath and be cleared of the charges. As for the other, if she is a woman that man has known, she is to remain a slave to her rightful master; for such women can enter the temple of Artemis only if they are slaves. If she says she is a virgin, let her be shut in the cave of the pan-pipes.

Thersander challenges his wife to prove that she has not had intercourse with Cleitophon during her husband's absence abroad, and Leucippe to prove her virginity. Melite will undergo the test by the waters of Styx. A woman takes an oath and enters the spring of Styx. If the oath she has sworn is true, the water stays where it is; if her oath is false, it rises to cover her neck (8.12). Melite, encouraged by the specification of 'during the time of [her husband's] absence

abroad', when she and Cleitophon had consorted only with words, promptly accepts this challenge. Leucippe for her part accepts to undergo the test of the grotto of Pan, which has been described earlier to her (8.6). A girl is locked in the cave of Pan. If she is a virgin, the pan-pipes are heard. If she is not a virgin, she disappears, the victim of Pan.

A virginity test was something Leucippe was willing to undergo back in book 2, when, after her mother had burst in to discover her and Cleitophon together in bed, the next morning she is defending her actions (with what might seem a revisionist attitude – or at least there is something of a tension between her passionate defence of her virginity to her mother and her willingness to indulge her passion for Cleitophon). She says: 'If there exists a *dokimasia parthenias*, a virginity test, *dokimason*, test me.' 'That's all we need,' replies her mother, 'that our misery should be known publicly', and flounces out of the room (2.28). Now Christian writers' talk of virginity tests,[9] and the story of Salome the midwife, whose hand shrivelled when, from lack of faith, she tested Mary's virginity (and was healed after the birth of Jesus), may indicate something of the popular tradition of physical testing for signs of virginity.[10] (Soranus, as we saw in the first chapter, denied the existence of a physical hymen, and such medical controversies may be echoed in the conditional clause here, though the rhetoric of the passage is primarily that of an assured challenge rather than doubt.) At the end of the novel, then, it is this public vindication of virginity that is finally to be enacted. 'That's all we need' for closure ... Since book 2, however, Leucippe's virginity has become increasingly the subject of challenge and defence. She herself defers consummation with Cleitophon (to his disappointment) because she (like her mother) has a dream – of Artemis, who enjoins her to keep her virginity until married (4.1). She is captured first by robbers and later by pirates. (This prompts Thersander to expostulate (6.21): 'You a virgin? Were the robbers eunuchs? Was it a pirate den of *philosophers*?!'.[11]) She becomes the object of desire for a military commander. The general is put off by Menelaus, who first pleads for a few days' respite (4.7), and who then offers the pretence that Leucippe is menstruating (4.7), and it isn't *themis* to sleep with her – the only example I know in Greek literature of such an excuse.[12] The commander agrees, but asks if he

can at least touch her body and kiss her – since menstruation does not prevent kissing (to add to our story of the kiss. It is in response to this request that Cleitophon delivers the speech about an 'adultery of the kiss' that I discussed in the previous chapter).[13] Finally the military commander's advances are avoided when Leucippe suffers an attack of a drug-induced seizure that almost kills her; and the lovers' next adventure takes them away from him to Alexandria. At Alexandria, a sexual ambush is avoided only because she and Cleitophon notice a picture in a shop window, the images on which, after analysis, seem a bad omen for the trip they were planning: they defer the trip and thus Cleitophon's art historical *sophia* unwittingly prevents the ambush, at least for a day.[14] Leucippe is, however, captured and sold (twice) into slavery. Bought by Thersander's agent, Sosthenes, she is handed over to Thersander, who tries to seduce and then to rape her. Her speech to him is a masterpiece of empassioned self-defence that would fit well into a Christian martyr text – and shows how far she has progressed from the flouncing of book 2 (6.21): 'Set out your tortures, bring in the wheel! Behold, my hands – let them be stretched! Bring in your whips also: behold, my back – let it be beaten! Let fire be brought: behold, my body – let it be burnt! Bring the sword too: behold, my neck – let it be sacrificed! Feast your eyes on a new contest: a single woman contends against all your tortures and triumphs over all ... Tell me, do you fear not even Artemis, your goddess? Are you going to rape a virgin in the virgin's city?' Every outrage, she concludes in true martyrological fashion, constructs a greater encomium for herself. Indeed, as the narrative progresses towards the public, legal testing of her virginity, not only do the defences of her virginity become more involved, but also the images of violent penetration increase. The famous *Scheintod* scenes, for example, offer to the transfixed gaze of Cleitophon (and the reader) the vision of Leucippe's body being assaulted and violently mistreated (so she taunts Thersander: 'behold ... behold ... behold ... feast your eyes ...').[15] In the first *Scheintod* scene (3.16), Leucippe is disembowelled in a sacrificial ritual by Egyptian cutthroats (though it turns out that Satyrus and Menelaus, with the timely assistance of a stage-sword and a sheep-skin full of blood have faked the event); second (5.7), Leucippe is beheaded by pirates, and her body thrown into the sea to slow up their pursuers (though

it eventually turns out that the pirates have in fact swapped the clothes of Leucippe and a prostitute in order to sell the virgin at a greater profit). Both these narrative *coups* offer dramatic scenes of violence by men with swords to the female body, only to preserve Leucippe's bodily integrity by a series of theatrical devices, a stage sword, a substituted body. From the first deferral of sex, thanks to the mother's dream of a sword entering the virgin's body, Achilles has both preserved Leucippe's virginity and repeatedly played with the idea of losing such physical integrity. Just as Chloe's virginity is maintained by the author's sophistic(ated) construction of innocence, so Leucippe's virginity is maintained and framed by her author's knowing feints and ruses about the physicality of chastity. Penetrating wit.

Leucippe thus, despite her original willingness to indulge her passion for Cleitophon, is forced to defend with increasing passion – and successfully – her physical integrity, and the test of the cave of Pan endorses her with a tune from the pan-pipes more melodious than any previously heard (8.14). Yet it is also crucial that at the same moment Melite's chastity is also publicly and divinely endorsed from the test of the waters of Styx – on the technicality that Thersander had specified during his absence abroad, and Melite and Cleitophon, of course, had had sexual relations only after both of them knew that their rightful partners were alive and returned. It is typical of the slyness of Achilles Tatius that he juxtaposes Melite's and Leucippe's triumphant public displays of chastity as the denouement of his plot.

It is instructive in order to gauge the tone of this narrative of challenge and preservation of bodily integrity to compare it with Heliodorus and his great work the *Aethiopica*. Here too we have a ritual virginity test at the end of the narrative, which acts as a mystical, theophanic endorsement of both the hero, Theagenes, and the heroine, Charicleia. The greatest gods of the Ethiopians are the Sun and the Moon. The victorious Ethiopian king, who has in war captured the hero and the heroine – his own long-lost and unrecognized daughter – is to make the traditional sacrifices for the nation's safety: the sacrifice of a male and female virgin. The test for virginity is to walk on the marvellous 'gridiron' (*eschara*), a lattice of gold that scorches anyone who is in any way unclean (*mē katharon*) (10.7).

Theagenes is shown to be pure, and the crowd marvel (*thaumazein*) both at his stature and beauty and that despite such beauty and his age he is still untouched by Aphrodite. Charicleia, however, runs as if possessed to take the test and stands unmoving on the gridiron. The crowd are amazed (*thambos . . . thauma*) not merely at her more than mortal beauty but at her demonstration that beyond the physical charms of youth (*hōra*), beauty's greatest adornment is *sophrosune* (10.9). And as with the story of Thecla and similar martyr narratives, the massed crowd is moved to sympathy and to beg for her release. This public and ritual proof of virginity will lead eventually to recognition, achieved social position and the happy ending of marriage – though significantly there is no mention of consummation as in *Daphnis and Chloe*. It is a fitting climax to this novel's erotic narrative. For in Heliodorus, both hero and heroine are religiously committed to virginity – *both* the male *and* the female – to the extent that when Charicleia, the heroine, asks Theagenes, the hero, to swear that he will not make an attempt on her chastity till they are married, he is almost insulted because such a task offers no chance of testing of the character of his love (4.18). When Charicleia perceives Theagenes is stimulated by their chaste kisses, she does, however, remind him of the oath, and he 'held out without difficulty and maintained his *sophrosune*, proving himself the master of his pleasure even when taken by desire' (5.4.5).* Charicleia indeed at the opening of the story (or so her father is said to tell Calasiris, a holy man and the manipulative prime mover of the plot) has decided to renounce marriage, and has (2.33.5) 'made a god of virginity'.† Calasiris duly helps Charicleia and Theagenes fall in love and elope, but even then – in what the lovers call (4.18) a 'self-imposed but innocent flight' of 'chaste desire' (*sophron eros*) – when Charicleia confesses that the one and only thing that could challenge her *sophrosune* is her love for Theagenes, she quickly adds (1.25) that even this is 'lawful' and that she has given herself to him as a future husband not as a lover and has kept herself thus pure (*katharos*) from intercourse. When Theagenes himself is pursued by another woman, Arsace, a royal figure, who contrives to kiss him in a piece

* οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐπανήγετο καὶ σωφρονεῖν ῥᾳδίως ἠνείχετο ἔρωτος μὲν ἐλάττων ἡδονῆς δὲ κρείττων γινόμενος.

† ἐκθειάζουσα παρθενίαν.

of courtly ritual, the text comments (7.26): 'Theagenes left the room kissed, but in no way did *he* kiss her'* – a reaction of recoil which contrasts tellingly with the pleasure Cleitophon takes in the kisses of Melite as he puts off consummating his marriage to her. When Theagenes is locked up and tortured by Arsace in an attempt to compel him to her bed, there are no games with philosophy, sex and bondage as in Achilles Tatius. Rather, it is the Christian martyr acts – Paul and Thecla, for example – that seem to be evoked (8.6.4): 'though his body was in torment, his soul had the strength of virtue ... He triumphed and revelled in the opportunity presented to him to display his love and devotion to Ch' ... aricleia.† Threatened death is escaped not by theatrical tricks, but by divine intervention: Arsace has her rival Charicleia sentenced to death by burning, but however high the wood is piled the flames do not touch the maiden. The crowd recognize her innocence and purity (8.9). The very mainsprings of the plot, desire and elopement, are turned – with notable rhetorical care – to show this awe for chastity. Calasiris, in a first-person account of what he said to persuade Charicleia to accept flight from her home with the hero, argues (4.10) that *eros* does afflict 'many famous women and many virgins who are in other respects self-controlled (*sophron*)'. Such an opening may recall the arguments in Achilles Tatius and other earlier literature such as Euripides' *Hippolytus*, arguments which lead to counsels of transgression. (As the nurse in *Hippolytus* argues to Phaedra (439–81), 'since Zeus himself felt desire, so you too bear up in your desire and don't think yourself greater than a god'.) But Calasiris' conclusion is strikingly different and places desire firmly in the service of law not transgression (4.10.6): 'The most intelligent thing is to direct your will to self-control; it is possible to escape the foul name of appetite (*epithumia*), choose a legal union, and turn this sickness into marriage.'‡ The speech of Calasiris is the self-representation of a design to persuade a virgin in love to elope, but it is also a rhetoric that is in

* ἐξῆλθεν ὁ Θεαγένης φιληθείς, οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε φιλήσας.

† τὸ μὲν σῶμα καταπονούμενος, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἐπὶ σωφροσύνῃ ῥωννύμενος, καὶ μεγαλαυχούμενος ἅμα πρὸς τὴν τύχην καὶ γαυριῶν εἰ ... ἐπιδείξεως ἀφορμὴν τῆς εἰς τὴν Χαρικλείαν εὐνοίας τε καὶ πίστεως παρεσχημένη ...

‡ πρὸς τὸ σῶφρον τὸ βούλημα περποιῆσαι σοφώτατον· ὃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ βουλομένῃ πιστεύειν ἔξεστι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμίας αἰσχρὸν ὄνομα διώσασθαι τὸ δὲ συναφείας ἔννομον συνάλλαγμα προελέσθαι καὶ εἰς γάμον τρέψαι τὴν νόσον.

tune with the dynamics of the novel's narrative. As John Morgan writes: 'Heliodorus ends with marriage, an affirmation of its profoundest social and sexual values. The marriage about to be enacted when the text closes is the end to which all the experiences of the hero and heroine have been directed, and which alone makes their experience bearable and senseful. It is a sacramental ending to a novel which has elevated love to the status of sacrament.'[16] The sacramental investment in male and female virginity, mutual love and reciprocal desire, makes understandable the identification ancient writers made: that Heliodorus was a Christian bishop.

The difference between the concluding scenarios in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, then, is marked and significant. For Heliodorus, we have the triumphant public reaffirmation of hero and heroine as pure sexually and in their love, joined with parents in secured family unit; in Achilles Tatius, we have Cleitophon's disingenuous claim to his father-in-law that 'if there is such a thing as virginity in men I have it for Leucippe'; in Heliodorus, we have the crowd's amazement that such a beautiful couple should be still untouched; in Achilles Tatius, we have Cleitophon's and Melite's conscious (and concealed) adultery; and, above all, we have the triumphant religious endorsement of Melite's chastity because Thersander's challenge specifies 'in my absence abroad'. The juxtaposition of the public acclamation of Leucippe (doubted previously even by her father) and the public acclamation of Melite (doubted by her husband) raises a question of the security of the knowledge of the integrity of the female body. Achilles Tatius' novel juxtaposes the preservation of Leucippe's virginity to a sly and self-aware manipulation of patriarchal concern for the *knowability*, the *testability* of female chastity. What is your wife (or your daughter) really like . . .?

The divine authorization of Melite's dubious chastity, then, is not just a joke at the expense of the baddy Thersander. It also manipulates a question of the knowability of chastity. For within patriarchal concerns for female chastity lurks the problem of how to *know* for sure about the integrity of the female body – and the related problem of the *knowingness* of the female. For here, as so often, the worry of knowing about the woman is linked to the deceptivenes of the female – Melite – whose bodily form and verbal

utterance do not reveal her behaviour. Yet, as the reader is put in the know with regard to Melite's cozening of Thersander, the case of Cleitophon (his *parthenia*) also significantly links the worry of knowing to the manipulation of self-representation in a (male) first-person narrative, his and our complicity in recounting Melite's story. What are the telling signs of virginity or chastity? (Not merely) what are its physiognomics or psychological deformation? (But also) how do stories about the self inform the narrative of virginity or chastity? As with *Daphnis and Chloe*, Achilles Tatius' playfulness about chastity revolves around the linkage of sex and knowledge.

This worry about the knowledge of female chastity has a long history in Greek writing. Helen of Troy – particularly as represented in *Odyssey* 4, and particularly as obsessively re-presented in fifth-century literature – is a central figure in such a history – how can an adulterous wife be returned to live in wealth and comfort in the home she had deserted? How condoned, explained ... represented?[17] From a quite different perspective, the Hippocratic doctors found physical signs – a deeper voice, for example – to indicate a loss of *parthenia*,[18] as Aeschylus is quoted as saying a 'young woman's eye betrays her when she has tasted man'.[19] In early Greek texts of law and philosophy too there are similar concerns, which provide a fundamental textual ground for Second Sophistic writing. Lysias 1, to take a well-known example from the law court, stages the self-representation of a cuckolded husband who has killed his wife's lover *in flagrante delicto* in his own house. The law allows for such retribution provided it is unpremeditated. Thus the husband's tricky task in court is to convince the jurors he never suspected his tricky wife of infidelity – even when she wore make-up. What – when – did he, should he, have known or suspected? How innocent (however naive) can a husband be with regard to a wife's sexual transgression? A further law, what is more, specifies the punishment of loss of all citizen rights for a man who knows his wife has committed adultery and does not divorce her. Knowing is all important for the (Athenian) patriarch. But I want to look here at two later texts, which are indebted to these earlier debates, but which offer a slightly different light on the issue of female chastity, the first a moral tract, the second a novel. The first offers an argu-

ment about the nature of the city and uses the virgin's known virginity to discuss the moral order of the polis; the second offers a narrative that depends not merely on suspicion of a wife's fidelity, but on the question of how a difficult scenario of bigamy is to be understood by the men involved. The moral tract is written by Dio Chrysostom, a first-century CE Romano-Greek rhetorician and broadly Stoic political theorist, whom few would accuse of sharing the sly knowingness of Achilles Tatius. In his seventh Discourse, an account of how the author met a rustic man from whom he learnt a different view of city-life, and how (therefore) a proper city might be organized, Dio turns to consider the problem of brothels in the just city (not exactly a major Platonic concern). Now sacred prostitution as well as secular prostitution was a regular part of culture throughout the Mediterranean,[20] and continued through the Christianization of the Empire, despite the attempts of those churchmen like Leo I who tried (in the fifth century) to ban prostitution altogether.[21] Roman rhetoric with its customary economic turn usually focuses on the danger or outrage of excessive expenditure on prostitutes,[22] and in Cato finds among the ancestors a paradigmatic supporter of prostitution as an institution necessary for young men to discharge their sexual tensions without worrying citizen women; in Greek writing there is little, if any, moral disapprobation of the institution of prostitution as such (as opposed to the humiliation for a citizen to be treated as a prostitute: in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE in Athens to be convicted of prostitution was punishable with disenfranchisement[23]). Greek writing too deprecated excessive expenditure, but not expenditure *per se*.[24] Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, the role of the hetaira in Greek writing in no way implies a deep-seated concern for the institution of prostitution itself. Indeed, one of the letters of Theano – supposedly the wife of Pythagoras, forged perhaps by a *sophos* of the Hellenistic period[25] – recommends to a Nicostrate, woman to woman, that she should not worry or feel jealous because her husband has a hetaira: it's just a stage he is going through, just pleasure he pursues: tolerance is the correct palliative to his *bêtise*. So too Perictione in her *On the Harmony of a Woman*, another Neo-Pythagorean homily under the name of a woman,[26] writes: 'A woman must bear all that her husband bears, whether he be unlucky or sin out of ignorance,

whether he be sick or drunk or sleep with other women. For this latter fault is peculiar to men, but never to women. Rather it brings vengeance on her. So she must maintain the law and not be jealous.'[27] Dio Chrysostom, however, vitriolically condemns prostitution itself for coining filthy lucre from *hubris* and *akolasia*, 'outrageous treatment' and 'lack of control' (133). He condemns sex with prostitutes as a 'congress without love, desire without desire', *anaphroditou mixeōs kai anerastōn erotōn* (133). He goes on to demand a ban from the city of all prostitution, on the grounds that it is an affront to the gods of marriage and the family, and on the grounds that it is an evident encouragement to licentiousness and practices which contravene the laws of the natural union of male and female (135–7). Religion, nature and the family – the weapons of any decent fundamentalist – form an ideological nexus to buttress a contentious conclusion with the edifice of self-evident truth. He offers two interesting claims for his position, that lead his argument in a wholly novel direction. First (138), he states that one should not stand idly by when degrading violence is done to other people, because the whole human race is held in the same and equal honour by god. This seems to be an early claim for human as opposed to citizen rights; and, what is more, prostitution for Dio Chrysostom seems inevitably to involve the perpetration of degrading violence, a view which surprisingly universalizes the sense of *hubris* with which the prostitution of a citizen's body was repeatedly regarded in Greek writing and law. Second – and this is the point he will expand – he argues that the absence of laws and strict controls in apparently trivial matters leads to further transgression as people pursue ever greater thrills (139):

Now one must above all reflect that these public, unconcealed and unworthy (*atimoi*[28]) acts of adultery (*moicheiai*), acts which are all too shameless and without restraint, generally provide the cause of secret and concealed outrages against women and children of good family (*entimoi*). For such crimes are all too easily dared when decency (*aischune*) is despised in society. Nor as some think was this institution invented to provide safety and restraint from such sins.*

* ἤδη οὖν χρὴ παντὸς μᾶλλον οἴεσθαι τὰς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ταύτας φανερὰς καὶ ἀτίμους μοιχείας καὶ λίαν ἀναισχύντως καὶ ἀνέδην γιγνομένας ὅτι τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ ἀφανῶν εἰς ἐντίμους γυναῖκάς τε καὶ παῖδας ὕβρεων οὐχ ἥκιστα παρέχουσι τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ

He uses the term *moicheia*, 'adultery', with its full legal implications, along with the vocabulary of enfranchisement, to emphasize the civic and anti-familial status of the act of using prostitutes. So the crimes are committed *en tō mesōi*, 'in the public domain', and decency is despised *en koinōi*, 'in society', 'in common'. The availability of prostitution indeed, he suggests, leads to threats on the honour of women and children of good families. Someone may rather crudely claim, Dio interjects at this point, that prostitution exists precisely to preserve the sanctity of marriage – which is the position famously ascribed to that rather crude Roman, Cato, namely, that prostitution is a way to keep lusty young men away from citizen wives.[29] 'Men, however', says Dio in response (140), 'readily tire of what's very cheap and easy, and pursue with fear and great expense the forbidden, because it is forbidden.' Thus, the adultery of prostitution leads to the adultery of citizen marriage, with the following result (142): 'in such a case, I declare, when the business of married women is conducted thus with apparent respectability, you cannot easily be certain about the virginity of virgins, or ever trust the truth and justice of the hymn sung at virgins' marriages'.* The very existence of brothels thus necessarily throws doubt on the virginity of a city's maidens. Dio's extreme rhetoric effaces the fundamental boundaries between different social categories of sexual object – wives, prostitutes, virgins, slaves – or at least holds up such effacement of categories as the necessary result of a deviation from the iron rule of *sophrosune*, which he constructs apparently as a narrowly conceived sexual self-control wholly within the bounds of marital union. The worry about a daughter's chastity becomes here part of Dio's strategic redefinition of *sophrosune* within the polis: security about a girl's virginity is made dependent on that redefinition of (male) *sophrosune* that would remove the sexual licence of prostitution. The alternative is one corrupt desire leading to another in a cycle of increasing transgression (itself a commonplace in Roman worries about the import of Greek luxur-

πάνυ ῥᾳδίως τὰ τοιαῦτα τολμᾶσθαι, τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐν κοίνῳ καταφρονουμένης, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἴονταί τινες, ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἀποχῆς ἐκείνων εὑρῆσθαι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων.

* παρ' οἷς, φημί, ταῦθ' οὕτως ἐπιεικῶς ἐξάγεται τὰ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρθένων ἐκεῖ θαρρῆσαι ῥᾳδίον τῆς κορείας οὐδὲ τὸν ὑμέναιον ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ δικαίως ᾀδόμενον ἐν τοῖς παρθενικοῖς γάμοις πιστεῦσαί ποτε.

ies). Thus Dio concludes (151–2) that the final degradation of this downward spiral of misplaced desire will be the homoerotic corruption of those destined to be magistrates, judges and generals, a significantly civic act of corruption – which is likened climactically in this essay on the appetites to that epitome of immorality, the man who uses pickles to excite his flagging taste for unmixed wine. From brothels to pickles ...

In Dio Chrysostom, then, the reversal of Cato's wisdom on prostitution is put in service of the construction of the place of sexuality in the city that utilizes the standard concern for a daughter's virginity and a wife's chastity to enforce a new standard of male *sophrosune*. The moves of the argument are clear enough, and the strategy shows strikingly how the representation of the female is structured in and through a debate about male behaviour. Knowing about female integrity is important as an element in projecting a standard of male virtue. Dio Chrysostom's complete hostility to prostitution, however, is not found in the Latin texts of the period, and is very hard to parallel in the Greek – until Christian moralists turn their attention to the problem, though even in this moral tradition there remains a surprising range of responses.[30] How should the force of such an extreme account of *sophrosune* and the appetites be evaluated, then? Is it sophistic provocation, reversing a standard argument, and challenging in and by its counterintuitive extremism? Is it an attempt to redefine the moralists' high ground, part of a general move towards asceticism, tinged here by Stoic ideals? A sign of the times – as it appeals to the signs of the times in its accusations of contemporary corruption? Is it a passionate – or even a psychologically overcommitted – plea for control of the civic appetites? An exercise in the potential of rhetorical formulation? In the difficult process of writing cultural history, such writing does not 'speak for itself', but rather traces a site of negotiation, a negotiation formed and prompted by the engagement of the reader's commitment to *sophia*, to civic virtue, to family values, to the normative processes of reading. If the worry of Achilles Tatius knowingly manipulates a question about the knowledge of chastity, Dio Chrysostom's straining at the assumptions of civic morality is equally – if differently – provocative in its claim to knowledge, its claim to a privileged didactic place in the construction of the moral citizen.

My second text on the knowability of chastity is another novel, the earliest fully extant work of the genre, Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*. The date is uncertain, though it is not later than the first century CE (and thus roughly contemporary with Dio Chrysostom).[31] Remarkably, so many generic markers of the novel seem in place, that some critics have seen Chariton as the inventor of the genre of romance. His novel will help us see another crucial link in the connections between chastity and knowledge. In this boy-meets-girl romance, the first surprise is that the supremely beautiful Callirhoe and the finely handsome Chaereas meet, fall in love and are married by the end of book 1 chapter 1. Her other suitors are as outraged as the reader by the suddenness of this turn of events (1.2.1–4), and hatch a plot to make Chaereas jealous of his wife's chastity. First, when Chaereas visits the country place, they secretly garland the door of their house in town, and leave other signs of a lover's visit (1.3.2–3). A crowd gathers to see the shocking signs of the apparent courtship of a married woman, and Chaereas, when he returns, in humiliated anger accuses his wife of infidelity. She – 'like the spirited daughter of a general that she was' (1.3.6) – speaks up for herself and convinces Chaereas of his error: but the doubt rankles. Chaereas is thus prepared for the second part of the plan. First, one of the suitors' accomplices seduces Callirhoe's maid – 'a woman' comments the narrator 'is easily caught when she thinks she is loved' (1.4.2). Second, an accomplished scoundrel is suborned to tell Chaereas that he is the only one who does not know he is being cuckolded. Proof is offered. Chaereas pretends to go to the country, hides and sees the seducer of the maid, dressed in soft clothes, big rings, and with perfumed hair, slipping up to the house as if hoping to escape detection, knocking secretly and gaining entrance. Chaereas is outraged, bursts back into the house, punches Callirhoe in the stomach, and his wife falls apparently dead. And it's still only chapter 4. At this point, Callirhoe is buried, and when pirate grave-robbers come, it appears that she was only in a deep coma. She wakes, is taken by the pirates as a slave, to begin an odyssey around the Mediterranean, while her grief-stricken husband pursues what he thinks is a corpse on a similar route.

Suspicion of a wife's fidelity is, then, the very mainspring of Chariton's plot. It is this in part that makes the rest of the narrative

so fascinating. Callirhoe is the most beautiful woman in the world, and like Helen – the most famous adulteress in Greek literature as well as its archetypal 'most beautiful woman in the world' – she goes to the East and indeed to Egypt, and everywhere she goes she excites the desire of all who see her. Indeed, she excites a jealousy in all who have or wish to have her. *Zelotupia*, an erotic jealousy and suspicion, continues to motivate the plot.[32] Moreover, wars are fought for her, as she becomes the object of desire for increasingly important figures – eventually the Great King himself. It is Callirhoe who experiences a series of challenges to her chastity, while Chaereas wanders after her demonstrating his military prowess or rhetorical skill, but not provoked in terms of his sexual purity. The most interesting of Callirhoe's encounters is with Dionysius, a leading citizen of Miletus. He desires Callirhoe, who has been sold to his estate manager and wishes to marry her honourably and richly. Callirhoe has meanwhile discovered that she is pregnant. She is convinced that she must either abort her child, or marry Dionysius and have him believe the child is his own (for she is only two months pregnant), or kill herself. 'The choice', she says (2.10.7), 'is between chastity (*sophrosune*) and my child.' In a famous scene (2.11), alone and desperate she debates with a picture of her husband – the seal on her ring, symbolically enough – the choice between remarriage for the sake of the baby, or death for the sake of faithfulness. She allows each of the three parties a vote: she votes for her own death, since to be the wife solely of Chaereas is for her the most important thing of all: 'This to me is sweeter than my parents and my country and my child: to try not to be taken by another husband.' The baby votes for life, and for future recognition as his father's son. Chaereas has the casting vote, and, since she dreamt the previous night that he appeared to her and said 'I hand you our son', then his vote too must be for life. By a two-to-one vote, she will live and marry Dionysius. 'I call you to witness, Chaereas', she invokes her husband in conclusion, 'you yourself are leading me down the aisle to Dionysius.'*

This piece of deliberative oratory is a brilliant staging of the *topoi* of the law court, all parts played by Callirhoe – complete with generic pathos, *prosopopoiia*, and marvellous sophistic twist of the

* μαρτύρομαί σε, Χαιρέα, σύ με Διονυσίῳ νυμφαγωγεῖς.

topos of bringing one's family into the court to plead for sympathy . It is a scene, however, that leads the heroine to remarry and to live with Dionysius with her child, brought up as the son of Dionysius. Or, in the heroine's earlier terms, to sacrifice her *sophrosune* for her child's life, to allow a second husband to take her. Indeed, Dionysius is drawn as a decent figure, quite unlike the pirates, philanderers and bullies who usually threaten the novelistic heroine. It is this that makes the conclusion of the novel so interesting. Chaereas and Callirhoe have been reunited after their many adventures to return home. Callirhoe writes a letter of farewell to Dionysius (8.4.4–6):

Callirhoe too thought it proper to show her gratitude to Dionysius by writing to him. This was the only thing she did without Chaereas knowing; for she knew his natural jealousy and was at pains to conceal her secret. She took a writing tablet and wrote the following: 'From Callirhoe: greetings to Dionysius, my benefactor – for it was you who freed me from pirates and slavery. Please do not be angry. For I am with you in spirit through the son we share. I entrust him to you to bring up and educate worthily of us. Do not let him learn what a stepmother is. You have not only a son, but also a daughter. Two children are enough for you. Marry them to each other when he comes of age, and send him to Syracuse, so that he can see his grandfather too. Plangon, my greetings to you too. I have written this in my own hand. Fare you well, good Dionysius, and remember your Callirhoe.'

'This was the only thing that Callirhoe did without Chaereas knowing', comments the narrator, 'for she knew his natural jealousy and was at pains to conceal her secret.'* A wife's hidden and fond letter to a man she has lived with for some time might indeed be thought a source for 'natural jealousy' in patriarchal culture. Now, it is only shortly before this letter that Callirhoe and Chaereas have been reunited; and in a night strikingly compared to that first night together of Odysseus and Penelope in the *Odyssey*, the hero and heroine have told each other all that has happened to them: 'Who could tell that night? How many stories it was full of, and how many tears and kisses together?', it begins (8.1.14), and finally closes with a direct quotation from the *Odyssey* (23.296): 'happy they came to the proper place of their marital bed of old' – the very line where Odysseus and Penelope finally are reunited, and where the greatest

* τοῦτο μόνον ἐποίησε δίχα Χαιρέου. εἰδυῖα γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔμφυτον ζηλοτυπίαν ἐσπούδαζε λαθεῖν.

Hellenistic critics of the *Odyssey*, Aristarchus and Aristophanes, are reported to have said the *Odyssey* should end.[33] The comparison with the *Odyssey* underlines how the sexual liaisons in this novel have been the prerogative of the *wife*, not the husband – the inversion of the endemic double standards of Greek patriarchy. Indeed, Chaereas weeps through the first part of Callirhoe's tale, but (8.1.15) 'when Callirhoe reached the part about Miletus, she fell silent, ashamed, and Chaereas recalled his natural jealousy but she comforted him with the account of the child'.* (Even after this, she adds quickly in her defence that she did not give the Great King so much as a kiss.) But it is clear that her marriage with Dionysius – however silenced – is a source of shame, *aidos*, and that the very silence is for Chaereas a stimulus to his 'natural jealousy', the same phrase used to justify the secrecy of her later letter to Dionysius. In the patriarchal world of Greek marital relations for a *woman* to say 'I was true to you darling in my fashion', cuts little ice. Penelope was accused by the Suitors in the Assembly of Ithaca of sending false messages to them, leading them on (a story which in later Greek writing leads to some scurrilous suggestions about even Penelope's chastity), but it is crucial to the normative world of the *Odyssey* that Penelope is tested and vindicated as a paradigm of wifely resolve;[34] Callirhoe is in a more tricky position. There is an evident awkwardness in the text's construction of a marital ideal here. Callirhoe's farewell letter to her second husband, indeed, comforts *him* with the thought that she is 'with him in spirit – *tēi psuchēi* – through our common son, whom I leave to you to raise and educate in a manner worthy of us'. She maintains the fiction of paternity and merely asks that when the boy is a man he is sent to see his ... *pappon*, his ... grandfather.[35] The son and heir of the hero and heroine is thus left with the supposed father, as Dionysius is finally begged to remember 'your Callirhoe' – emphatic last words *tes ses*. And indeed when Dionysius reads the letter – a fine scene of the lover as reader in the text – he concludes that Callirhoe, although she no longer calls him husband, left him unwillingly: on which the narrator comments, 'Desire is thus facile,[36] and easily persuades a person his desire is reciprocated'

* Καλλιρρόη μὲν ἐσιώπησεν αἰδουμένη, Χαιρέας δὲ τῆς ἐμφύτου ζηλοτυπίας ἀνεμνήσθη, παρηγόρησε δὲ αὐτὸν τὸ περὶ τοῦ τέκνου διήγημα.

(8.5.13–14). As she comforted Chaereas with the 'story about the child', so she comforts Dionysius with a 'story about the child'.

This manipulative and misleading letter from a bigamist wife – 'the spirited daughter of a general' – has prompted a fascinating range of response as critics expand Chariton's – and Callirhoe's – repressed tale-telling. Foucault – a surprising romantic – writes simply 'the two spouses preserve their love, their purity and their faithfulness throughout their adventures'[37] – as if Dionysius played no part in the tale. David Konstan recognizes at least that Callirhoe gets married to Dionysius, but still writes that the 'second marriage does not cast the least shadow on her fidelity, and Chaereas' anxieties are wholly resolved when he is assured that she acted not out of love for Dionysius but on behalf of his own child and thus himself'[38] – a partial account which does not mention the reprises of Chaereas' jealousy, or Callirhoe's letter, or the fate of that comforting child, or how sleeping with another man casts not the least shadow on fidelity. Perry comments with his characteristic tone: 'It seems hardly plausible that Dionysius should continue throughout to believe, as he does, that Callirhoe's child is his own begetting especially after he learns that Callirhoe was married to Chaereas shortly before she came to him.'[39] Why didn't Dionysius *know*? Wiersma writes 'As the story tells us, the letter was the only thing she did without Chaereas' knowledge. But would Dionysius have accepted "his" son, if with him she had not done more "without Chaereas' knowledge?"'[40] – an account which seems to know exactly what Callirhoe told Chaereas in bed that first night .... Knowledge and the polemical *construction* of a wife's chastity are set at stake in Chariton's narrative of jealousy: who knows what about Callirhoe? The readers of Callirhoe in the text – her husbands, Chaereas and Dionysius – are left with the one man suppressing jealousy and in ignorance of her letter, the other, the 'dupe of love', believing she left him unwillingly. What is required for Chaereas or the critic to declare her purity and fidelity absolutely unshadowed by her time with Dionysius? Could the sexual initiation of Daphnis and Chloe be so reversed? Or the *parthenia* of Leucippe and Cleitophon? The marriage that opens this text with such a generic shock refocuses the concern with female sexuality onto a different sense of integrity, a different construction of *sophrosune*. A concern with the

boundaries of the acceptable behaviour of the wife. If being the wife of one man is becoming a privileged term in Graeco-Roman culture, what is Callirhoe, the Helen of this novel, *like*?

With Chariton, then, we see that as chastity invokes knowing, so knowing depends on a set of negotiations of the knowable by the players in the novel and by the critics of the text. For chastity (fidelity, love) is constituted by a process of definition that remains contestable. Not merely what is known (of the woman) but what is or can be or should be knowable or known. When Christian writers start to argue that *thought* about sex is itself staining – adultery in the heart – they are renegotiating the same negotiable problematic, redefining the criteria of judgement within a different calculus of pleasure, will and physical action. To worry 'What is my wife or daughter like?' is to engage in the process of cultural definition, to negotiate the contests of a normative sexual discourse. The question of when chastity, or fidelity, or love is lost or fractured is ever open to social, moral, intellectual, emotional contestation (adultery of the soul? adultery of the body? adultery of the *kiss*?). It is this space that Chariton's Callirhoe inhabits, these questions she continues to provoke.

Daphnis and Chloe depends on a playfully extreme version of the relation between sexuality and knowledge; the texts I have been considering in this chapter so far in their different ways treat the specific issue of knowledge and chastity – and the complicity of the male subject. My analysis of *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, however, and the novel's narrative of wifely sexual adventures and husband's chastity, has also led to the issue of *symmetry*, one of the broadest categories through which the sexual discourse of later Greek and Latin writers has been recently discussed.[41] (So my first question of the knowability of chastity becomes implicated with the second question of 'How like a man can a woman be?') In Classical Greek writing, the hierarchy of gender relations in the family, however often inverted or corrupted in comic or tragic transgression, is scarcely challenged as the norm of social existence, except perhaps in a text of radical social fantasy such as Plato's *Republic*. Even there, however, the possibility of female Guardians must be tempered by the pervasive denigration of the feminine in Plato's writing. Yet, it has been argued, the trend in the Greek novels for heroes and

heroines of a similar age, class and intellectual constitution (a trend started in New Comedy of the fourth century BCE); the Roman emphasis on being *univira*, the wife of one man,[42] which becomes in Christian writing the requirement of a marriage for life with a spouse equal in moral fervour and religious duty; are key indications of a general shift throughout later antiquity in the idea and ideals of familial and sexual relations – a move often described as the pursuit of symmetry: where a social equivalence of lover and loved one becomes joined to an expectation of a shared and reciprocal love and duty. Plutarch's *Amatorius* will be a central text in this history, but before I finally reach it, I want to look briefly at two further texts, again a novel and the work of a moralist, which will both add further crucial elements to the developing picture and show how complex the issue of symmetry rapidly becomes. The moralist is Musonius Rufus, a first-century Roman Stoic writing in Greek, whose titles include 'That Women Should Do Philosophy', 'Whether Sons and Daughters Should Receive the Same Education', 'Whether Marriage is a Bar to Philosophy', an 'On Sex', and two fragments entitled 'What is the Main Point of Marriage?' – works which have often been taken as key texts in the discussion of a move towards symmetry between the genders.[43] Musonius, as a Roman writing in Greek, is a good example of how the Greek tradition of *sophia*, the very tradition mobilized by the novels for their particular brand of erotic wisdom, is appropriated by Romans to do philosophy – could his ideas be expressed in Latin? Or rather what would happen to such material in the process of translation? It is not just cultural capital or linguistic imperialism that leads a Roman to choose to do his philosophical writing in Greek or Latin. Musonius, as a distinguished Roman, living in Rome, and writing in Greek, provides what will be in this chapter a limit case of some of the complex assimilations and conflicts between different areas of Greek cultural composition, and, perhaps most importantly for my argument, will stand as a paradigm for one crucial strand of the fabric making up the *Amatorius* of Plutarch, another writer who lives on the cusp of Roman and Greek cultures.[44]

As a Stoic, Musonius has been profitably viewed within contemporary Stoic debate and within a specific philosophical tradition;[45] he may indeed have been the teacher of Dio Chrysostom.[46]

The titles of several Stoic treatises on themes similar to those of Musonius are known,[47] and Zeno's *Republic*, a founding text of Stoic political philosophy, seems to have discussed the role of the family, the passions, and sexuality within the polis, as did Plato's *Republic* (although the fragmentary state of Zeno's work precludes detailed reconstruction[48]). Interestingly, as Malcolm Schofield has pointed out, 'all the leading figures' of early Stoicism 'wrote on erotic love'[49] – he lists works by Zeno, Persaeus, Ariston, Cleanthes, Sphaerus (and Chrysippus), which implies a considerable philosophical interest in *ta erotika*, and provides a fundamental element of the background against which the novels' amusement at and dependence on philosophy resound. What is more, questions such as whether a wise man should marry, what the roles of love and friendship in a community are, and the education of women, seem to have continued to be actively debated, which betokens a continuing interest in the overlapping concerns of sexuality, gender and education. Zeno himself is said to have written on intercrural intercourse, the expected form of sexual consummation between consenting males, and he 'evidently ruled that like all sexual intercourse it is insufficient for virtue and happiness ... and that consequently:

> Do not have intercourse with the youngster you love in preference to the one you don't (or *vice versa*), or with a female in preference to a male (or *vice versa*). For it is not the case that one thing suits and is suitable for the one you do, and another for the one you don't, or one thing for females, another for males, but rather just the same.'[50]

This apparently blithe view rather takes the sword to the Gordian tangles I have been tracing (not to mention Plato's *Phaedrus*). Musonius is less sanguine, as we will see, and indeed constructs an even more severe view of erotic behaviour than Dio Chrysostom, his near contemporary (and, it has been suggested, pupil). My concern here is not to trace in detail the Stoic arguments on *philia* and *eros* and gender, but rather to look at one particular set of arguments about symmetry, in particular to see how Musonius can end up in the extraordinary position – for a male writer in Greek – of lauding the virtue of Amazons.

It is, first, Musonius' stringent distaste for pleasure that distin-

guishes his austerity. In the 'On Sex', Musonius reviles the pursuit of pleasure as a sign of decadence; not merely the degrading pursuit of ever more refined pleasures as in Dio Chrysostom, but the pursuit of pleasure altogether: only sex in marriage for the procreation of children, he claims, is acceptable, and 'the pursuit of mere pleasure, even in marriage, is unjust (*adika*) and against the law (*paranoma*)'.[1] 'Musonius' opinion', as van Geytenbeek puts it, 'is exceptional',[51] in its refusal to allow erotic pleasure even between husband and wife. ('Philo and Clement are the only moralists who share it' ... clearly dodgy company.) What is more, other Stoics such as Antipater in their arguments for the desirability of marriage positively encouraged reciprocal affection and recognized a place for pleasure at least within the dictates of *sophrosune* and *enkrateia*. Needless to say, adultery is also strongly rejected by Musonius, as is sex with boys, which is no more reasonable than adultery since it is a *tolmema para phusin*, 'an outrage against nature'. Indeed, a person who acts 'with *sophrosune* would not dare to approach a prostitute, a free woman outside marriage, or even by God his own female slave'. As Dio Chrysostom had blurred the distinctions between different categories of (female) sexual object, so here Musonius' list goes against the standard cultural assumptions, as he links the citizen woman, the prostitute and the slave – usually open to a master's requirements – as equally off limits to a man of *sophrosune*. Interestingly, it is the most challenging ('by God') claim that a man should not sleep with one of his female slaves that Musonius develops. He points out first that all such sexual crimes are clearly shameful to men, since they are not committed openly. But secondly, he imagines an objection that comes precisely from the standard normative expectations: adultery is quite different from sex with a slave; in adultery the husband of the corrupted woman is wronged; 'but no-one is harmed if a man sleeps with his own slave or an unattached female. For he destroys no-one's hopes of patrilineal inheritance.'[2] The objection assumes, it will be noted, that adultery or sleeping with a slave or an unattached woman is to be evaluated according to the woman's relation to the man who possesses her, and within the frame of household values. 'No-one'

* τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, κἂν ἐν γάμῳ ᾖ.
† ἐλπίδα παίδων οὐδενὸς διαφθείρει.

means no male adult in authority. To use one's own slave does not challenge the household order, because property and progeny are not at risk. Musonius retorts to this 'common-sense opinion' that such a man may not be harming his neighbour, but is 'proving *himself* absolutely a lesser man, and of less honour'.[1] For a sin dishonours and worsens the sinner. The clash between the social implications of adultery (the rhetorical basis of a speech such as Lysias 1) and an individual moral sense of wrongdoing (which the philosopher is trying to promote) is thus dramatically marked in this debate between an imagined objection and philosopher's response. But Musonius adds a final telling argument:

There is a simple argument for this. For if it seems to someone that it is not disgraceful for a master to approach his own female slave, particularly if she happens to be unattached, consider what sort of an event it would be if a mistress approached a male slave. For this would not seem bearable, not only if it were a legally married woman who approached the slave, but even if an unmarried woman were to do this act. Yet surely a person would not reckon that men are worse than women, and are less able to control their own passions; the stronger in judgement less capable than the weaker, the rulers than the ruled! For it is fitting for men to be much more in control if indeed they reckon themselves to stand in authority over their wives.†

If you do not think it shameful or out of place for a master to come to his slave-girl, particularly if she's unattached, what about if a mistress comes to a slave-boy? This scenario of reversal would be unbearable (and not only if she were married and had a husband).[52] The worry that the mistress of the house is sleeping with slaves and other lowly characters is a common trope of satire and comedy in Rome in particular, and the double standard it embodies is taken as a *donnée* of the discussion.[53] Then the twist of the argument: surely no-one would think men less strong than women (another 'self-

* αὐτόν γε πάντως χείρονα ἀποφαίνων καὶ ἀτιμότερον.

† πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλοῦς μοι ὁ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ τῳ δοκεῖ μὴ αἰσχρὸν μηδ' ἄτοπον εἶναι δούλῃ δεσπότην πλησιάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ τύχοι οὖσα χήρα, λογισάσθω ποῖόν τι καταφαίνεται αὐτῷ, εἰ δέσποινα δούλῳ πλησιάζοι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἀνεκτόν, οὐ μόνον εἰ κεκτημένη ἄνδρα νόμιμον ἡ γυνὴ πρόσοῖτο δοῦλον, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄνανδρος οὖσα τοῦτο πράττοι; καίτοι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐ δήπου τῶν γυναικῶν ἀξιώσει τις εἶναι χείρονας, οὐδ' ἧττον δύνασθαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας παιδαγωγεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν, τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. πολὺ γὰρ κρείττονας εἶναι προσήκει τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἴπερ καὶ προεστάναι ἀξιοῦνται τῶν γυναικῶν.

evident' claim), less capable of schooling their desires (that aim of philosophical *askesis*). Thus, a man who wants to maintain his rule must show himself to be more in control (of himself) than the ruled. The argument that aims to limit sexuality within the monogamous conjugal bond mobilizes the expectations of the hierarchical relation of man to woman. The *reductio ad absurdum* of allowing the wife the same privilege as a husband with the servants leads to a requirement of the husband to give up his privilege if his hierarchical position is not to be challenged. (The difference between Callirhoe's marriages while her spouse remains chaste on the one hand, and Cleitophon's 'curing' of Melite, while his love fights for her chastity, on the other, is brought into sharp focus by this argument.) To assert the *droit de seigneur* is to demonstrate that the master is mastered by his desire, and is of lesser status, *atimoteros*, than the weaker, the *ruled*, the female. The state of monogamous chastity is thus constituted by such a manipulation of the discourse of mastery. Symmetry is argued for by the assumptions of male supremacy.

It will perhaps come as no surprise that 'the main point of marriage' for Musonius is the production of children, that marriage is not a bar to philosophy, that women can do philosophy, and that daughters should receive the same education as sons, namely, in virtue: for 'are not bitches and dogs, mares and stallions trained alike?' It is from this last Discourse, 'Whether Daughters and Sons Should Receive the Same Education' that the following significant passage comes:

> Someone may perhaps say that manliness (*andreia*) is a quality only of men. Not so! For a woman too must be manly and the best woman at least must have no stain of cowardice, so that she is bowed down neither by labour nor by fear. If this is not so, how will a woman be chaste, if someone by causing her fear or imposing labour could force her to suffer some outrage.*

The proposition that a woman should be manly, and*rizesthai*, is shockingly direct in Greek terms, not least since *andrizesthai* can even imply to perform the role of the husband sexually, 'to be the

* τὴν ἀνδρείαν φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως μόνοις προσήκειν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταύτῃ. δεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα <καὶ> καθαρεύειν δειλίας τήν γε ἀρίστην, ὡς μήθ' ὑπὸ πόνου μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβου κάμπτεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς ἔτι σωφρονήσει, ἐάν τις ἢ φοβῶν ἢ προσάγων πόνους βιάσασθαι δύνηται αὐτὴν ὑπομεῖναί <τι> τῶν αἰσχρῶν;

man'.[54] The great monsters of the literary and mythic pantheon include Clytemnestra, who for Aeschylus is monstrous not least because of her *androboulon kear*, her heart that 'plots like a man' / 'against her man' (where the ambiguity of the adjective neatly sums up the tragic logic whereby to plot *like a man* is for a woman always to be plotting *against* the male).[55] The woman who dresses or acts like a man is constantly regarded as transgressive (even when, like Hipparchia, it is imitating her philosophical 'husband', Crates[56]). So, in Herodotus (7.99), the woman Artemisia, who willingly leads her dead husband's troops to battle, is described by the historian as a 'wonder' (*thōma*) for such military behaviour, and her motivation is said to be *lēma*, 'heart' and *andrēiē*, 'manliness' (the only time Herodotus uses the abstract noun). The mixed-race female from the margins of the Greek world, typically for this historian of Otherness, in the absence of a man takes on the qualities of manliness, and finally, although she herself points out that Greek sailors are as superior to Persians as men are to women (8.68), by her performance in battle prompts Xerxes, the Persian king, to comment (8.88): 'My men have become women, my women men' – a *bon mot* which utilizes the standard expectations of gender to stress once more the 'marvel' of Artemisia. Artemisia is for the historian another wondrous example of the mirror of otherness by which the Greek world is defined. In medicine, as Anne Hanson has shown in a splendid article, 'the virile woman' indicates a medically anomalous and worrying condition that needs treatment.[57] So, Sophocles' Electra in his *Electra*, a virgin who has been prevented from marriage and shows all the dangerous symptoms predicted by the Hippocratic corpus for such a condition, imagines how she and her sister, if they kill their mother and Aegisthus, will be received like heroes of the State and praised for their *andreia*, their 'manliness' (983) – a further sign of the violently transgressive position she has come to adopt. Van Geytenbeek again usefully traces the precedents in the philosophical tradition to show the surprisingly extreme quality of Musonius' position.[58] Of the many texts he considers only one passage – in Aristotle's *Politics* – even mentions *andreia* as a possibly female quality, and the whole passage shows that the term is introduced merely to reinforce rigid gender distinctions and hierarchies within the household. For in order to explain the difference between

the virtue of a ruler and the virtue of the ruled, Aristotle writes (*Pol.* 1277b): 'In the same way, self-control (*sophrosune*) and manliness/courage (*andreia*) are different in a man and in a woman. For a man (*anēr*) would seem a coward if he were as courageous/manly (*andreios*) as a courageous/manly woman (*gune andreia*), and a woman would seem a chatterer if she were as orderly (*kosmia*) as a good man.' For the purposes of his analogy between ruler/ruled and male/female, a woman's *andreia* is allowed only to dismiss it, as a woman's performance in language, when viewed from the male perspective (in a move which strikingly anticipates the well-known research of Lakoff[59]) can only be excessive – or silent.

There is one further text, however, pertinent to my whole argument indeed, which is not considered by van Geytenbeek but which may also be relevant to Musonius' claim here, namely, Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, or *The Household Manager*. For Xenophon's dialogue on how an *oikos* should be organized and run is a particularly important text in that it brings together the figure of Socrates and the issues of gender relations within the household in a way that few passages of Plato do – and does so in such a manner as to 'make him seem a Christmas present to the twentieth-century student of ideology', as Eve Sedgwick would put it.[60] The influence of Xenophon on the novelistic and other prose traditions of the Second Sophistic is well established, and the *Oikonomikos* can often be heard in later homiletic writing.[61] Socrates relates to Critoboulus how he learnt from Ischomachus about the organization of his *oikos* and how he had taught his wife. Ischomachus is made to offer a set of rules and attitudes that are usually described by critics in glowing terms as an ideal or idealized portrait of a gentleman's marital harmony where reciprocity if not symmetry is the watchword, and a woman's privileges beneath a man's control are maintained.[62] The brief passage that most concerns me comes towards the middle of the work, when Ischomachus has outlined how he had taught his wife to order things responsibly in the household. Socrates comments (10.1): 'By Hera, Ischomachus, you have given a display of your wife's manly (*andrike*) attitude!'* What is one to make of this remark from the master of irony, Socrates? Sheila Murnaghan in a

* νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ... ὦ Ἰσχόμαχε, ἀνδρικήν γε ἐπιδεικνύεις τὴν διάνοιαν τῆς γυναικός.

fine article has argued that this is no chance remark or humorous aside, but rather it is an 'approving comment' that stresses how 'Ischomachus' lesson is above all designed to make her more like a man'.[63] The dialogue is made up of three overlapping didactic conversations – Socrates and Critoboulus, Socrates and Ischomachus, Ischomachus and his wife – which structuring thus works to assimilate the 'idealization and artificiality'[64] of Ischomachus' conversation with his wife to the privileged scene of male education between an elder man and his younger lover.[65] The assimilation of the private realm of the house to the public interests of the polis and its *agora* (where the dialogue takes place), argues Murnaghan, is an assimilation of the female to the male: 'Ischomachus' training of his wife symbolizes his mastery of the feminine potential for disorder and self-indulgence in his own personality ... In describing his wife, he is describing a side of himself.'[66] The description of a wife's 'manly reasoning' thus is not threatening, as with Aeschylus' Clytemnestra, but a sign of the struggle for self-control in the house, the person, the state. Murnaghan, however, like most who write on this work, including Foucault, passes over in tactful silence what else is known about Ischomachus' wife. For in Andocides' celebrated speech *On the Mysteries*, the leading political figure, Kallias, is reviled (124–9) for marrying a daughter of Ischomachus, but then seducing the girl's mother, named as Chrysilla,[67] and moving her into his home too, where she became pregnant and was deserted by him; the daughter attempted suicide.[68] The son of his liaison with his wife's mother was first denied and then accepted by Callias: 'What ought a son like that be called?', asks Andocides, 'Oedipus? Aegisthus?' Whatever the true versions of events behind Andocides' dramatically aggressive and manipulative tale,[69] there is certainly a good deal of scandal attached to the name of Ischomachus' wife. What is more, Ischomachus himself goes down in history – both in comedy and in the law court – as a man whose wealth at death was vastly lower than expected, because, it was suggested at least on the comic stage, of parasites.[70] It may be that Xenophon, writing after this famous trial, wished to 'clear the name and reassert the virtue of a woman he had known and respected' – or so Harvey argues (who also writes that it may be that 'Chrysilla, freed from the repressive attitudes of her late paternalistic, pompous and priggish husband,

simply ran wild and made whoopee. That would be understandable'[71]). MacKenzie goes further and regards the whole dialogue as (thus) a joke: 'Knowing as they surely did her later conduct the whole presentation must have seemed hilariously funny ... I cannot believe that Xenophon's Ischomachus would not have seemed to Athenians a pompous fool.'[72] It is, however, more pertinent from the perspective of this future history of Ischomachus' wife, to consider what Murnaghan terms a woman's 'susceptibility to moral slackness'[73] which is at the root of Ischomachus' homiletics. For Ischomachus' 'mastery of the feminine potential for disorder' is to prove temporary, and Socrates' remark on his wife's 'manly reasoning' may be seen not merely as praise for Ischomachus' attempts at order, but also as a typically Greek awareness of the continuing potential for moral disorder in the household, and in female behaviour above all. As in Lysias 1, where the contrast between a man's careful household management and a woman's eventual corruption is explicit and worked through, so Socrates' strange phraseology may hint at the disasters to come in this household manager's house. Praising a woman, especially one as celebrated as Ischomachus' wife, for her 'manly attitudes' is difficult to see as a simple and direct gesture.

Musonius' bold expression that a 'woman should be manly', then, goes beyond other Greek writings, despite Plato's articulation in the *Republic* of the female ability to become a Guardian or other Stoic claims that virtue (*arete*) is the same for men and women. But there is more. For Musonius goes on to cite the bravery of female animals in the protection of their young – the argument from nature again – as an example of the need for women to be 'powerful in defence', and finally even cites the Amazons as proof that women need not lack military *andreia*, an argument which seems to rely all too precariously on the traditions of the civic representation of such transgressive female figures. Indeed, although he allows that men are naturally stronger and more fitted for gymnasia, he also points out that men can do many so-called lighter and apparently female tasks, and women many heavier ones. So he ends with a ringing proclamation that all human labour is common (*koinon*) to men and women, and nothing is barred by necessity, even if some things seem more fitted to one gender than another. Above all, *virtue* is a *shared*

project. Thus men and women alike should be trained in philosophy, the only route to true nobility. If the shared nature of virtue and the need for a philosophical training are Stoic commonplaces, the route to such a conclusion – the common nature of labour; the manly example of the Amazons – has been far from inevitable.

Musonius, as he pursues the goal of monogamous union based on philosophy (as opposed to the hierarchies of the *oikos* based on the rigid sexual division of labour and space), flaunts his socio-linguistic paradox where women must demonstrate *andreia*, the essential quality of men. This bold expression epitomizes the strain on the traditions of Greek writing that arises from his arguments for the commonality of *arete*, *sophrosune* and *erga*, that seems to go beyond even the philosophical tradition that grants that both men and women can possess *arete*. How can a woman be like a man? How is the 'virile woman' to be comprehended? If the 'On Sex' of Musonius uses the symmetry of men and women to construct a *reductio ad absurdum*, the second homily revels in the rhetorical possibilities of a parallelization of men and women in education and marriage. Symmetry struggles against the normative traditions of Greek writing inevitably invoked by the homily. In both passages, however, it must also be recalled that it is a man who is the assumed addressee of the philosopher's diatribe. The questioning and manipulation of what a woman is like, how like a man she is, are aimed above all at the promotion of a particular sort of male virtue, which requires a particular familial frame. It is the potential rhetorical strategies for the constitution of that frame which Musonius is working to articulate. Symmetry here is a rhetorical strategy designed to provoke the male moral subject.

The aim of symmetry, then, which also provides a dominant structuring principle of the novel, when it enters the didactic frame of the essayist not only testifies to a growth of a morality based on individual judgement, purity, and control as Foucault writes, but also becomes mired in an extremism of expression and argumentation. The shift of the argument towards harmonious symmetry produces also counterintuitive claims such as the positive evaluation of the Amazons, as Musonius strains against the boundaries of convention and tradition. This extremism – and all normative systems, sexuality above all, produce such extremisms – is thus

provocative in its claim to privileged knowledge; it constructs a site of negotiation for the reader's commitment to *sophia*, to the normative values of sexual discourse. The didactic text, for all its didacticism, does not simply give out a message which 'speaks for itself', but is a route towards the polemical positioning of the subject. It is only through such strategic rhetorical manipulations, negotiations and exclusions that the move towards symmetry is maintained. The closer that symmetry comes to equivalence, the more extreme and difficult the rhetoric must become.

My second text in the move towards symmetry can be dealt with far more briefly. It is Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca*, where I shall be concerned only with one brief scene from the final book, which gives an extraordinary vision of the ideal of the loving and lasting monogamous union which is the end-point of the idealism of symmetry. In the final book, the hero – as usual, committed to his love and challenged in his chastity – visits an old fisherman, who tells him the sad story of the loss of *his* love (5.1). This narrative within the narrative has a bizarre outcome, however. The fisherman was a Spartan who eloped with his beloved. She died shortly after. 'But', he says, 'her body was not buried. I have it with me. I love it (*philo*) and live with it always.' And he takes the hero into the house and shows him the mummified corpse – 'in the Egyptian style'. He explains his life style with his mummy lover (5.1.11):

'So', he said, 'I talk to her as if she were still living and I lie down with her and feast with her. And if I come home tired from fishing, she cheers me up when I see her. For she does not now look to you as she does to me. But to my mind's eye, child, she is as she was in Sparta, as she was when we eloped. I see the festivals of the night, our trysts.'

The dead and mummified wife is treated like a live woman: she cheers up the poor Spartan, for whom she looks like she was back in Sparta when he first saw her (a comment that overlaps the lover's longing gaze with the technique of embalming in a ghoulish fashion). The hero draws the wonderful gnomic conclusion that 'verily I have learnt that true love knows no boundary of time'* (again a comment that repeats a standard *topos* of erotic narrative, only to seem quite deformed by the context of this love story). What

* καὶ νῦν ἀληθῶς μεμάθηκα ὅτι ἔρως ἀληθινὸς ὅρον ἡλικίας οὐκ ἔχει.

is hard to judge is the tone of this encounter. How funny, how extreme, how provoking a version of symmetrical and constant desire is being constructed here? What is it to be chaste and faithful to a woman *like this*? If Baucis and Philemon offer the paradigmatic tale of lasting mutual love transformed into an image of itself in death, what is to be made of this less than symmetrical couple, and its image of lasting 'mutuality', even in death? As always, the inset erotic narrative can be related to the framing narrative in a variety of significant ways, and the hero's gnomic utterance invites us to see the scene as a generalizable example. As the novel plays a role in the construction of symmetrical and monogamous chastity as an ideal, so it plays with the roles such an ideal enforces.

Now I have offered these discussions of selected novels and moralists' discourses (and poems) because together they sketch fundamental elements of the intellectual and literary context for Plutarch's *Amatorius*, one of the most fascinating texts of later Greek,[74] to which I am finally turning. On the one hand, the concerns with what a woman is like and how like a man she can be, what the nature and limits of *sophrosune* are, and what the commitments and duties of an affective bond between a man and his beloved – the debates I have focused on – are central to the concerns of the *Amatorius*. In particular, Plutarch offers the most extensive extant theoretical exposition of the possibility of mutual *eros* within the frame of a monogamous union. Plutarch provides the theory, as it were, to the practice of the novel. Although Foucault argues that the *Amatorius* is to be seen as a turning-point in the history of desire, its significance is perhaps better seen as the fullest statement of an ideological or theoretical self-situating that runs in different guises through the various texts I have been discussing and finds its most developed narrative expression in the great sophistic novels of Longus, Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius. On the other hand, it has been important to trace these thematic considerations through the different genres of novel and diatribe and poem because Plutarch's text, although it is a dialogue in Platonic or Xenophontic form, expands its frame in a thoroughly novelistic direction. The set speeches and formal discussions show a deep engagement with the moral discourse of the time (as the novel often parodies such prose), while the frame for the dialogue draws on the novel to develop the

erotic narrative which prompts the dialogue. At the same time, with extensive quotation and discussion of poetic responses to *eros*, the work is situated within the high literary culture that is the frame for the epigrams I have been discussing also. Plutarch's text is woven out of – and speaks to – these different strands of the intellectual life of later Greek culture. In part, my desire here is to do justice to what might be called the dialogic form of the *Amatorius*, to articulate the relation between the novelistic frame and the didactic exchange of *sophoi*.

The *Amatorius* begins with a certain Flavianus asking Autoboulus, Plutarch's son, to give an account of the famous discussion his father had had on the subject of *eros*, and Autoboulus promptly does so. The dialogue reported is between Plutarch himself and a group of friends: they have visited the town of Thespiae to join in the local festival, the *Erotideia*, dedicated to Eros, since Plutarch had just managed to save his wife from a great argument that had brewed up between their parents. The dialogue is set on Mount Helicon in a shrine of the Muses above the town itself. Flavianus – with fine literary self-awareness – asks Autoboulus to cut out all the *topoi* about landscape – 'leave out of your account the poets' meadows and shade, and the runs of ivy and smilax and all the other commonplaces (*topoi*) writers grab with more enthusiasm than aesthetic sense in their desire for Platonic colour, his Ilissus, the agnus castus, and gentle grass-grown slope' (749a): the pleasing pun on the topographical, laced with the explicit recollection of Plato's famous dialogue on desire, the *Phaedrus*, set by the Ilissus, establishes the literary and philosophical texture of the dialogue to come, as it places itself under the aegis of sophisticated withdrawal from explicit striving for Platonic or poetic effect.[75] Despite – or because of – such a refusal to use the usual topographical settings, the festival of Eros and the shrine of the Muses remain a significant background: the son talks of his father's views on desire at a celebration of Eros, after he had sidestepped a row between *his* parents and parents-in-law. When Plutarch praises *eros* in marriage, the moment of this encomium will not be forgotten. What's more, the dialogue of Plutarch and his friends is in part prompted and repeatedly interrupted by events in the town of Thespiae, events which recall many scenes of the novels I have been discussing. For a young and

beautiful man has become the object of desire for a rich young widow, Ismenadora; his male advisers and suitors advise him against such a union. In the course of the dialogue, she kidnaps him, and pressures him to marry her. The dialogue ends with its participants going to join in the celebration of the marriage and to laugh at the man who counselled unsuccessfully against it. Since the first part of the dialogue is taken up with arguments for and against desire for men and desire for women, and since the second part of the dialogue – sadly fragmentary – includes a lengthy speech by Plutarch himself in praise of desire in marriage, one question inevitably raised is the relation between the theoretical exposition of the nature of desire, and the erotic narrative which prompts it. How does the story of Ismenadora's pursuit and capture of her beloved relate to the philosophical exegesis that frames it?

Now Foucault devotes many pages to the *Amatorius*, which he sees as a key text in the development of Western sexuality; for him, Plutarch's evidently particular and even unique attitude to marriage here and elsewhere[76] is a telling sign of changing ideological constructions of sexuality. 'Plutarch's text testifies', he writes, 'to the formation of an erotics that on certain central points differs from the erotics Greek civilization had known and developed.'[77] It develops 'an erotics that seeks to form a single eros capable of accounting for the love of women and the love of boys, and to integrate the *aphrodisia* (sex itself) into it'.[78] The 'old erotics' was 'dualistic', both in that it was based on the differences between 'common love' and 'noble, pure, elevated, heavenly love',[79] and in that it was expressed through the difference between love of boys (with its institutions and practices) and love of women (with its institutions and practices). Plutarch's text 'may bear witness to a movement that will not actually be completed until much later, when an absolutely unitary conception of love will be constituted.'[80] 'It is', he concludes characteristically, 'roughly this order of things which is still ours today.'[81] Since this text, then, traces the transition from a dualistic to a unitary concept of desire, to how things 'roughly' are today, the *Amatorius* is indeed an absolutely central work for the whole project of Foucault's history of sexuality.

The structure of the dialogue, as Foucault shows, maps this transition. For the first part of the dialogue sets in agonistic oppo-

sition a set of largely familiar arguments that we have already discussed in favour of love of boys and love of women, whereas the second part of the dialogue, thanks in part to a large lacuna, is left to Plutarch's encomium of the god, Eros, as instantiated most fully in the relation of marriage – an encomium full of high-flown religious language and mysticism, where critics have extensively debated Plutarch's precise intellectual stance with regard to contemporary, particularly Stoic, philosophy.[82] Strikingly, this encomium of desire in marriage is given by the figure of Plutarch himself, the father of the dialogue (as his son recounts). Unlike Plato's intricate recession of differently gendered and authorized voices in the *Symposium*'s praise of Eros, where Plato writes how Apollodorus heard from Aristaenetus what Socrates said Diotima told him about *eros*, Plutarch gives himself the last word. The dialogue with its encomium of the erotics of marriage silences, as it were, the old debate, as Plutarch plays Plato and Diotima both.

Autoboulus' account begins with a brief setting of the scene. Ismenadora, a widow, has fallen for the younger and poorer Bacchon. It is a prospective union that has divided the youth's friends and has become a source of contention. Peisias, who is the most sober of Bacchon's male suitors, counsels against the marriage; Anthemion, Bacchon's older cousin, recognizes the brilliance of such a wealthy match for Bacchon. Protogenes acts as Peisias' second in the duel; Daphnaeus for Anthemion. Plutarch has been asked to act as arbiter and referee between the two camps. The *agon* opens with Protogenes both attacking women, with abuse of Ismenadora in particular, and praising male desire, while Daphnaeus replies in favour of women and the holy bond of marriage. (Peisias adds his passionately expressed views later, while Anthemion remains in a more dignified, tactical retreat most of the dialogue.) Protogenes opens his exposition by denying that the term *eros* can be applied for male feelings towards women or virgins at all. It is rather mere *epithumia*, 'appetite', or *orexis*, 'physical longing'; and the 'object of appetite is pleasure and use'* – the sensations that flies feel for milk or bees for honeycomb. To support this dismissive position, he tells the remarkable story of Aristippus (750d-e):

* τέλος γὰρ ἐπιθυμίας ἡδονὴ καὶ ἀπόλαυσις.

A man denounced Laïs to Aristippus on the grounds she did not love him. Aristippus replied that he was not of the opinion that wine or fish loved him, but he used each of those with pleasure.*

That Laïs is a hetaira (and thus in a particular position with regard to the economics of use and pleasure) does not reduce the extraordinary willingness to ignore the claims of *philia* in personal relationships that this witticism projects, with its twist on the customary Athenian association of fish and hetairas.[83] (Not being able to persuade a hetaira to be one's lover, and indeed falling in *eros* for a hetaira are staples of the plots of New Comedy in particular; the place of figures such as Aspasia and, indeed, Laïs in the public life and imagination of Greece help focus the outrageousness of Aristippus' response.[84]) This aggressive separation of 'higher emotional feelings' from heterosexual physicality is then traced with great verve in the distinction between 'mere copulation' between the genders, and the true and noble desire of male for male. Protogenes' rhetorical reduction of heterosexual liaisons to mere use value, however, is more than matched by Daphnaeus, who quotes Solon, Aeschylus and, with careful selectivity, some passages of Plato – only the passages that proscribe male–male relations as contrary to nature – in order to show the primacy and reciprocal *charis*, 'grace and favour' of heterosexual liaisons. He also dismisses the philosophical position as mere hypocrisy (752a–b):

Boy-love says no to pleasure. For it is ashamed and frightened. It needs an appearance of decency to get hold of the young and beautiful. So it finds the excuse of virtue and friendship. It works out in the sand of the gymnasium and takes cold showers and lifts its eyebrows high and says it's 'doing philosophy' and being 'self-controlled' – on the outside, because of the law. Then at night, when all's quiet, there is 'the sweet harvest when the guard has left'. But if, as Protogenes says, there is no sexual liaison (*aphrodisia*) with boys, how can you have Eros without Aphrodite?†

* τῷ κατηγοροῦντι Λαΐδος πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς οὐ φιλούσης ἀποκρινάμενος ὅτι καὶ τὸν οἶνον οἴεται καὶ τὸν ἰχθὺν μὴ φιλεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡδέως ἑκατέρῳ χρῆται.

† οὗτος δ' ἀρνεῖται τὴν ἡδονήν· αἰσχύνεται γὰρ καὶ φοβεῖται. δεῖ δέ τινος εὐπρεπείας ἁπτομένῳ καλῶν καὶ ὡραίων. πρόφασις οὖν φιλία καὶ ἀρετή. κονίεται δὴ καὶ ψυχρολουτεῖ καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς αἴρει καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν φησι καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἔξω διὰ τὸν νόμον· εἶτα νύκτωρ καὶ καθ' ἡσυχίαν

γλυκεῖ' ὀπώρα φύλακος ἐκλελοιπότος.

εἰ δ', ὥς φησι Πρωτογένης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀφροδισίων παιδικῶν κοινωνία, πῶς Ἔρως ἔστιν Ἀφροδίτης μὴ παρούσης;

The sneering treatment of philosophers – taking cold showers, rolling in the sand, and boasting of their commitment to philosophy and chastity, eyebrows permanently raised – leads to a double attack. Either they hypocritically take their pleasure under the cover of darkness; or they have nothing to do with *aphrodisia*, in which case how can one have *Eros* without *Aphrodite* whose attendant he is? That would be like drunkenness without alcohol. The mythological punning, literary quotation, and broad caricaturing of the life of the gymnasium is a rhetorical mixture which enrages Peisias, who enters the debate with great force (752b): 'How unscrupulous! What insolence!' He replies with a brief but passionate speech not merely expressing outrage that anyone should transfer the god Eros from the clean air of the gymnasium to the unguents and disorderliness of the brothel, but also offering a striking generalization by way of conclusion (752c): 'For a *sophron* woman at any rate, it is of course not fitting to desire (*eran*) or to be desired (*erasthai*).'* This erotic version of Thucydides' Pericles' famous dictum that a woman should not be spoken of either for praise or for blame, chimes with much Classical writing on the dangers of male desire for females and on the tragic consequences of female desire *tout court*. In the Classical period, it is hard to find a narrative of female desire that does not end in disaster. Even in the world of the novels, the sexual desire of the heroine, as we have seen, is surrounded and fenced with strategic care. It is precisely this point of grand moral generalization, however, that prompts Plutarch himself to enter the debate, siding with Daphnaeus because (752c) Peisias has spoken *ou metriazon*, 'without moderation'. It is the implication that marriage is a 'union devoid of desire', *koinonian aneraston*, and 'lacking inspired love', *amoiron entheou philias*, that motivates Plutarch, the father of the dialogue, to play his part in it. The debate on male and female desire thus becomes a foil for the encomium of desire in marriage. The arguments about reciprocal pleasure and duty will be transcended by the image of marriage as the acme of reciprocal pleasure and shared duty.

But that – following as it does at least the form of Foucault's argument – is to get ahead of ourselves. For the debate continues not with such generalizations about desire but with remarks specific to

* ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε σώφροσιν οὔτ' ἐρᾶν οὔτ' ἐρᾶσθαι δήπου προσῆκόν ἐστι.

the case in Thespiae, and in particular with remarks about what Ismenadora, the widow, is like. She has been introduced in the opening paragraphs of the dialogue (749d) as a woman of wealth and breeding, 'a widow who had lived for no small time without reproach, although she was young and pretty enough'. Peisias now argues that for a young man to be sent into a house of such wealth and splendour constitutes a dangerous threat of corruption (752e): 'If we mixed him up with such pomp and estate, we might unwittingly make him disappear, like tin when mixed with copper.' (The analogy from precious metals is, of course, pointed.) But his real concern is the character of Ismenadora herself: 'We see her tendency to rule (*archein*) and dominate (*kratein*).' Her usurpation of the role of the man – his *kratos* – is what disturbs, and Peisias sees evidence of this desire in her choice of such a young man to pursue. This is a sign of the destabilizing effect of wealth, which in women encourages 'decadence and vain, flighty recklessness'.*

His second line of attack (753a–b) harks back to his generalization about the unsuitability of a woman experiencing desire – either as subject or object. What if Ismenadora does desire the youth, as her supporters claim?, he asks. What then is to prevent her from leading a drunken revel to his door at night to pay him court? Is she to play the role of the 'lover outside a locked door' and go to the gym to fight his rivals? 'For that's a lover's practice.'† The expected actions of a male lover are offered as self-evidently ridiculous when applied to a woman. If symmetry is to emerge as an ideal, it will have to ride the scorn of such a *reductio*. In contrast to the model of the male lover, Peisias suggests the expected norms of female behaviour: should not a decent and *sophron* woman sit at home in an orderly fashion (*kosmiōs*) and wait for suitors? 'Who would not flee in disgust a woman confessing desire', he concludes, 'let alone base a marriage on such intemperance (*akrasia*)?' This argument in Greek terms is far from unconvincing. In the novels, we have seen a range of women whose advances to the younger male hero are seen as a threat to his chastity (and even his life). Lycainion in *Daphnis and Chloe* and Melite in *Leucippe and Cleitophon* may be less than

* τρυφὰς καὶ χαυνότητας ἀβεβαίους καὶ κενάς.
† ταῦτα γὰρ ἐρωτικά.

harmful or malicious, but they can scarcely be called *sophron*. In Xenophon of Ephesus (3.12), an older woman called Kuno ('Mrs Bytch'), 'disgusting to look at, worse to hear, and given over to every intemperance (*akrasia*)', murders her husband in order to get the hero as her man: he refuses to sleep with a murderer, and flees. Arsace in Heliodorus uses torture, mental and physical, to try to persuade Theagenes to be hers, and ends by killing herself. In Lucian's *The Ass* – a carnivalized threat of the sexuality of the older woman – the hero's older female companion drops him when he is metamorphosed into a man again instead of an ass, because he no longer has the physical requirements to satisfy her. Indeed, Plutarch himself in the *Conjugal Precepts*, his explicitly didactic treatise on marriage, writes repeatedly on the dangers of a woman's wealth and luxury in a marriage (nos. 8, 12, 20, 21, 22, 26),[85] and specifically points out that a wife should never take the initiative in matters of desire (18): 'a woman ought not take the initiative: to do so is the sign of the prostitute and the impudent'. Indeed (11), even as every action of the *sophron* household will be taken with a shared attitude (*homonoountōn*) of husband and wife* – a phrase that may recall Odysseus' praise of like-mindedness in marriage[86] as much as the Stoic commitment to the reciprocities of wedlock – similarly every action should 'reveal the husband's leadership and choice'.† Peisias' argument about the danger and unsuitability of an older, wealthier widow pursuing a young man because of her desire, and ruling him, draws on highly traditional, strongly felt, and normative expectations of gender roles, evident elsewhere in Plutarch as well as in other Greek texts.

Now Foucault argues that throughout the dialogue the widow Ismenadora is indeed represented as an *erastes*, a male older lover, an honourable pursuer, so that there is, in one crucial sense, no real choice for the young man to make: he 'does not really have to choose between two fundamentally different forms of love ... but between two forms of the same love, the only difference being that in one case it is love of a man, in the other, the love of a woman'.[87] The final concession – 'the only difference' – is, however, precisely

* ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὁμονοούντων.

† ἐπιφαίνει δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡγεμονίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν.

la différence. How like a man can a woman be? Can a woman play the role of *erastes*? Can the force of Peisias' scorn, the strength of his traditional position, be so simply bypassed? The dialogue will continue to explore this issue, but any equivalence between Ismenadora's desire and a male lover is not easily conceded.

At this point, significantly, it is Plutarch himself who is enjoined by Anthemion to answer Peisias' argument. The author replies first by merely asking sarcastically what charge could not be levied at a woman if wealth and love are to be stigmatized (which does not go far to answering the points raised in objection to Ismenadora's behaviour). He too tries a *reductio*: if wealth is dangerous, should one then marry only a poor woman one could buy from the slave market? But that is no guarantee of success: look at how many cases there are in history of the lamentable influence of prostitutes and the like, even on kings. This brief set of illustrative tales leads to a more pointed discussion of what is to be looked for in a woman, and how a sensible man can live happily with a wealthy woman. As one might expect, character, virtue and good sense feature prominently. It is only in his conclusion that Plutarch returns to Peisias' opening complaint that Ismenadora has shown a condemning tendency to rule and dominance. Marriage between young people is difficult, especially if there is Eros involved: a marriage is thrown off course when the two people 'have neither the power to rule nor the will to be ruled' (754d).* This image of the difficulties of organizing and maintaining the relations of authority (*archein*) in a marriage of young people leads directly to the following extraordinary conclusion (754d):

As a nurse rules her charge, a teacher the child, a gymnasiarch the ephebe, the lover the young man, the law and the general the man in his prime, and no-one is without a ruling figure or is his own authority, what's so terrible if a sensible older woman governs the life of a younger husband? She will be useful by virtue of her superior intelligence and pleasant and gentle by virtue of her affection.†

* οὔτ' ἄρχειν δυναμένων οὔτ' ἄρχεσθαι βουλομένων.

† εἰ δ' ἄρχει βρέφους μὲν ἡ τίτθη καὶ παιδὸς ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἐφήβου δὲ γυμνασίαρχος, ἐραστὴς δὲ μειρακίου, γενομένου δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ νόμος καὶ στρατηγός, οὐδεὶς δ' ἄναρκτος οὐδ' αὐτοτελής, τί δεινὸν εἰ γυνὴ νοῦν ἔχουσα πρεσβυτέρα κυβερνήσει νέου βίον ἀνδρός, ὠφέλιμος μὲν οὖσα τῷ φρονεῖν μᾶλλον ἡδεῖα δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ προσηνής;

Throughout the ordered transitions of a man's life from infant to adult, he is subject to authority (*archein*). So what is so terrible (*ti deinon*) if a sensible older woman rules (*archein*) a younger man? Her sense (*phronein*) will be useful as her affection (*philein*) will be pleasing. Thus Plutarch attempts to reverse Peisias' arguments on the dangers of Ismenadora's authority and desire. Foucault is not alone in quoting this remarkable passage without comment, as if it spoke for itself, as if it simply represented the author's considered opinion. There are good reasons to (t)read more carefully, however. First, we have already seen, in Musonius, Dio and elsewhere, the need to analyse carefully the rhetorical strategies concerning self-mastery, the challenges offered by desire for women, and how the assumed hierarchies of marriage are utilized in arguments on the relation between philosophy, desire and marriage. Second, the very form of Plutarch's rhetorical question should give pause: What is so terrible about an older woman governing a young husband? There's a ready answer to this in the very traditions and assumptions of Greek patriarchal culture, not to mention Plutarch's own advice in the *Conjugal Precepts*. As Kate Cooper has argued pertinently, what is always at stake in the assumption of female influence over a man is a challenge to masculine character and reliability.[88] The premium on (masculine) self-control means the female domination is a sign of corruption. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the narrative of the dialogue itself suggests Plutarch's statement does not demand immediate and straightforward assent. For this concluding paragraph continues – not quoted by Foucault – with: 'To sum up: as Boeotians we should revere Heracles and not worry about such a discrepancy of age, because we know that Heracles too married his own wife, Megara, aged 33 to Iolaus aged 16.'* This may be thought a double-edged mythological exemplum indeed, especially in a text that lauds constancy in marriage as an ideal. For while Heracles, a Boeotian, like the speaker, often personifies in Stoic and other philosophical systems a paradigm of virtue triumphant, the passing on of his own wife to his young assistant is more dodgy: it is an act said

* "τὸ δ' ὅλον", ἔφη, "καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα Βοιωτοὺς ὄντας ἔδει σέβεσθαι καὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τῷ παρ' ἡλικίαν τοῦ γάμου, γινώσκοντας ὅτι κἀκεῖνος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα Μεγάραν Ἰολάῳ συνῴκισεν ἐκκαιδεκαέτει τότ' ὄντι τρία καὶ τριάκοντ' ἔτη γεγενημένην".

by Diodorus to be because he was suspicious of having more children with her after he had killed his first family in a fit of madness; and it leads to his violent courtship – rape – of Iole, and his own deathbed requirement that his own son marry this abducted concubine of his. An act his son, at least in Sophocles' version of the tale in his *Trachiniae*, regards with horror and disgust. This exemplum scarcely recalls Heracles' representation as a figure of *arete*, so much as Aristotle's description of him as a figure excessive in all his appetites. Plutarch's amusing turn to mythology scarcely clinches the case.

What's more, it is precisely at this point in the narrative that a messenger arrives with news of an 'amazing and audacious event'* – namely, the kidnapping of the young man by the widow, his abduction to her house, and the beginning of a wedding ceremony. Peisias immediately starts ranting that not merely the laws of the state but also nature, *phusis*, has been perverted by this arrant gynocracy (755c).† The useful and pleasant 'rule' envisaged by Plutarch is immediately instantiated in rape. The surprising position that Plutarch has adopted about female rule is immediately framed and qualified by the erotic narrative it is meant to be commenting on. Peisias and Protogenes rush off to town – 'to turn over the gymnasium and the council to the women too' – and Anthemion and the others are left with Plutarch. 'Now we're just ourselves', says Anthemion, the supporter of marital bliss, 'we can admit that this really is a Lemnian event' (755c) – a reference to the Lemnian women, the most monstrous of the monstrous regiment of transgressive women in the Greek mythological pantheon, who all killed their husbands. As the Christian sage Athanasius put it (showing how turning the Other Cheek does not involve submission to the Other), rule by woman is the equivalent of being murdered. Another friend, Soclarus, suggests that the kidnapping is actually a ruse of the young man who wanted to escape his male admirers and marry Ismenadora. Anthemion sees this, however, as a grave slur on the boy's character, who is simple (*haplous*) and frank (*apheles*). Rather, Ismenadora is to be held accountable. Although previously blameless, she has been influenced by the divine force of Eros,

* πρᾶγμα θαυμαστὸν ... τετολμημένον.

† ἡ γὰρ φύσις παρανομεῖται γυναικοκρατουμένη.

which is greater than human reason. It is the explication of this divine force which will take up the rest of the dialogue.

The abduction of the boy takes place, then, at a crucial point in the argument, and changes its direction. The abduction is not merely a dramatic device in order to effect the removal of Peisias and Protogenes, 'the partisans of the love of boys', who 'were there long enough to celebrate the differential erotics one last time', as Foucault has it.[89] Rather, a question is provoked of how like an *erastes* can a woman be? How terrible – *deinon* – is it, when a woman acts like a man? What are the limits of the move towards reciprocity, symmetry and sharing? As Plutarch outrageously or ironically or playfully suggests that a woman can rule a young husband in marriage, the events in town – 'the daring of youth' – realign the question of what Ismenadora, the absent figure, is like; and require, after the suggestion of a divine influence on her action, a lengthy discussion of the divine nature of Eros. And it is only after this further discussion, further qualification, further redefinition, that the marriage of Ismenadora and the youth can be embraced by all, including Peisias, as if, in narrative terms at least, Plutarch's argument has won the day.

How, then, does Plutarch circle back to Ismenadora?

Slowly and carefully. First, he talks of the divinity of Eros and his place in the great writings of the past as a god (756b–757c). Second, he talks about how each sphere of human action has a presiding spirit, and in matters of friendship and desire this is Eros (757c–759d). Third, with a wealth of historical and mythological anecdotes, he begins to distinguish different elements in the sphere of Eros (759d–762b), both to laud the power of Eros and to distinguish between higher and lower forms of desire. Fourth, with similar examples, he explains the benefits that Eros bestows on humankind (762b–764a). Fifth and finally, he accedes to the request of a listener to explain how Egyptian *muthoi* relate to Platonic theory, and begins a lengthy exploration of the mystic lore of Eros that moves from an explication of desire as psychological process to the proper and noble forms of love, how Beauty is to be pursued (764a–771d). It is this final section that makes the transition, via a lacuna in which another speaker apparently addressed Epicurean theories, into praise of the love of husband and wife as the ideal of the mutual affection and duty of true Eros. So the whole exposition ends with

the tragic but uplifting story of Sabinus and Empona, a thoroughly novelistic account of a warrior's false death and concealment from the imperialist power of Rome, supported by his faithful wife, who is forced to conceal also her own pregnancy – a tale of mutual love and care even unto death. It is only after this long philosophical explication that the narrative returns to Ismenadora.

There are two general strategies which Foucault has traced through the course of this lengthy treatment of the divinity of Eros that help establish male love for a woman over and above male love for a man. First, Plutarch's argument, although on the one hand it relies strikingly on the vocabulary and transcendental sense of desire most often associated with the philosophical appropriation of the love of boys (e.g. 766a–b), and although, on the other, it offers exempla of male love that lead to great acts of courage, daring and fidelity (e.g. Cleomachus 760e–761b), at certain points it simply deprecates the male love of men in relation to love for women. So, for example, love for boys is said to be 'commonly transient' in comparison with the constancy of marriage (770b–c). So too 'male intercourse with males' is put under the heading of 'intemperance', *akrasia*, and 'assault', *epipēdēsis*,[90] and 'outrage', *hubris* (768e), which is given as the reason why the 'passive male' is regarded as the lowest of the low. Second, his argument depends, as Foucault rightly sees, on the privileging of a *charis*, a 'grace', where the inherent reciprocity of *charis* helps lower the status of male love for males. So (767d) he sets up a careful pun between *stergein*, 'affection', and *stegein*, 'to have a roof', which links domesticity and a privileged affective tie. A third strategy, however, is the attempt to turn the standard attacks on women against only bad women, and so leave good women and noble men to share the high ground of virtue. So (767a–b), as a horse-lover loves mares and stallions acording to quality, a noble lover of humans is moved to desire by proper values irrespective of gender: 'Aeschylus properly says that "A young woman's eye betrays her, when she has tasted a man"; do then the signs of an impudent, uncontrolled and corrupt character overrun womens' forms, but is there no splendour of an orderly and self-controlled character in her appearance?'. The physiognomics of the corrupt woman is separated from the physiognomics of women in general, or at least of the 'orderly (*kosmios*) and self-controlled

(*sophron*) character', to allow a space for the reciprocity and *sophrosune* of marriage as an ideal. Thus he can conclude (769b) that 'it is extraordinary to claim that women do not have a share in virtue (*arete*)', since:

Why need I talk about their *sophrosune* and understanding, their fidelity and justice, when the manly, the bold, the great-spirited is evident in many?*

Plutarch's *praeteritio* moves through the standard female virtues of *sophrosune*, and 'understanding', *sunesis*, and 'fidelity', *pistis*, and 'justice', *dikaiosune*, which, he says, he need not discuss, because in many women there have been evidenced the classic male values of 'manliness', *andreion*, 'boldness', and 'greatness of soul'. Here – and this is very many pages after Ismenadora's abduction of her beloved – finally Plutarch returns to the female behaving like a man (although without naming Ismenadora explicitly). And he, like Musonius, appears to allow a woman in the name of shared virtue to demonstrate the qualities of a man: *to andreion*. But the paragraph is not finished. What is terrible – *deinon* – he goes on to suggest, is to claim that a woman's *phusis*, her nature, is noble in other respects, but not when it comes to affective ties (*philia*) alone. Rather, her evident capacity for affection in the family is linked to a seductive grace (769c–d):

As poetry adds to a *logos* the sweeteners of song and metre and rhythm, and thus makes its educational force more powerful and its capacity for harm more dangerous, so nature has endowed woman with a grace of sight and a seductiveness of voice and a beguiling bodily form, for the corrupt woman a means to pleasure and deception, for the self-controlled a means to gain the goodwill and affection of her husband.†

The paragraph which begins by asserting female virtue in terms of manliness ends by re-establishing the basic and traditional and all too well-known criterion of the *sophron* woman and the *akolastos*

* τί δὲ δεῖ λέγειν περὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ συνέσεως αὐτῶν, ἔτι δὲ πίστεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅπου καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον καὶ τὸ μεγαλόψυχον ἐν πολλαῖς ἐπιφανὲς γέγονε;

† καθάπερ δὲ λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύσματα μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα καὶ τὸ παιδεῦον αὐτοῦ κινητικώτερον ἐποίησε καὶ τὸ βλάπτον ἀφυλακτότερον, οὕτως ἡ φύσις γυναικὶ περιθεῖσα χάριν ὄψεως καὶ φωνῆς πιθανότητα καὶ μορφῆς ἐπαγωγὸν εἶδος, τῇ μὲν ἀκολάστῳ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀπάτην τῇ δὲ σώφρονι πρὸς εὔνοιαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ φιλίαν μεγάλα συνήργησεν.

woman, which recognizes woman's seductiveness as a deception in the one case, but productive of a husband's delight in the other. Woman, like poetry, can be used for benefit or harm in the city, and because of her nature – seductive, beguiling, attractive – it is only by controlling woman within not merely marriage but also the normative restraints of *sophrosune* that her *philia* can be condoned. Once again, the claim of symmetry, of being 'like a man', reverts to a more traditional and hierarchical representation of the female.

So, concludes Plutarch famously (769d), 'to desire in marriage is a greater good than to be desired'.* The pain of marriage at the beginning should not be feared, since not only is 'wounding the beginning of pregnancy too', but also, 'studies confuse children when they start and philosophy upsets young men'. Marriage, then, finally is likened to the philosophy that has driven the dialogue, painful and confusing to start with, but finally the source of true stability and happiness. Thus, the account leads to its final story of Empona and Sabinus, without returning to the case in question, Ismenadora's marriage to Bacchon. The general case has swallowed the difficulties of the example it was designed to explain. It will be at the level of narrative not at the level of theory that this question is settled.

What, then, of Ismenadora? How is she to be comprehended by Plutarch's argument? Foucault places his discussion of Plutarch under the telling title of 'Boys' (not 'Wives' or 'Marriage') and like Plutarch's epideixis, he does not return to Ismenadora's case. The dialogue, however, ends briefly with a further messenger from Thespiae summoning Plutarch and his friends to the celebration of the wedding – which the god Eros is said to be clearly well-disposed towards. Even Peisias has welcomed it. ('Let's go and laugh at the man', concludes Plutarch happily.) So is this narrative closure an endorsement also of Plutarch's earlier position that a good woman can rule a younger husband – which would stand against so much of Greek writing? Does the argument he offers for the benefits and harmony of marriage efface the image of the kidnapping of the youth by an infatuated widow? Or are we to see something of a tension between the novelistic story of Ismenadora's desire, and the

* τὸ γὰρ ἐρᾶν ἐν γάμῳ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστι.

mystical vision of the god, Desire? For Foucault, setting the representation of the woman under the rubric of Boys, the story of Ismenadora, 'merely serves as [the] immediate context and illustration' of the 'essential business of the dialogue',[91] namely, the construction of the 'great unitary and integrative chain in which love is revitalized by the reciprocity of pleasure'.[92] For him, the narrative is wholly subordinated to the philosophical thrust of Plutarch's great speech. The unwillingness to see any tension between Plutarch's 'rule by a woman' and the kidnapping to which it is juxtaposed is thus fully emblematic of his reading. Kate Cooper, however, who is discussing in particular Christian texts that suppose a female influence over men, places the dialogue under the sign of irony, and suggests that Plutarch takes 'an absurdist delight in the hypocrisy of the very premise that men (even philosophers) can be induced to cast aside the pursuit of pleasure':[93] for her, it is the disjunction between the narrative of desire and the theorizing about desire that is itself part of the message of the dialogue. Fred Brenk, whose major concern is with situating Plutarch's religious and philosophical ideas within the context of first- and second-century intellectual discourse, suggests a third reading: that Ismenadora is to be seen to 'symbolize the new erotic dialectic': 'the female's aggressivity in the quest for the Form of the Beautiful ... is the underlying thread of the "phainomenal" romances which close the work'.[94] For Brenk, Ismenadora provides a biographical image of the work's philosophical novelty, which is, he claims, to be found in its 'evaluation of marriage, including sexuality, in the ascent towards the Form and the identification of the Form with a loving God'.[95] Thus, for Brenk, the narrative of female abduction, rather than laying claim to any social aspect, or any ironic undercutting, functions as a philosophical symbol.

For each of these critics, then, the construction of the 'move towards symmetry', the projection of the philosophical ideal of reciprocity and mutual desire in marriage, depends on the precarious negotiation of what the woman is like, on how the erotic narrative of Ismenadora can or cannot be integrated into the philosophical exposition of marital *eros*. What sort of a paradigm is the example of Ismenadora? Illustrative? Ironic? Symbolic? How does (the) narrative relate to (the) theory? The silence of Plutarch at the close of his

dialogue about the status of Ismenadora's marriage with regard to his theoretical position opens a question which the three critics answer in paradigmatically different ways. The place of female desire, and the equivalence between male and female – its potentialities and dangers – remain questions in the celebrations that close the text. Questions that trying to read the relation between Ismenadora's representation and the representation of Woman in Marriage by the figure of Plutarch inevitably provokes.

Ismenadora's narrative sums up – not least by being only the object of men's figuration – the expression with which I began: 'How like a woman ...' ('*How* like a woman?', 'How? Like a woman?'). Negotiating that expression turns out to be central to reading Plutarch's project, central to locating his text within a cultural history of desire.

An understanding of the shifts in later Greek writing on sexuality, then, is founded on – and can founder on – the representation of females and the female in the different texts of the period. The 'move towards symmetry', that has featured so markedly in current accounts of the history of sexuality, not only mobilizes particular and often difficult and shifting representations of the female, but also repeatedly is layered with more traditional, hierarchical images of the relations between the genders. The recuperative powers of patriarchal discourse remain strong. For all the philosopher's arguments for the sharing of virtue and the harmony of marital reciprocity, symmetry is not equivalence (and certainly not equality), and it is important to see how the theological and philosophical texts that are used to construct this history of sexuality are mined with an ideological import and drive to complicity that keeps the men together talking and in control. Ismenadora (still) does not speak and is not addressed, and despite any flirting with the manliness of women, the womanliness of men is thinkable solely as an insult. Since the history of sexuality has an especial tendency towards teleology (the move to 'roughly this order of things which is still ours today'), it is crucial to trace the way in which arguments for change also perpetuate 'this order of things'.

I have tried to show in this and each chapter how the more explicitly didactic texts on the subject of sexuality need to be seen in relation to the less explicitly – or ironically self-professedly – didac-

tic works (and *vice versa*). For the novels, dialogues, diatribes and poems that I have been considering form a network, a system of texts which refer to, draw on, appropriate one another, a system in and through which the desiring male subject is articulated. The interaction of philosophy and other elements of intellectual discourse with the narratives of the novel or the poetry of the symposium constitutes a fundamental dynamic of the discourse of ancient sexuality. And a work like Plutarch's *Amatorius* is the product of such interaction. To see such discursive space as a site of engagement and negotiation rather than simply as messages and lessons is one message and lesson I have been promoting. Finding the place of irony and humour in this writing is central to this sense of engagement; it involves not just marking the underside of official philosophical work, but also tracing an essential aspect both of the representation of philosophy as a normative and didactic discipline, and also of the practice of the writing of desire during the Second Sophistic. But beyond the attempt to show how some little-read texts contribute tellingly to understanding a period of great importance in the development of Western attitudes to sexuality, my concern has been with how to place erotic *narrative* – its lures, plays, delights – within a cultural history of desire, and to show how the failure to account for narrative fiction and its particular erotics and its particular contract with its readers leads to an oversimplified view of male desire, particularly in Foucault's history of sexuality. For what is desire without its fictions? If the 'ravishing bodies and penetrating arguments' of this book lead to a heightened awareness of the necessity, difficulty and enjoyment of exploring the place of narrative fiction in the history of ancient sexuality, then at least one of my desires in putting together these essays will have been fulfilled.

NOTES

PREFACE

1 Ps.-Lucian, *Erotes* 36.

2 Augustine, *City of God* 1.18. Augustine lived from 353 to 430; the *Erotes* is often dated to the fourth century (though there can be no certainty here). Nothing but a rhetorical nicety depends on the precise datings here.

3 McNay (1992) 4.

1 VIRGINITY AND GOING THE WHOLE HOG: VIOLENCE AND THE PROTOCOLS OF DESIRE

1 Methodius, *Symposium* 8.171: *partheïa* (παρθεΐα), 'next-to-godliness' is a very strange word that seems to have been chosen for the pun; the first quotation is from *Symposium* 1.10.

2 Brown (1988) 30.

3 Pinault (1992) 132.

4 See Fantham (1975).

5 *Ep.* 22.30 (*ad Eustochium*). See on this passage Kelly (1975) 41–4.

6 The dating of all the novels is contentious. See, for sensible parameters that I follow in this book, Reardon (1971) 333–9, with convenient summary in Reardon (1991) 4–5; Hägg (1983) 81–108; Hunter (1983) 1–15. I will not offer a detailed bibliography here for the debates on each of the major texts, which have often been dated with as much as five hundred years' difference by different scholars.

7 See Hunter (1983); Zeitlin (1990) for fine studies of this allusive style.

8 Euboulion is sometimes emended by editors to the masculine form Euboulios, a name which Methodius seems to have used as an *alter ego* in other dialogues. See Musurillo (1963) 42–3 n.1, where Debidour, who provides the notes to Musurillo's edition, rightly rejects such a change. Debidour's claim, however, that the female is better suited to the subject

of the fiction scarcely accounts for the politics of voice here, whereby virginity is promoted by a man through a set of female masks.

9 Brown (1988); Foucault (1985), (1986) are the most influential recent studies; see also North (1966); and, for several studies of such paradigmatic tragic treatments as Euripides' *Hippolytus* or Sophocles' *Ajax*, the bibliography and discussion in Goldhill (1986) 132–7, 185–98.

10 Rohde (1914) 549.

11 Tanner (1979) 87.

12 Tanner (1979) 100.

13 This sentence is taken from one of many drafts of what finally became Zeitlin (1990). Cf. 439 for the most recent version of the sentence.

14 For this Hellenistic art history, see Goldhill (1994). The cue to art history here is made not merely by the formal *ecphrasis* but also by the typically Hellenistic recognition of the picture as a tourist attraction.

15 See Thuc. 1.22 where he fails to regret that his history's lack of 'the mythic' – τὸ μὴ μυθώδες – may seem to an audience 'more unpleasurable' ἀτερπνότερον.

16 Hunter (1983) 48 – in what is a good discussion (47–50) of the proem's interest in historiography; see also Pandiri (1985) 117–18, with n.9 for further bibliography.

17 For the rare vocabulary of *terpnon* in Plato (who usually uses *hedone* and *charizesthai* in his discussions of 'pleasuring') see *Laws* 2 658b1, 658e9, with the surrounding discussion.

18 The most recent treatment of the role of the literary past in Longus is Zeitlin (1990); Hunter (1983) remains fundamental. On this scene, see also Bretzigheimer (1988) 532–4.

19 See e.g. Plato, *Symp.* 178b.

20 θεάομαι is used of the wondering gaze before art or human beauty or religious ceremony: it is as θεαταί that people visit the picture in the grove of the Nymphs.

21 For Plato's accounts of praise, see for discussion and further bibliography Nightingale (1993).

22 It is a fundamental factor of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*; a commonplace in the Anthology (e.g. 12.132a, 134, 135); Ovid, *Amores* 1.2.1: *esse quid hoc dicam?*

23 καὶ γάρ here is an odd use of the conjunction. Denniston (1954) 109–11 doubts that the category which is the only one to come close to this usage ('yes, and', 'and further'), ever occurs in continuous speech. But cf. also Philostratus, *Epist.* 19 and 38 where the same odd construction occurs.

24 Zeitlin (1990) 438.

25 See Hunter (1983).
26 Halliwell (1991) 284.
27 Halliwell (1991) 286. See also Dillon (1991), with further bibliography 345 n.2.
28 Halliwell (1991) 286.
29 Halliwell (1991) 288. On the expected behaviour of the young, see Murray (1990); on the law of *hubris*, see Fisher (1990) and Fisher (1992) 36–85 with 50–1 on this case. On the specifics of Conon 'crowing' over Ariston see Csapo (1993).
30 See Goldhill (1991) 167–222 for discussion of and bibliography on Aristophanes and the negotiation of the proper.
31 Loraux (1991) 237.
32 Halliwell (1991) 292.
33 See for Theognis the passages collected and discussed by Levine (1985) and Donlan (1985); for Plato, see e.g. *Philebus* 48–50, where laughter at friends is discussed.
34 Theophrastus wrote an 'On the Laughable'; so too did Demetrius. (Plutarch will be discussed below.) For other, including Cicero's and Quintilian's, contributions see Grant (1924), and, in later eras too, Branham (1989) especially 9–64, and, most recently, Freudenburg (1993) 52–108.
35 For recent discussion of the Latin appropriation of this Greek tradition, with useful bibliography, see Freudenburg (1993).
36 See Resnick (1987).
37 For the connections between Theocritus, Philetas and Longus, see Bowie (1985).
38 Heath (1982).
39 See Parker (1992) and below pp. 74–5.
40 *Epid.* 6.3.14 in a bizarre example of the politics of anatomy suggests young men can bleed either on their first sexual encounter or when their voice breaks, an account which seems to want to parallel male and female experience, as Dean-Jones (1994) 53 notes. But this is a unique and isolated case, which does not predicate such bleeding as natural or as a sign of 'virginity'.
41 On Lycainion's characterization see Bretzigheimer (1988) 539–41. She also has good things to say on the relation between the Lycainion episode and the philosophical and novelistic interest in *sophrosune*.
42 This remark is taken from an unpublished draft of what became Zeitlin (1990).
43 Anderson (1982) 43.
44 Teske (1991) is the longest account of Longus' use of the word *phusis*.

45 Felman (1977) – a brilliant essay.

46 According to the *OED* and other lexica 'fancy-man' and 'fanny' seem much later usages. 'Tell me where is fancie bred . . .'

47 Turner might claim some support either from the use of ὁδοί for the passages that link parts of the body in the text of the Hippocratic corpus (though the combination of the verb ζητεῖν with ὁδούς is very commonly used for the 'search for method'); or from such figurative uses as [ps.-]Lucian's *Erot.* 27 ὁδοὺς ἀπολαυσέως (cf. *Erot.* 20).

48 Edmonds (1916) xx.

49 Edmonds (1916) xx.

50 In Winkler (1990). Jack opened up areas of the ancient world for me, as he did for many others. A first draft of part of this paper was read first at the Dartmouth International Conference on the Ancient Novel on a panel that was to have included Jack but ended up being dedicated to him . . .

51 (1990) 117.

52 Not always very convincingly. See most recently MacQueen (1990); also Kestner (1974); Philippides (1980).

53 (1990) 118.

54 (1990) 124.

55 (1990) 125. The text here is difficult. Winkler is translating Reeve's Teubner text, which I also follow here.

56 (1990) 122. Winkler doesn't usually try to outline what literary figures might or should have been thinking about . . .

57 (1990) 122.

58 The mangling and consumption of the female body by dogs (on the route to a closure in marriage) is a threat in Xenophon of Ephesus and a central plot device in Iamblichus' *Babyloniaca*, summarized in Photius (*Bibliotheca* 94), conveniently translated in Reardon (1989). In Homer, it is the warrior male body that is threatened by dogs.

59 (1968) II 111; Szepessy (1972) lists other poems of girls who died on their wedding-nights.

60 See the discussion of Sissa (1990) 113–23 (a version of Sissa (1984)).

61 Sissa (1990) 113. For exactly what is being denied, see now the discussion of Pinault (1992).

62 See now, however, Dean-Jones (1994) 159–60, who is interested in its medical implications.

63 T. Middleton, *The Changeling*, quoted as an epigraph by Tanner (1979).

64 This is well discussed, particularly from the legal viewpoint, by Cole (1984). The *locus classicus* of the argument is Lysias 1.

65 There is surprisingly (or unsurprisingly) little treatment of rape in

comedy . Most books include only 'love' in the index ... There are scattered comments in Konstan (1983) and (1994). Comedy's common redirection of rape into the ultimate marriage of the partners – for which there are good legal precedents (Cole (1984)) – is another example of the strategies for the acceptance of citizen power (violence) over the almost invariably silent victim. For one attempt to read Ovid's rapes, see Richlin (1992).

66 On the tragic wedding see e.g. Seaford (1987), which he has extended in Seaford (1990) and (1993); and Zeitlin (1989); on male pursuit and virgins see Sourvinou-Inwood (1991) 26–143.

67 Helene Foley *apud* Winkler (1990) 126.

68 As Pat Easterling suggested to me in a taxi, it might mean 'one example of the lesson ...', though it is not normally translated thus.

69 (1990) 126.

70 (1990) 2–3.

71 (1990) 114.

72 (1990) 3.

2 THE GAY SCIENCE

1 Foucault (1986) 189.

2 Foucault (1986) 192.

3 Boswell (1980) 125.

4 Boswell (1980) 85–6.

5 Foucault (1986) 229.

6 See Figuera and Nagy (1985), and more generally on the symposium Murray (1990), Slater (1991). For a fine study of Lucian's treatment of the symposium and the *Symposium*, see Branham (1989) 104–23.

7 On Thersites see Nagy (1979) 252–64, and Thalmann (1988).

8 Boswell (1980), (1982–3); Halperin (1990); Hexter (1991).

9 Halperin (1990) 24.

10 Henderson (1975) 160; Henderson (1987) 160 *ad loc.* is more circumspect.

11 Diogenes Laertius 6.46, surprisingly not attested by Henderson (1987) *ad* 672.

12 Hunter (1983) is an exemplary standard treatment here (and very useful, too).

13 The emendation was first proposed by Badham and is followed by England (1921), though not by Burnet in the Oxford Text. Hermann reads *ei kai*, and is followed by Taylor (1934). Dover's discussion of this passage (1978) 166 oddly – or enablingly – simply leaves out the last phrase.

14 Boswell (1980) 14.
15 Boswell (1980) 14.
16 Boswell (1980) 14. See also Vlastos (1973) 25 n. 76.
17 See e.g. *Symp.* 209aff, *Phaedrus* 275d-278b; *Republic* 490b; *Theaet.* 148e–151d; and on the 'midwifery', *maieusis*, of the mind, see Vlastos (1973) 3–42; Burnyeat (1977); Halperin (1990) 137–42; and on the erotics of argument itself, see the fine study of Halperin (1992).
18 Boswell (1980) 14.
19 England, demonstrating a telling difficulty in separating linguistic commentary and ideological interests, translates *ton proton* as 'prominently' since 'It is hard to see why this self-evident remark [that failure of control over lust is the cause of male–male sexual relations] should be made only about the first perpetrators of the enormity.' It is hard to follow the logic of the mythological exemplum with such a reading.
20 See e.g. *Phaedo* 84d8ff; *Phaedrus* 229e6 (with Ferrari (1987) 10–12), 265c8 (with Ferrari (1987) 63–7) or the introduction to the Sun, Line and Cave images in the *Republic* (506d6ff). On Plato and myth in general see Detienne (1981) 155–89; Ferrari (1987) 113–39; Nussbaum (1986) 130–2, 207–33.
21 The text here is difficult. See England *ad loc.*, and Vlastos (1973) 25 n. 76.
22 Boswell (1980) 13.
23 Cohen (1991) 188. On Cohen's general thesis, see Hindley (1991), replied to by Cohen (1991b).
24 An especially good discussion in Winkler (1990) 17–70.
25 So Judith Butler (1990), one of the most influential recent studies, ends with a radical hope expressed in the most traditional rhetoric, a hope of finding ways of (149) 'confounding the very binarism of sex, and exposing its fundamental unnaturalness. What other local strategies for engaging the "unnatural" might lead to the denaturalization of gender itself.'
26 See for bibliography and discussion Nussbaum (1986) 165–99; Halperin (1986), (1990) 19–22; Boswell (1980) 24.
27 Cohen (1991) 191.
28 Cohen (1991) 181.
29 Halperin (1990) 160, a remark based on Halperin (1986). Vlastos (1973) 22 n. 65 already argues for a reading of these phrases that excludes the necessary implication of sexual intercourse.
30 Analysed by Halperin (1990) 131–4; Ferrari (1987) 140–203, especially 175–84.
31 An excellent analysis in Winkler (1990) 44–70, whose general conclusions strongly influence mine here.
32 Cohen (1991) 198.

33 I've had my go at this problem in Goldhill (1991) 167–222, with further bibliography there.

34 See Vlastos (1973) 3–42; Gagarin (1977); Nussbaum (1979) (redrafted for Nussbaum (1986)); For an excellent recent discussion, with further bibliography, see Halperin (1992).

35 Cohen (1991) 191.

36 Irigaray (1985) 162.

37 Cohen (1991) 188.

38 Lloyd (1983) 35, his emphasis.

39 Lloyd (1983) 42.

40 See Winkler's detailed and fascinating study of *Problems* 4.26: Winkler (1990) 67–70.

41 Winkler (1990) 69.

42 The different versions – and further complexities – of these arguments are now magisterially studied by Sorabji (1994).

43 Not only philosophers and essayists. Soranus, the leading medical writer of the second century, in his discussion of the desirability of virginity, adduces the behaviour of animals to show how animals who have not been covered are stronger and longer-lived (*Gyn.* 1. 30–3.)

44 For a full range of the use of animals in late philosophy see Sorabji (1994).

45 Latin writing – *quid in ista revolvor?* – also appropriates this Greek discourse: see e.g. Ovid's Myrrha (*Met.* 10.293ff) with Feeney (1991) 195–7, to be contrasted with Iphis (*Met.* 9.726–34); Seneca, *Phaedra* 348–52 with Boyle (1987) 18–24. For further remarks on the relation between Roman and Greek writing, see below p. 133.

46 Winkler (1985).

47 See e.g. Lucian, *Vera Historia*; Theocritus (especially *Idyll* 7).

48 Quoted by Rohde (1914) 242, Hunter (1983) 51, Zeitlin (1990) 432 ... This single remark has to make do for the range of evidence brought to bear in a study such as Goulemot (1991), Marcus (1964), Radway (1984) or Thurston (1987).

49 For the sources on these exempla and the later authors who echo Achilles Tatius, see Rommel (1923). It is interesting that chapter 17 was imitated in its entirety by Nicetas (4.135–148) and Gregory of Nazianzus and other Christian writers have close parallels.

50 This is the first extant version of such a story for the magnet. Vilborg (1962) 35 assumes it is none the less taken from earlier erotic literature. Plato in the *Ion*, of course, famously uses the magnet as an image for the influence of a poet on his audience.

51 The sexing of palms goes back as far as Herodotus (1.193); Philostratus

(*Imagines* 1.9) describes a bridge of palms, formed by palms of different sexes, planted on either side of a river, but joined in love to make a natural causeway.

52 See Xenophon, *Mem* 1.3. for a good account of the kiss as a maddening bite like that of a spider.

53 Bartsch (1989).

54 John Henderson's favourite passage from way back ...

55 See the forthcoming work of Helen Lakka.

56 Bartsch (1989) 45.

57 Bartsch (1989) 49–50.

58 See Goldhill (1994) for discussion and bibliography on Hellenistic *ecphrasis*.

59 See e.g. Galinsky (1972) 101–25; Höistad (1948); Feeney (1986). The parodic discussion of Heracles also goes back at least as far as Aristophanes' *Clouds* 1050ff.

60 Euripides, *Hippolytus* 474–6; see Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* 6.

61 See Diogenes Laertius 5.43, 6.16, 7.36. This tradition is discussed by Parker (1992).

62 See Parker (1992). Ps.-Lucian, *Erotes* 28.

63 Clement, *Protreptikos* 53 P; Aeschrion 1 G–P (*AP* 7.450).

64 Alexis fr. 236.5 K–A, where they note that LSJ translate ποιητικούς as 'ingeniosos ac sollertes'.

65 Callimachus, *Epigram* 46 Pfeiffer (*AP* 12.150), which I have discussed in Goldhill (1986b) 41–4.

66 Bartsch (1989) 127.

67 Barthes (1975) 88.

68 Barthes (1975) 89.

69 Encomium of Helen 10. See also e.g. Lucian, *Vera Historia* 1.1. For *psuchagogia* and the theory of the Latin novel, see Laird (1993) 170–4.

70 Richlin (1983) 36 quotes this poem to show that 'the beauty of the anus is explicitly related to its sexual function', which rather short-circuits the oddities of this poem's view of female anatomy.

71 There is a very fine discussion of this in Dean-Jones (1992); see also the more general, and excellent, Hanson (1990). As Dean-Jones (1994) 157 notes of one of the rare passages that does consider female pleasure in intercourse, 'the description of female pleasure in *Genit.* 4 ... hardly shows an intimate knowledge of feminine experience'.

72 A much discussed topic, particularly with regard to Freud. See e.g. Walkowitz (1980); Showalter (1985); Helsinger, Sheets and Veeder (1983) 56–108; Nead (1988); Mort (1987).

73 There is insufficient discussion of the motive force of rape in ancient

comedy (see above pp. 165–6), but see from a more general perspective Higgins and Silver (1991) and Tomaselli and Porter (1986); Armstrong and Tennenhouse (1989); Kappeler (1986) is a central and overused model for Richlin (1992).

74 Phillips (1992) 95.

75 Phillips (1992) 100.

76 Goulemot (1991). The great title of his study – *Ces Livres qu'on ne lit que d'une main* – is taken from Rousseau.

77 On Hesiod, see e.g. Loraux (1981) 75–117; Zeitlin (forthcoming). The way a woman is fabricated is central to the Pygmalion story: see Downing (1990); Elsner (1991).

78 I have changed his rendition of *antitupei*, however, from 'compete on equal terms' to 'are firm in response' to stress the physicality of *antitupei*, 'strike against', 'repel' ('especially of a hard body' *LSJ*).

79 Anderson (1982) 25. For a good and detailed acount of how Lucian adopts and adapts Plato, see Branham (1989) 67–123.

80 Bartsch (1989) 174.

81 Bartsch (1989) 155.

82 (1986) 228.

83 Anderson (1982) 32.

84 Vilborg (1962) 12.

85 Branham (1989) 56. His description (7) of Lucian as a 'serio-comic sophist who engages his audience in a playful reappraisal of the contemporary value of its celebrated cultural past', is applicable to at least one strand of the writing of Achilles Tatius also.

86 (1986) 228.

87 Vilborg (1962) 11.

88 Scurrilous stories about Pericles and Aspasia are recorded in Athenaeus 13 589e–f, and go back not only to comedy, but also to Plato's *Menexenus*, where Aspasia as a teacher of rhetoric is said to teach Socrates his parodic Funeral Oration.

89 A strategy well analysed for late rhetorical schooling by Russell (1983) 32–3, 45–51, 123–8.

90 For Phyllis, the prostitute who forced a lustful Aristotle to carry her on his back, see Stammler (1937) 1028–40, and the cover of the paperback edition of this book. This debate may be echoed in a versified expenses list of Crates the Cynic philosopher, which suggests in its last line 'a talent for a whore and three obols for a philosopher' (Diogenes Laertius 6.86); cf. Philostratus, *Epist.* 44 for a further juxtaposition of philosophers and whores.

91 See Philostratus, *Epist.* 63.

92 The same pun on *ho meros*, 'thigh', and *Homeros*, 'Homer', is used by Crates (with the adjective *homerikos*), *AP* 11.218.

93 Foucault (1986) 232.

94 Dörrie (1938). The testimonia on Achilles Tatius' life are conveniently collected in Vilborg (1955) 163–8.

95 This phrase is taken from the introduction to the Loeb of Gaselee/Warmington (1968), which agrees with Photius whole-heartedly (xi): 'the lesson of the main plot ... is, undoubtedly, considered as a whole, a panegyric of chastity'.

96 Testimonia again in Vilborg (1955) 163–8.

97 This word, it will be recalled, was used of Daphnis' state of arousal in *Daphnis and Chloe* 3.18.

98 On this statue and its description, see Elsner (1991).

99 This story is also recorded by Valerius Maximus 8.11.4; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* 7.127; Lucian, *Eikones* 4; but this is the longest account. From Samos there is a similar story – except that the man fails to consummate his passion with the statue and reverts to a piece of uncooked sacrificial meat instead, which cries out for a structuralist analysis along raw/cooked lines. See Athenaeus 13 605f4–10, and the nice analysis of its place in Athenaeus by Henry (1992).

100 There is a witty attempt to link this debate to modern discussions of 'object-choice' in Halperin (1994).

101 Foucault (1986) 215–16.

102 Well traced by Branham, particularly in the *Demonax*. See Branham (1989) especially 57–63.

103 This aspect of the dialogue is also well analysed by Foucault (1986) 218–27.

3 HOW LIKE A WOMAN

1 On Augustus' legislation and its social implications see for good examples from a much discussed issue: Humbert (1972) 138–80; Richlin (1981); Wallace-Hadrill (1981); Gardner (1986) 31–96; Rawson (1986) especially 26–31; Treggiari (1991); and most recently Edwards (1993) 34–62.

2 The most telling account of this is Brown (1988) with plenty of further bibliography.

3 With, of course, some exceptions. I have learnt in particular from Hopkins (1965); Saller and Shaw (1984); Shaw (1987); Hopkins and Burton (1983) (an earlier period but a piece with important and continuing implications); Champlin (1991), and the works cited in n. 1.

4 For the 'erotic *pharmakon*', see Goldhill (1986b) and (1991) 246–61.

5 See the celebrated opening of Sappho fr. 16 'Some say an army of horsemen is best (*kalliston*), others an army of footsoldiers, others of ships; but I whatever someone desires (*eratai*).'

6 Dioscorides writes around the end of the third century BCE according to the traditional understanding of negligible evidence (see Gow and Page (1965) II 235–6); Argentarius around the beginning of the first century CE.

7 'Swell' is my attempt to capture the double sense of *kuma* as both 'wave' and 'embryo' (i.e. = *kuēma*). The imagery of sea-faring for sex is common and both *eresso*, 'to row' and *saleuo*, 'to ride at anchor', 'be tossed at sea', have sexual connotations elsewhere: see e.g. Dioscorides 5.6 G–P, *AP* 5.55.6 (*amphisaleuo*); Archilochus 41 West (a scholion to Aratus); rowing is more common: Meleager 60.2 G–P, *AP* 5.204.2; *AP* 9.416.7; Plato Comicus 3.4.

8 See *Anthologia Planudea* 4.134 (G–P 128) where Meleager uses it to distinguish between Niobe's male children, killed first by Apollo, and her female children killed shortly after by Artemis. This Dioscorides passage seems to be the only occasion in extant literature that the term is used in a specifically sexual context.

9 See e.g. Augustine, *City of God* 1.18 where an *obstetrix* is said to damage the 'integrity' but not the 'sanctity' of a body 'whether by testing, or malevolence or inexperience or chance' – a range of choices that suggests a wide variety of possible scenarios. Cf. John Chrysostom, *PG* 47.516. Earlier evidence is complicated. Rousselle (1988) 25 follows Bourgey (1953) 17 n. 6 in suggesting that doctors themselves scarcely ever conducted vaginal examinations, and that information came from midwives and women themselves. Manuli (1980) finds more evidence for doctors' examinations. Lloyd (1983) 62–86 gives a characteristically nuanced and full picture.

10 *Protoevangelium of James* 19–20, discussed in this way by Clark (1993) 75.

11 φιλοσόφων ἦν τὸ πειρατήριον; A similar question is amusingly put in the mouth of a pirate in Chariton's novel *Chaereas and Callirhoe* discussed below: When one pirate suggests returning the captured heroine to her family, another retorts 'Idiot, are you commanding us to be philosophers (*philosophein*)?' (1.10.4).

12 On ancient ideas of menstruation see King (1983); Dean-Jones (1989); and on the pollution of menstruation, see von Staden (1992) 14, and Dean-Jones (1994) 234–40.

13 Heraiskos, a holy philosopher of the fifth century CE, was said (in the

Souda) to get a headache if he heard a menstruating woman speak, so sensitive was he to the possibilities of female pollution. See Clark (1993) 77 for the story; Bowersock (1990) 60 for Heraiskos in context. This story reflects the changing and intensifying Christian attitudes to the body traced by Peter Brown (1988).

14 See above p. 71.

15 On the scopophilia of these scenes, see Elsom (1992) and Lakka (forthcoming).

16 Morgan (1989) 320.

17 See e.g. *Iliad* 3 with Lynn-George (1988) 27–37; *Odyssey* 4, with Bergren (1981) and Goldhill (1988); Sappho fr. 16 with du Bois (1978); Most (1981); Winkler (1990) ch. 5; Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* with Segal (1962); Euripides, *Helen* with Segal (1971); *Troades* with Croally (1994). Suzuki (1989) is less useful.

18 See Armstrong and Hanson (1986) 97–100.

19 Plutarch, *Amatorius* 767b, quoted and discussed below p. 156.

20 The evidence is conveniently assembled and discussed by Herter (1960).

21 About 460 CE; see *Codex Justinianus* 11.41.7. Mary Magdalen is the first in a series of Christian stories of reformed prostitutes, and even empresses with shady pasts: for a particularly famous example, see Procopius, *Secret History* 9.1–30, with Cameron (1986) 66–83 and Fisher (1978); Beaucamp (1990) 121–32.

22 Convenient primary and secondary references with discussion in Edwards (1993) 186–90.

23 Aeschines, *In Timarchum* is the *locus classicus* for this law in action; discussed well by Dover (1978); Winkler (1990) 56–64; Halperin (1990) 88–112 with further relevant bibliography.

24 See e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.11 – where the danger of (even) kissing a beautiful boy is that it leads to '*many* expenses on *damaging* pleasures'.

25 The text is to be found in Thesleff (1961), though translations are harder to come across: I have not been able to see Guthrie (1919); Taylor (1822) is partial. Its provenance is quite unclear, as is the case for all the Neo-Pythagorean forgeries collected by Thesleff. The circulation of these texts is also unclear, and the Neo-Pythagoreans never became a major force in the philosophical schools of Hellenistic Greece, though Balch (1981) attempts to draw links between the Neo-Pythagoreans and Christian writers. On the existence and work of female philosophers in Alexandria, see Pomeroy (1977) and (1984) 61–72. Cole (1981) 229 suggests that these are male forgeries in the name of famous women of the past; Pomeroy (1984) 64–5 that they are the works of Alexandrian Neo-Pythagorean women named after famous Pythagoreans of the past.

Treggiari (1991) 193 suggests that 'sermons on wifely duty would have more impact' if written under a woman's name. Pomeroy (1984) 67 calls such an argument 'hypercritical'.

26 Perictione is the name of the mother of Plato. Text in Thesleff (1961) 142–4; translation in Pomeroy (1984) 68–70. There are very similar sentiments in Melissa's *Letter to Kleareta* (Thesleff (1961) 115–16).

27 καὶ μὴ ζηλοτυπέειν, translated by Levin in Pomeroy (1984) 70 as 'and not emulate men'. The letter of Theano already quoted – ἤκουον ... ὅτι ζηλοτυπέεις αὐτόν ... μὴ σύ γε – and such passages as Plutarch, *Rom. Quaest.* 267d, ζηλοτυπήσασα δούλην ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνδρί, 'she became jealous of a slave on her husband's account', suggest that the commonplace of a woman's compliance is foregrounded rather than a desire to be like men in committing adultery. The plot of Iamblichus' *Babyloniaca* depends on the destructive force of female jealousy.

28 *Atimoi* implies not only a lack of honour in a general sense, but also a specific lack of civic status that prostitutes have and any citizen convicted of prostitution would suffer (in at least the fifth century). It is contrasted with *entimoi*, 'of worth and status', 'enfranchised', in the next phrase.

29 It is a position adopted elsewhere too, of course, in the comic tradition as well: see Hunter (1983b) 153–4 *ad* 67.

30 It would, for example, be interesting to know the background of the judgement of *Cod. Theod.* 15.8.1 which states that only Christians can buy out Christian prostitutes.

31 On the date, see Perry (1967) 96–8. It was believed through most of the nineteenth century by most scholars that Chariton was very late; papyrus finds have now dated it to before about 160 CE.

32 Fantham (1986) argues that *zelotupia* from the fifth century to Hellenistic culture is a violent emotion quite out of place in Greek marriage, though a commonplace in erotic liaisons. This helps stress the strangeness of Chaereas' response here, the way Callirhoe is made always the object of violent erotic feelings.

33 ἀσπάσιοι λέκτροιο παλαίου θεσμὸν ἵκοντο. For evidence, bibliography and discussion of this complex issue, see Goldhill (1988) 26, and the useful summary in Russo, Fernandez-Galiano and Heubeck *ad* 23.297–24.348.

34 Not that this means Penelope is a simple figure or that the gender discourse of the *Odyssey* is without its own paradoxes and tensions, see Katz (1991); Goldhill (1993).

35 Callirhoe, as she debates whether to kill herself and her unborn baby, promises herself that the child will be easily recognized because she is

sure he will look just like his father: the stamp of legitimacy with which Telemachus is recognized in the *Odyssey* by Helen and Nestor.

36 κοῦφος, the word I have translated 'facile', implies 'light', 'easy', but also 'vain', 'fickle'.

37 Foucault (1986) 229.

38 Konstan (1989).

39 Perry (1967) 130.

40 Wiersma (1990) 119.

41 Foucault (1986) is most influential, but see also Konstan (1994b), which develops Foucault's argument furthest; Williams (1958); Manning (1973); Veyne (1978); Treggiari (1991) 229–61. Cameron (1986) is a useful critique of this overall scheme.

42 See in particular Humbert (1972) 31–56, who notes also (179): 'le remariage est un phénomène très fréquent à tous les échelons de la société'; more speculative is Treggiari (1991) 229–62.

43 Vogt (1960) 42 is typical when he writes 'Hier [in Musonius] ist die ethische Gleichwertigkeit der Geschlechter mit allen Konsequenzen anerkannt.' He is quoted with approval and followed by Crouch (1972) 107–8, though Balch (1981) 144 sees this as going too far.

44 Plutarch had also read Musonius whom he quotes by name at 453d and 830b, though Russell (1973) 91 writes 'Plutarch is unlikely to have been influenced by Musonius [on marriage], although he quotes remarks of his once or twice in different contexts ... in fact, he differs from him considerably.' I would prefer thus to see Musonius as one of the writers Plutarch is responding to.

45 See especially van Geytenbeek (1963); Lutz (1947). Also Benabou (1987); Babut (1963); Manning (1973). For Musonius and Christian writing see Balch (1981) esp. 143–4.

46 See Jones (1978) 12–13.

47 See van Geytenbeek (1963). Schofield (1991) 119–27 is an important new discussion of Stoics and marriage. For the tradition of writing on marriage see Vatin (1970) 17–56; Balch (1981); Treggiari (1991) 183–228.

48 I am indebted in what follows to the fine study of Malcolm Schofield (1991) especially chapter 2, 'The City of Love'.

49 Schofield (1991) 28.

50 Schofield (1991) 44–5. The Zeno passage is quoted from Sextus Empiricus *PH* 3.245, Schofield's translation. Zeno, according to Antigonus of Carystus, quoted in Athenaeus (563e), 'never consorted with a woman, but always with boy-friends', which is why Stoics are 'oglers of boys'. So the Cynic Cercidas describes *eros Zanonikos*, Zenonian desire, as 'male for male', *P. Oxy.* 1082 fr. 4.13–14. Schofield, however, concludes

that 'Zeno's treatment of love was not exclusively homosexual' (45 n. 39) and that 'Zeno's city was no more a male club than was Plato's' – perhaps a double-edged conclusion ...

51 Van Geytenbeek (1963) 73, who compares other restrictions on sexual activity in the philosophical tradition. He does not note, however, the rebarbative Occelus Lucanus, a Neo-Pythagorean of perhaps the first century BCE, who writes, (Thesleff (1961) 135) in his *On the Nature of the All* 44–5 that 'intercourse is not for pleasure, but for engendering ... Therefore one must look at this one thing first that sex is not for pleasure': it is rather (46) 'necessary and noble (*kalon*)' because it is for the 'immortality of the species'. Further restrictions in 52–7. Musonius – at the very centre of Graeco-Roman culture – remains, however, exceptional.

52 This point is not, of course, challenged by the first-century CE *senatus-consultum Claudianum* which allowed a free woman to cohabit with a slave with the master's permission. The children became slaves. If the master's consent was not obtained, the woman became a slave also. This law was probably passed with an eye on the great wealth and influence of some of the servants of the imperial household. Bishop Callistus of Rome surprisingly did not denounce such liaisons as fornication even though they were not marriages. See Clark (1992) 34–5 for continuing reactions to this problem.

53 The *locus classicus* is Juvenal 6 (with J. G. Henderson (1989)). See also e.g. Herodas, *Mime* 5; Aristophanes, *Thesmo.* 491; Martial 12. 58.

54 See e.g. Heliodorus 5.4.5 where Theagenes easily controls his desire and does not *andrizesthai* with Charicleia; and Achilles Tatius 4.1 where Cleitophon also desires *andrizesthai* with Leucippe, but is put off by her dream of Artemis.

55 Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 11. See Zeitlin (1978); Goldhill (1986) 29–31, 51–6, 151–4.

56 Hipparchia (according to Diogenes Laertius 6.96) dressed and acted like her master and, eventually, sexual partner, Crates the Cynic, even to the point of wearing the same ragged clothes and going to symposia. Cf. Thecla and Paul, where the assumption of a transgressive sexual relation is inevitably made by her family because of Thecla's imitative behaviour.

57 Hanson (1992) 44.

58 Again, van Geytenbeek does not note a Neo-Pythagorean writer, who goes under the name of Perictione, Plato's mother. In her *On the Harmony of Woman* she begins by requiring a woman 'to be wise in her soul with regard to virtue, so that she will be just and manly (*andrēiē*) and thoughtful and beautified by self-sufficiency and despising of empty

opinion'. 'Beautified by self-sufficiency', αὐταρκείῃ καλλυνομένη, with its paradoxical mix of traditional female ideals of 'beautification' and male (political and philosophical) ideals of 'self-sufficiency', shows the explicitly challenging gender manipulation in this sentence.

59 Lakoff (1975).

60 Sedgwick (1983) 119.

61 Most explicitly, Philodemus (*On Vices and Corresponding Virtues* 9) criticizes Xenophon, and Cicero is said to have translated the *Oikonomikos* in his youth. See also Tatum (1989) 3–66 for an excellent discussion of Xenophon in his tradition.

62 Foucault (1985) 152–65 dedicates a whole chapter to analysing the economics of the marital arrangements where 'the husband's wisdom ... was always ready to acknowledge the wife's privileges' and 'the wife ... must in return exercise her function in the house ... in the best possible way'. Chantraine (1949) 8 calls Ischomachus' words 'charmantes par leur autorité débonnaire et leur gentillesse'. Harvey (1984) 70, for reasons we will see, calls him 'paternalistic, priggish and pompous'.

63 Murnaghan (1988) 12.

64 Murnaghan (1988) 10.

65 Murnaghan is building here on a perceptive remark of Sally Humphreys (1983) 44.

66 Murnaghan (1988) 13–14.

67 A good example of how the only women named in Athenian court are those who are transgressive and/or to be insulted: see Schaps (1977).

68 MacDowell, 152 ad 124 writes cautiously that 'Chrysilla may be the wife who appears in X[enophon]', but 'we cannot be certain this is Chrysilla since there is no proof that Ischomachus was married only once'. Davies (1971) 264–9, however, with a wide range of testimonia, concludes that beyond all reasonable doubt it is the same woman. Anderson (1974) 174 first unhappily suggests Xenophon could not have known the stories; second, that it just *can't* be the same family!

69 The most persuasive account of What Happened is to be found in Davies (1971) 264–9.

70 Lysias 19.49 tells us Ischomachus had only a fraction of his rumoured fortune when he died, a remark which may be the basis of Athenaeus' question (12 537c): 'Who destroyed the wealth of Ischomachus?'. Aratus (quoted in Athenaeus 6 237a) gives the answer as parasites.

71 Harvey (1984) 69–70. This article stresses the later history of Chrysilla, but has only these quoted remarks by way of analysis of its impact on the *Oikonomikos*.

72 MacKenzie (1985) 95. Treggiari (1991) 187 tries without argument to

have things both ways, noting the 'piquant [*sic*] recent work on [Chrysilla's] identity' while maintaining that 'Xenophon is far more generous to the dignity of the married woman than most classical theorists'. Most recently Pomeroy (1994) 261–4 no less awkwardly suggests that Xenophon 'expresses nostalgia for the days when Athens was prosperous' – and, presumably, when wives were proper.

73 Murnaghan (1988) 12.

74 There is no secure dating for the dialogue. Plutarch died around 120 CE in his seventies.

75 The same joke occurs in Achilles Tatius 1.1–2. For the use of the *Phaedrus* in Second Sophistic writing see Trapp (1990) and Hunter (forthcoming) 7–8.

76 See Goessler (1962); Babut (1963) 108–12; Wicker (1975); Balch (1981) 143–9; Martin (1984); Stadter (1965) 7 writes paradigmatically 'Plutarch's exaltation of women and of conjugal love is unique in classical Greek literature'. Le Corsu (1981) 274 concludes, however, 'Pour notre moraliste, la femme idéale est l'épouse soumise, menant une vie discrète et digne, toute de dévouement à son mari, sans tapage et sans luxe', which sounds less revolutionary altogether.

77 Foucault (1986) 209.

78 Foucault (1986) 210.

79 Foucault (1986) 198.

80 Foucault (1986) 198.

81 Foucault (1986) 198.

82 See Babut (1969) 108–12; Martin (1978); Martin (1984); Brenk (1988), with good further bibliography; Cooper (1992).

83 For the association of fish and hetairas in Greek thought, see Davidson (1993) who writes (64): 'The practice of comparing women to fish and vice versa seems to have been rather general in Athenian society in which flute-girls and hetaeras were apparently given nick-names like "Antherine", "Red Mullet", or "Cuttlefish" ... the two things are paired together so often, not, as we might have suspected, by accident, nor because these are the "two chief objects of Athenian extravagance", as Becker commented, but because somehow they implicate the subject in the same desires.' The quotation from Becker is from *Charicles*, Eng. trans. (London, 1874) 324.

84 Indeed, later in the dialogue (767f), Laïs is used as the example of a 'much celebrated and much loved' woman, who incited all Greece with passion, and even when she tried to withdraw from the public gaze because she had fallen in love with Hippolochus of Thessaly, she was stoned to death by jealous women.

85 Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.* 8. 10. 5 (1161a1–4) describes the occasional cases where heiresses rule their husbands ('not by virtue (*arete*) but by wealth and power') as analogous to oligarchies.
86 *Odyssey* 6.180–5, quoted in part later in the dialogue (770a).
87 Foucault (1986) 197.
88 Cooper (1992): for the many Christian arguments about why it is terrible if a woman is *not* submissive to a man, see e.g. Crouch (1972); Martin (1978); Balch (1981).
89 Foucault (1986) 199.
90 On the sense of *epipēdēsis* see Csapo (1993) 18–19.
91 Foucault (1986) 203.
92 Foucault (1986) 210.
93 Cooper (1992) 154.
94 Brenk (1988) 469.
95 Brenk (1988) 471.

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